NEITHER A HAWK NOR A DOVE: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICYBy Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Viking, Rs 999
President Pervez Musharraf had once asked Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri the following question: "Are you a hawk or a dove on India Kasuri Sahib?" Kasuri, the then newly-appointed foreign minister of Pakistan, had not exactly expected such a question in his very first meeting with the president. Kasuri was the foreign minister of Pakistan from 2002 to 2007, a period when the bonhomie between India and Pakistan was at its height. In this volume, Kasuri claims that the book's primary focus is on his understanding of foreign policy and the security challenges faced by Pakistan during his tenure as foreign minister. But Kasuri has ended up commenting on nearly every vital incident that has shaped the India-Pakistan relationship since Independence. The failure of Pakistan to establish a proper civil-military relationship has resulted in the army often switching between the roles of governorship and guardianship. Contemporary Pakistan is a perfect example of a nation where the military controls democratic institutions without actually taking over the reins of power, thereby forcing elected representatives to step back.
Many unresolved issues in the India-Pakistan relationship are a direct result of the Partition. Kasuri rightly examines the societal and ethnic tensions that existed in India prior to 1947. One must study the animosity that existed among the various religious groups in colonial India to understand the violence that preceded, and succeeded, the Partition. Some of the popular slogans on the streets of Punjab in 1947 were, "Lay Kay Rahain Gey Pakistan, Bat Key Rahay Ga Hindustan (We will create Pakistan and divide India)" and "Pakistan ka matlab kya? la ilaha ilallah (What is the meaning of Pakistan? There is no God but Allah)". Historians remain uncertain about the number of people killed during the period. Kasuri's frank and unbiased commentary on the violence is illuminating.
Written largely in the form of a memoir, Kasuri dedicates the first chapter entirely to his family life. Kasuri's mother belonged to a princely family of northern India with pro-British leanings. His father hailed from a family of anti-colonial nationalists from Punjab. This opposing influence, the author argues, was responsible for his non-conventional views on India.
Kasuri discusses Junagadh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir while focusing on the security dilemma faced by Pakistan. However, it seems that he has refrained from entering into an exhaustive discussion on the matter. Nevertheless, he admits to the extraneous role played by the British army commanders and the "raiders" immediately before Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India. This validates the claims of V.P. Menon - Independent India's first home secretary and a close aide of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. In his book, Integration of the Indian States - considered to be an authoritative and authentic account on the accession of various princely states to either dominion - Menon had echoed views that are similar to those of Kasuri.
Kasuri also comments on Indian foreign policy. He takes note of Jawaharlal Nehru's gradual shift from the West to Soviet Russia during the Cold War. Pakistan's growing closeness with the United States of America, the author opines, was one of the reasons for this major shift in Indian foreign policy. The Indo-Soviet relationship was cemented during Nikita Khrushchev's visit to New Delhi in 1955.
Kasuri's skilful use of anecdotes to comment on the relationship between Hindus and Muslims in India is commendable. Prior to the Kargil war, the Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had called up his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, complaining that Pakistan had wasted no time in occupying the heights dominating the Srinagar-Leh road in the Kargil sector. After a brief conversation, the Indian premier passed on the phone to the legendary Bollywood star, Dilip Kumar. Kumar was born as Yousuf Khan, and originally hailed from Peshawar. The actor requested Sharif to take the necessary action to bring the situation under control. He claimed that whenever there was a rise in tension on the border, the position of Indian Muslims becomes vulnerable and they find it difficult to even leave their homes.
The Prussian general, Carl von Clausewitz, had defined war as a tool for the continuation of foreign policy. Though the general had 19th-century Europe in mind, his theory holds true for subcontinental politics. But Kasuri remains evasive when he talks about the Kargil war. The entire narrative regarding the Kargil episode remains focused on the role of Sharif and the nuclear tests that preceded the war. While analysing Sharif's role in the conflict, Kasuri ignores the crucial meeting between the Pakistan prime minister and the former American president, Bill Clinton, that took place at the Blair House in Washington. The discussions and negotiations that transpired during the meeting have been documented by Taylor Branch in the book, The Clinton Tapes: Wrestling History with the President.
Kasuri's decision not to indict Musharraf may be intentional. It could also be that he genuinely believes that the general was not entirely responsible for the war. In his autobiography, Yeh Khamoshi Kahan Tak? Aik Sipahi Ki Dastan-e-Ishq o Junoon, Shahid Aziz, the former chief of general staff, lays the blame for the misadventure in Kargil squarely on Musharraf's shoulders. What makes the Kargil conflict unique is that the reasons for its inception are still being debated upon. One expected the author to divulge more, because Kasuri was Sharif's special envoy during the crisis. He travelled to numerous nations across the world in an attempt to explain Pakistan's case.
Kasuri was yet to become foreign minister in 2001. Yet - and this is interesting - he chooses to speculate about the reasons for the failure of the Agra Summit of 2001. He lays stress on the crisis that was generated in India on account of Vajpayee's poor health. Kasuri suggests that L.K. Advani had intentions of replacing Vajpayee, for which he needed to please the hawks in the party and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. The failure of the talks would have boosted his stature as a hardliner, whereas if the talks were to succeed, Vajpayee would have been feted at home and abroad.
The author also discusses the role of mediators in the bilateral relationship as well as Pakistan's complex ties with the US regarding Afghanistan. Kasuri has not revealed anything that is not already in the public domain. This would certainly disappoint the readers. The book is engaging and lucidly written, but it fails to add anything substantial to the existing body of knowledge about India's bilateral relationship with Pakistan.
