The new government in Pakistan knows that its hauteur will be tolerated. The United States of America took no offence when its top diplomats were snubbed by Pakistan’s democratically-elected leaders on the eve of the government-formation in Pakistan. It has also tamely put up with protests from within the new dispensation against Pakistan being made the killing fields of the US. With the mighty Pervez Musharraf, the US’s main prop in the war against terror, cut down to size in one fell swoop of democracy, there is not much it can do but acknowledge that the interiors of Pakistan’s corridors of power have changed. The joint counter-terrorism strategy being planned with the civilian government is the US’s attempt to come to terms with the altered reality in Pakistan. The promise of a substantial hike in aid and the assurance to curb the controversial air strikes by drones are not only meant to show the US’s willingness to do business with the new power-players, and on their terms, but also to indicate that the Americans no longer consider Musharraf indispensable to their gameplan in the region.

Loaded more with such subtle messages than with intent, the joint counter-terrorism strategy may not graduate beyond being anything other than just a ‘strategy’. The increase in aid, which is now supposed to be channelled towards the strengthening of civilian law-enforcement institutions like the police, shows the US is yet to learn that there is little correlation between financial aid and a diminution of the terrorist threat. The greenbacks this time will be flying in the face of a resolute determination on the part of the civilian government to limit US operations in the tribal areas. Both Nawaz Sharif and Asif Ali Zardari strongly believe in tribal rights, and will continue to think very differently from the US on ways to tame the insurgents. In which case, the US may suddenly realize that a ‘joint’ strategy still works better with the president. The comment of the new information minister that Pakistan has to “take them [the US] at their word” about the reduction of the air strikes points to the lack of mutual trust. Since there is no way the government can simply sweet-talk insurgents into giving up arms in a hurry without providing them with concrete ways of economic and social advance, the trust between the US and the ruling coalition may nosedive in the days to come.