Historical archives, when they are opened for researchers, sometimes throw up startling revelations. More often they confirm existing ideas and conclusions. The best example of this is the opening up of the KGB archives in Russia after the collapse of communism. The records kept there have only added details to the sordid story of V.I. Lenin and Josef Stalin?s tyranny. They have not dramatically altered the understanding of the communist regime. Similarly, the documents of the British war cabinet from 1942 do not add in any substantive way to the existing knowledge about Winston Churchill?s attitude to Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. The Indian media have unnecessarily exaggerated the importance of these documents. The media have treated it as a kind of revelation, whereas what they reveal is totally consistent with the known facts about Churchill?s views on Gandhi.

According to the records that have been opened, Churchill wrote thus to the then Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow: ?I would keep him [Gandhi] there [imprisoned in Aga Khan?s palace] and let him do as he likes. But if you are going to let him out because he strikes, then let him out now.? Churchill was thus unwilling to succumb to the pressure that would ensue once Gandhi went on hunger strike. Churchill always believed that Gandhi?s modes of protest ? hunger strikes, boycott, civil disobedience ? were all forms of political blackmail. He wanted the administration in India to call Gandhi?s bluff. The year 1942 was particularly tense for Churchill and the British Indian administration. India was critical for the war effort, but the Congress leadership was unwilling to cooperate in it ? unless there was a guarantee that India would be granted self-rule once the war ended. Churchill, as prime minister, was not favourably inclined to providing any such guarantees. The British Empire lay deep in his heart and he believed, rightly, that relinquishing India would be synonymous to the liquidation of the empire.

Churchill?s memo on Gandhi should be read in this context. Despite Churchill?s reluctance and pride, there was an offer from the British government for a negotiated transfer of power in India. Both the Cripps Mission and the Cabinet Mission came out to India to try and thrash out some sort of agreement between the government and the various Indian interest groups. Gandhi had, by 1946-47, when the process of independence came to be worked out, become a marginalized figure in Congress politics. By a strange twist, his critic and foe, Churchill too had been forced to move out of the limelight. Out of power, Churchill could only watch his great rival, Clement Attlee, play the endgame of empire. Britain?s escape from empire and India?s accession to independence were remarkable because both the knight of empire, Churchill, and the mastermind of swaraj, Gandhi, had nothing to do with the redrawing of the map of India and of the British Empire.