India and China continue to be at loggerheads on a range of bilateral issues. China has shown no signs of budging on key issues that matter to India. S. Jaishankar, the Indian foreign secretary, had visited Beijing in February for the India-China Strategic Dialogue, but it was evident at the end of the visit that the two sides had failed to bridge their differences. There was no change in Beijing's stance on blocking efforts to get the Pakistan-based militant, Maulana Masood Azhar, listed as a terrorist under UN norms. Its opposition to India gaining entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group continued. New Delhi has also been left asking Beijing to explain how it can take part in the 'Silk Road summit' to be held in China in May when the China-Pakistan economic corridor passing through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir violates India's sovereignty.
There was, however, some positive engagement on Afghanistan. China reportedly expressed its admiration for India's assistance efforts in Afghanistan, and the two sides explored the possibility of joint development projects. This came against the backdrop of the growing threat of the Islamic State to China. The IS has released a video of Chinese Uighur Muslims vowing to return home and "shed blood like rivers" even as the Chinese military displayed its might as a show of force in Xinjiang. A rattled China is calling for greater global cooperation against the IS. This is also the reason for China joining Russia in a bid to engage the Taliban in Afghanistan.
But there remain some major differences even on Afghanistan that the foreign secretary was careful to mention. On the Taliban, he suggested that "their [China's] characterisation was that there were elements of Taliban which are very extreme. In their view there were also elements of Taliban that can work with international community and Afghan government."
Even as Beijing and New Delhi struggle to manage their complex relationship, India has become more nuanced in its approach to China. India seeks to engage China on a range of issues despite differences. But there is also a new realism in acknowledging and articulating these differences. The diffidence of the past has been replaced by a new self-confidence in asserting its vital interests vis-à-vis China.
This self-confidence is reflected in the manner in which India is gradually bringing Tibet and Taiwan in its bilateral matrix with China. The Chinese government had warned that the Dalai Lama's recent visit to Arunachal Pradesh would cause "serious damage" to Sino-Indian ties as "China is strongly opposed to the Dalai Lama visiting disputed areas." India took the warning in its stride and decided that Kiren Rijiju, the Union minister of state for home affairs and Narendra Modi's point man on Tibetan issues, would meet the Dalai Lama.
Taiwan is also now part of the Indian foreign policy discourse. A three-member women's parliamentary delegation from Taiwan visited India amidst signals that the two sides might be getting serious about enhancing their bilateral engagement. Incidentally, the leader of the delegation, Kuan Bi-Ling, underscored that Taiwan is "totally independent". This visit was in contrast to last year when India had reportedly backtracked from sending representatives to the swearing-in ceremony of the then Taiwanese president-elect, Tsai Ing-wen.
What is clear is that Sino-Indian relations have entered uncharted territory as New Delhi seeks to reset the terms of bilateral engagement. The future of Asia depends on how the two regional giants relate to each other. The Modi government wants to ensure that India is not the one to blink first.
(The author is professor of International Relations, Department of Defence Studies, King's College, London)
