|
|
Secularism is usually understood to mean a separation of religion from the State. But while this definition is useful, it does not take us very far. What, for instance, is ‘separation’ supposed to mean? Does it mean ‘equidistance’ of the State from all religions? Does it mean non-interference by the State in religious matters, and vice versa? Does it mean an effort on the part of the State to ensure the ‘coexistence’ of all religions? Or does it mean the active promotion on the part of the State of a non-religious attitude among the people?
The philosopher, Akeel Bilgrami, gives a definition that carries us somewhat further in understanding secularism. This states: “Should we be living in a religiously plural society, secularism requires that all religions should have the privilege of free exercise and be even-handedly treated, except when a religion’s practices are inconsistent with the ideals that a polity seeks to achieve (ideals often, though not always, enshrined in stated fundamental rights and Constitutional commitments), in which case there is a lexical ordering in which the political ideals are placed first” (emphasis added). This definition, which applies equally to societies that are not multi-religious, explicates ‘separation’ between religion and the State by emphasizing both religious freedom and a lexical priority for political ideals.
This dichotomy between the political and the religious, however, raises a crucial question: what can be the foundation for ethical conduct in the realm of the political? Religion is commonly seen as providing the basis for ethical conduct in society, and if religion is not to intrude into the sphere called the political, then it cannot possibly be seen as providing the basis for the ethical conduct of human beings in so far as they are engaged in that sphere, that is, in their role as citizens.
To say that the basis of ethical conduct of human beings qua citizens is some transcendental ethics independent of religion is simply to bring in religion through the back door: this transcendental ethics will then simply constitute another religion. Hence the basis for ethical conduct among citizens must be found elsewhere, and this can only be in the quest for human freedom.
Human beings engaged in the quest for freedom act ‘ethically’ because they see analytically that any other mode of action will undermine their quest for freedom. Ethical conduct, in other words, has analytical, as distinct from ethical, roots. Karl Marx had once said that a nation that oppresses another cannot be free; much the same can be demonstrated to be true for a person as well, in which case the reason I do not oppress you, or strive to oppress you, is because I see analytically that it diminishes me instead of permitting me to realize my potential, that it undermines my quest for freedom.
The emergence of the domain of the secular, where there are political ideals that have lexical priority over religious practices, presupposes, therefore, the awakening among the people of a quest for freedom in this life as distinct from a quest for salvation after this life which is what religion promises. The dichotomy between the religious and secular domains is rooted, therefore, in the basic difference between these two very distinct kinds of quest.
The quest for freedom in this life, and hence the struggle against the constraints that come in the way of the realization of freedom, for an individual, is typically collectively undertaken, since these constraints cannot be overcome by individuals acting on their own. While such collective struggles against oppression, which ipso facto are struggles for freedom, have characterized the whole of human history, an obvious instance being the uprising of slaves in ancient Rome led by Spartacus, the conscious formulation of the theoretical proposition that human beings through their collective action can become masters of their own destiny, which underlies the quest for freedom, is of recent vintage, essentially from the time of the English and the French Revolutions. Secularism which is based upon this premise, therefore, is essentially a modern phenomenon, even though there may have been many earlier anticipations of it and kindred formulations of it.
It follows then that the emergence of the domain of the secular is associated with the coming into being of a new ‘community’, a collective of individuals united by their common struggle for freedom in the place of the old community or communities of individuals united by a common religion, not necessarily supplanting it, but certainly superimposed upon it. This new ‘community’, to be sure, is not a frozen thing, its character and constituents fixed forever; on the contrary, these constituents and the relations between them keep changing over time in ways and for reasons that we need not go into here (having to do with class relations), but through it all there is a stream of collective struggle.
Secularism, it follows, faces threats of two very distinct kinds: the first, which is obvious and needs little elaboration is through the intrusion of religion into the domain of the secular, through the upsetting of the lexical priority for political ideals defined independently of religion. Movements to establish the Hindu rashtra in India, or an Islamic State in some Middle Eastern countries, are examples of this obvious threat, which undermine ipso facto the quest for human freedom.
There is, however, a second, more subtle but no less insidious, threat to secularism, and this comes from the persistent effort of bourgeois society to break up all emerging collectives engaged in the struggle for freedom, to undermine the basis of all collective struggle, and to transform the new ‘community’ into a set of atomized individuals alienated from one another. The irony here is that to the extent that the bourgeois order is successful in breaking up society into a set of atomized individuals, each supposedly engaged in pursuing individual self-interest, it undermines not only the quest for human freedom, but also the foundations of a secular polity, which the bourgeois order itself swears by.
To avoid misunderstanding I should clarify that the need for the development of the individual is not being questioned here. But the individual can develop, can come into his or her own in the sense of realizing his or her potential, only through struggles along with other individuals, as part of a collective. The destruction of collective endeavour, making for a retreat of the individual into an isolated world of private existence, is simultaneously, therefore, a crippling of the individual. The apotheosis of the individual at the expense of the collective by the bourgeois order, therefore, is simultaneously a crippling of the individual too. And to the extent that it succeeds, it constitutes a threat to secularism as well.
This is so for two obvious reasons: first, individuals, thwarted in their collective endeavour in the domain of the secular, retreat, not just into an isolated world of private existence, but also into their religious communities. The foundation of a secular polity which consists of the emergence of a new community superimposed upon the pre-existing religious communities thus gets undermined. Secondly, since such thwarting also facilitates the suppression of rights and the intensification of economic oppression, it smashes dreams of greater freedom in this life and forces upon people, as the only dream to cling on to, the hope of salvation in a life after this one.
The struggle for secularism, it follows, is not separate from the struggle for a just society, for social justice and economic rights. Secularism, based on a dichotomy between religion and the polity, appears prima facie to be concerned with keeping religion from encroaching upon the polity, whence the need for according lexical priority to the polity; but it is concerned not just negatively with preventing such encroachment but more positively with the strengthening of the polity itself, by strengthening collective endeavour for social justice and economic rights. Secularism therefore is not just concerned with religion; it is inseparable from the whole gamut of struggles for social justice and economic rights.
Those who value secularism must therefore value this entire gamut of struggles. The defence and strengthening of secularism are effected through a strengthening of all these struggles. The very act of people engaging collectively in these struggles ipso facto strengthens secularism; and to the extent that tangible gains are made as a result of these struggles, it only creates an even stronger base for further struggles of this kind and hence provides even firmer roots for secularism.
