The Supreme Court has issued an unambiguous warning by flagging the siphoning off of more than Rs 52,000 crore through digital fraud between April 2021 and November 2025. It has asked the Reserve Bank of India and the Union ministry of home affairs to take steps to effectively address such crimes within a month. Data reveal the magnitude of the threat. Over 39,000 cases of digital arrest fraud and related cybercrimes were reported in 2022. In 2024, that figure crossed 1.23 lakh, with losses of nearly Rs 1,936 crore reported in that year alone. These estimates are conservative as many victims do not report fraud due to fear or embarrassment. The reasons for the surge are easily identifiable. India’s digital payments ecosystem has expanded rapidly. However, monitoring mechanisms have not kept pace. Fraudsters thus get away by impersonating police officers, court officials, or regulatory authorities and invoking fabricated charges. Limited digital literacy, particularly among senior citizens, and an ingrained fear of official authority make such tactics effective. At the institutional level, coordination among banks, telecom service providers and local cybercrime units is patchy. Cross-border scam operations further complicate enforcement.
India has a statutory framework to combat such offences. The Information Technology Act, 2000, provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, and rules framed under telecom and banking regulations provide legal tools. The RBI has also issued a standard operating procedure when suspicious transactions are detected; it has also proposed to compensate victims of small-value fraud up to Rs 25,000. Yet significant loopholes remain. For instance, as the apex court pointed out, the definition of “suspicious transaction” is not sufficiently dynamic or customer-specific. Banks are not uniformly mandated to deploy advanced Artificial Intelligence capable of flagging deviations from established spending patterns. Inter-agency data sharing remains fragmented. Compensation schemes exclude larger losses, leaving many victims without relief. Awareness campaigns are intermittent and lack targeted communication in regional languages. The RBI must move beyond advisories and impose binding, technology-based standards for real-time fraud detection tailored to individual account behaviour. The home ministry must establish a single, national coordination grid integrating banks, telecom operators and cybercrime units. Public education is equally essential. Digital literacy initiatives should include practical demonstrations of common scam techniques. The Supreme Court has articulated the urgency. Regulatory oversight, technological enforcement and sustained public awareness must now follow.
