A government unable to control large parts of its territory, a military in disarray, fears of loss of control over nuclear assets, radical Islamists intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction — these are the stuff of nightmares. Pakistan’s current turmoil is causing jitters around the world precisely because the nightmarish scenario evoked above might just come to pass. The militants who attacked Pakistan’s naval base, PNS Mehran, have underlined the enormity of the security challenge that violent Islamists pose to Pakistan and the whole region.

For long, the United States of America and the West have viewed nuclear weapons in South Asia with dread because of the possibility that a conventional war between India and Pakistan might escalate into a nuclear one. Indian and Pakistani officials, on the other hand, have pointed out that despite several provocations, India and Pakistan have behaved ‘rationally’ during various crises by keeping their conflicts limited and avoiding escalation. But since 9/11, the nature of the problem for the West has changed in so far as the threat is now more of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal being used against the West by radical Islamists.

The present turmoil in Pakistan has raised concerns about the security of its nuclear stockpile. Instituted in 2000, Pakistan’s nuclear command and control arrangements are centred on the National Command Authority, which comprises the Employment Control Committee, the Development Control Committee and the Strategic Plans Division. Only a small group of military officials apparently has access to the country’s nuclear assets. However, these command and control arrangements continue to be beset with some fundamental vulnerabilities that underline the reluctance of Pakistan’s military to cede control over the nation’s nuclear assets.

Poor record

Pakistan is the only country where the nuclear button is in the hands of the military. Moreover, senior civilian and military officials responsible for these weapons have a problematic track record in maintaining close control over them. A.Q. Khan, the head of the nation’s nuclear programme, was instrumental in making Pakistan the centre of the biggest nuclear proliferation network by leaking technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya.

While the military remains professional, it has also become deeply demoralized. The growing ‘Islamization’ of the younger generation of Pakistan’s military officers is well-recorded. There is a real danger of elements within Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex colluding with radical Islamist groups.

Nuclear proliferation has never been a first-order priority for the US when it comes to Pakistan. Now the chickens are coming home to roost as Pakistan’s military seems unable to take on the Islamist forces. The nation’s nuclear weapons seem within the reach of the extremist forces. The US has announced that there are contingency plans in place to deal with the possibility of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of militant groups. But it remains far from clear as to what exactly the US would be able to do if such an eventuality arose. Meanwhile, India needs to be aware of the potentially catastrophic implications of the collapse of governing authority in Pakistan.

So far, Indian leaders had little reason to doubt that their Pakistani counterparts would take rational decisions when it came to the use of nuclear weapons. That assumption might soon need revisiting if the present trends in Pakistan continue for much longer. The violence in Pakistan and all its attendant consequences in the nuclear realm point to the long-term costs of short-sighted policies followed by the West in countering proliferation.