It can be a matter of little satisfaction for the people of Pakistan that General Pervez Musharraf has not declared himself president for life. Other dictators, like Nkrumah of Ghana and Sukarno of Indonesia, before him did not hesitate to do so. However, General Musharraf is going to be there for a long time. From October, when he would have completed three years in office, he would get another five-year term thanks to the April 30 referendum. He has also said that he proposes to bring a constitutional amendment to reduce the life of the national assembly from five to four years. He clearly intends to oversee not only the October elections but also the next assembly elections as president. He would then get another five-year term from that national assembly. All together, it would be a fair guess that the general intends to stay on for at least 13 years. General Musharraf's continuing in office, however, is unlikely to bring immediate stability to Pakistan. At least five trends seem clear as of now: political divisions in Pakistan are likely to increase; the October elections may not be free and fair; the emergent parliament would be fragmented; the president's powers would increase and the provincial assemblies may come into conflict with the local self-government bodies. The run-up to the October elections is likely to divide Pakistani society sharply - between those who support the general and those who don't. It is already clear that General Musharraf will not allow Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to contest. However, he cannot prevent their partymen from contesting, entering into electoral adjustments or forming alliances with other political parties. The broad contours of such arrangements have begun to emerge. The religious parties have joined hands with the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy. Even human rights activists, the Pakistan Oppressed Nationalities Movement and the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists are supporting the ARD. For the first time in Pakistan's history, the centrist, the right as well as the left forces are ranged against General Musharraf. Once the ban on political activity is lifted, as is scheduled to happen in July, political debate in the country will pick up momentum and polarize people. The ground rules for the October elections to the national and provincial assemblies are a major source of anxiety for the political parties. General Musharraf has announced that the same method of polling as in the recent referendum would be used in October. This is not a good omen. It not only implies that there will be polling booths aplenty, conveniently located at places of work, petrol pumps and hotel lobbies. But it may also mean that the same corruption, misuse of government machinery and electoral malpractice which were witnessed during the referendum may be repeated. In the April 30 referendum, there was virtually no secret voting, no voters' lists, no polling agents, no attempt to restrict multiple voting and no transparent counting. At this rate, the October election could be as much of a farce as the referendum. The election is also unlikely to throw up clear winners. There are no charismatic political leaders who can move the electorate in General Musharraf's favour. He does not have any politician of the stature of Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif in his camp. And none of the political parties supporting him can get a majority in the national assembly. The Pakistan Muslim League (Qaid-e-Azam), which has been created by General Musharraf by splitting the Pakistan Muslim League, does not have a clear leader. Everyone in that party is a prime ministerial candidate. If there is no rigging, the PML(Q) cannot get a majority. The other parties supporting General Musharraf are also not electoral heavyweights. Imran Khan's Tehreeq-e-Insaf party is not seen as a big election winner. The Millat Party of the former president, Farooq Leghari, can help him win only his tribal seat. The influence of the Awami National Party is limited to the North-West Frontier Province, and that of the Baluchistan National Party to Baluchistan. On the other hand, the Muttahida Quami Movement has considerable influence not only in Karachi, but also in Hyderabad (Sindh) and in parts of Sakkar and Mirpurkhas. But the MQM does not seem to know where it stands - it supported General Musharraf in the run-up to the referendum but boycotted the polling. It may, however, still go with General Musharraf. The Pakistan Peoples' Party and the PML are the only parties with widespread support and they are opposed to the general. While the PPP's support base is concentrated in Sindh and in rural Punjab, the PML has influence in the urban areas of Punjab. The PML led by Nawaz Sharif was created by the army in Punjab at one time to counter the PPP. But today, the PML (Nawaz) is opposed to the army's rule. Punjab accounts for half the seats in the national assembly. And there is no political party in sight which can deliver the province to the general. This must be a source of anxiety for him and his advisors. All indications till now are that General Musharraf will have to unite his allies and help them form a coalition government in a fragmented national assembly. But this assembly would also have a sizeable presence of the PPP and PML(N), sitting in the opposition. The prime minister of the coalition that is cobbled together would be weak and dependent on a strong president backed by the army. The powers of the prime minister and the cabinet are likely to be further curtailed by the national security council. The president (and the chief of army staff) will be its chairman and the three service chiefs will be its members along with the prime minister and the defence minister. All decisions of strategic importance will be taken by the NSC, which in effect would keep a check on parliament. The power to dismiss the elected government will rest with the president's office. Under the circumstances, even pro-establishment political elements may find that the compromises they have to make with the president and the army do not suit them. Just as Mohammed Khan Junejo as prime minister had to confront Zia ul-Haq, the new prime minister may be forced to do the same, however docile he might be to begin with. Each compromise that General Musharraf makes with the prime minister will undermine him politically and morally. Not only at the centre but even in the regions there may be political uncertainty. The provincial assemblies, once in place, would come into conflict with the local government bodies, elected on a non-party basis and headed by nazims. Nothing has been done as yet to redefine and separate the powers of the provincial assemblies from that of the local bodies. Since all the administrative and financial powers have been given to the nazims, the provincial assemblies may find that they have little to do. From all indications then, it seems that Pakistan is entering a difficult and uncertain phase in its political life. The world will be watching with keen interest to see how it charts its course.