To grasp the global collateral damage from the US-Israeli war with Iran, consider the Persian Gulf nation of Qatar.

A close US ally and longtime mediator between Washington and Tehran, Qatar’s government sought to avert the war. When that failed, Qatari officials warned of the dangers of a prolonged conflict.

Resource-rich Qatar nonetheless faced more than 700 Iranian missile and drone attacks, which have targeted Gulf countries that host American military bases. These attacks forced Qatar to suspend natural gas production, which generates its vast wealth and normally accounts for a fifth of the global supply.

Despite the fragile ceasefire announced on April 7 that has halted strikes, the war has struck at the heart of Qatar’s interests, upending the economy and shaking the nation’s reputation as a haven for business.

As it takes stock, the Qatari government will be forced to swallow a bitter pill, analysts say: Neither its strong ties with the US nor its cordial relationship with Iran have spared it from pain.

Qatar’s case reflects the thorny position that Gulf countries have found themselves in during the war. Trapped between their chief ally and their neighbour, they are now forced to rethink their security strategies.

The war has caused a state of “strategic shock” for Qatar and its neighbours, said Rashid Al-Mohanadi, the vice-president of the Centre for International Policy Research, a think tank in Qatar.

“There was an assumption that such a big move in the region, like starting a war with Iran, would at least happen in consultation with the Gulf,” he said. “We thought we had a better working relationship with the United States.”

While many Gulf Arab countries have historically had an antagonistic relationship with Iran, Qatar — along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE — has invested considerable political capital in building warmer ties in recent years. Many Gulf officials saw this as the most pragmatic way to contain the threat posed by Iran.

Now, all of these countries are re-evaluating their approaches to Iran.

Seeking to protect the nation, Qatar’s royal family leaned on its relationship with the US, which has a major air base in Qatar and had pledged to defend the country. Qatari officials have also tried to make their country indispensable to the world’s economy and to global diplomacy, serving as a mediator with difficult parties like Iran, Russia and the Palestinian militant group Hamas in Gaza.

In recent years, the government sought to cultivate close ties with US President Donald Trump, donating a Boeing 747 jetliner to him. A Qatari government-owned real estate firm sealed a deal last year with Trump’s family business, the Trump Organisation, to construct a Trump-branded golf course in Qatar.

And when Trump visited Qatar last May, he signed an agreement with officials there "to generate an economic exchange worth at least $1.2 trillion", the White House announced.

Despite all of that, Qatar was able to exert little control over a war that directly involved it.

The war’s human toll in Qatar has been mitigated by air-defence systems that intercepted most attacks. Qatari authorities have reported no civilian deaths.

Still, the effect has been palpable. Tourism withered. Qatar Airways planes that once crisscrossed the globe, stopping off in the capital, Doha, were grounded. Many foreign residents with the means to do so left.

Qatar’s all-important energy sector has been hit by the worst shocks.

The state-owned QatarEnergy shut down liquefied natural gas production at its main site, Ras Laffan, early in the war. The company was unable to safely export gas through the Strait of Hormuz — the only waterway through which its gas reaches global markets.

In mid-March, Iranian attacks hit Ras Laffan directly, inflicting extensive damage. Qatar’s energy minister, Saad al-Kaabi, announced that it could take up to five years to repair, and estimated that the annual loss in revenue for Qatar would be about $20 billion, equivalent to 37 per cent of the total government revenue Qatar expected to bring in this year.

“This has taken the whole region back 10 to 20 years,” al-Kaabi had told Reuters.

“The good news is that the Qataris have deep pockets,” said Farouk Soussa, an economist who monitors West Asia for Goldman Sachs.

“Probably the idea that confidence is lost forever and nobody is coming back is going too far,” Soussa said. “It will depend on what the postwar regional order looks like.”

New York Times News Service