Demonstrations in Chennai demanding that the Centre vote against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC

After all the brouhaha, India finally voted with 24 other states last week in favour of the controversial United Nations human rights council resolution on human rights violations in Sri Lanka. In fact, New Delhi was pressing for as many as seven amendments to the draft resolution but, given the time constraint, it had to remain content with the original draft. The main concern that governed India’s intervention in the matter was the need for a credible and independent investigation into alleged war crimes and human rights abuses in Sri Lanka. In his remarks, India’s permanent representative to the UN human rights council in Geneva, Dilip Sinha, said, “As a neighbour with thousands of years of relations with Sri Lanka, we cannot remain untouched by developments in that country and will continue to remain engaged in this matter.” He underscored “the inadequate progress by Sri Lanka in fulfilling its commitment” to the UN council, and called upon the nation to fully implement the 13th amendment. “India has always been of the view that the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka provided a unique opportunity to pursue a lasting political settlement, acceptable to all communities in Sri Lanka, including the Tamils”, Sinha suggested.

If New Delhi had tried last year to amend the United States of America-sponsored resolution in order to make it less intrusive, more balanced and more respectful of Sri Lankan sovereignty, this year it was trying to do the opposite: bringing in amendments to make some words in the resolution stronger. It reportedly pushed for seven written amendments in six paragraphs of the resolution. But if this was aimed at the domestic political landscape, it clearly failed to have any impact as both the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam had accused the United Progressive Alliance government of “diluting” the resolution by not moving any amendments demanded by them.

As a consequence of this domestic political posturing, India today has not only marginalized itself in the affairs of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka but has also made sure that one of its most important neighbours will move further into the arms of China. After repeatedly opposing country-specific resolutions at the UN humans rights council and other such bodies, India has now set a dangerous precedent which will come back to haunt it. India’s foreign policy today stands bereft of both principle and pragmatism.

As it is Sri Lanka has been rapidly slipping out of India’s orbit. India failed to exert its leverage over the humanitarian troubles that the Tamil population trapped in the fighting were facing. New Delhi’s attempts to end the war and avert humanitarian tragedy in northeast Sri Lanka proved utterly futile.

Colombo’s centralized location between Aden and Singapore makes it extremely significant strategically for Indian power projection possibilities. After initially following India’s lead in international affairs — even demanding that the British leave from their naval base at Trincomalee and the air base at Katunayake in 1957, Colombo gradually gravitated towards a more independent foreign policy. And it was India’s enthusiasm for China that made Sri Lanka take China seriously. But after the Chinese victory in the Indo-China war of 1962, Colombo started courting Beijing much more seriously.

Now, China has displaced Japan as Sri Lanka’s major aid donor with an annual aid package of $1 billion. Bilateral trade between China and Sri Lanka has doubled over the last five years with China emerging as Sri Lanka’s largest trading partner. China is now supplying more than half of all the construction and development loans Sri Lanka receives. Chinese investment in the development of infrastructure and oil exploration projects in Sri Lanka has also gathered momentum. China is providing interest free loans and preferential loans at subsidized rates to Sri Lanka for the development of infrastructure. It is the first foreign country to have an exclusive economic zone in Sri Lanka. China is also involved in a range of infrastructure development project in Sri Lanka — these include constructing power plants, modernizing Sri Lankan railways, and providing financial and technical assistance in the launching of communication satellites. China is financing more than 85 per cent of the Hambantota Development Zone, which is to be completed over the next decade. This will include an international container port, a bunkering system, an oil refinery and an international airport, among other facilities. The port in Hambantota — deeper than the one at Colombo — is to be used as a refuelling and docking station for China’s navy. Though the two countries claim that this is merely a commercial venture, its future utility as a strategic asset by China remains a real possibility, much to India’s consternation. For China, Hambantota will not only be an important transit for general cargo and oil but a presence in Hambantota also enhances China’s monitoring and intelligence gathering capabilities vis-à-vis India.

India has expressed its displeasure at the growing Chinese involvement in Sri Lanka on a number of occasions. In 2007, India’s then national security advisor openly criticized Sri Lanka for attempting to purchase a Chinese-built radar system on the grounds that it would ‘overreach’ into Indian air space. Yet, Sri Lanka has emerged stronger and more stable after the military success in the Eelam war and the two elections at the national level. To counter Chinese influence, India has been forced to step up its diplomatic offensive and offer Colombo reconstruction aid. With the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam now out of the picture, the Indian government is hoping that it will have greater strategic space to manage bilateral ties. However, while New Delhi will have to continue to balance its domestic sensitivities and strategic interests, Beijing faces no such constraint in developing even stronger ties with Colombo. As a consequence, India is struggling to make itself more relevant to Sri Lanka than China.

Colombo matters because the Indian Ocean is important. The ‘great game’ of this century will be played out on the waters of the Indian Ocean. Though India’s location gives it great operational advantages in the Indian Ocean, it is by no means certain that New Delhi is in a position to hold on to its geographic advantages. China is rapidly catching up and its ties with Sri Lanka are aimed at expanding its profile in this crucial part of the world.

India’s highly problematic move at the UN human rights council will now make it even more marginalized in Sri Lanka. This will gravely damage its long-term, vital interests.