When 18-year-old Owais Hammam was allegedly kidnapped by Jewish settlers in the West Bank village of Khirbet Bani Harith on Dec. 3, the episode marked more than another violent incident in a long-running conflict.

According to media reports, Hammam was beaten, humiliated and harassed for hours at a nearby settlement before being released the next morning. Israeli military soldiers were reportedly involved. He was hospitalised with multiple injuries and severe psychological trauma.

The incident reflects a broader escalation since Oct. 7, 2023, with settler violence shifting from vandalism to kidnapping and prolonged abuse. United Nations figures show that over 3,200 Palestinians were forcibly displaced by settler violence and movement restrictions in the two years to October 2025, which the UN described as the worst month for such violence since records began in 2006.

As a scholar of Israeli extremist groups, the author argues this escalation signals a transformation within Israeli state institutions, with the military, police and government increasingly aligned with — or complicit in — settler violence.

This institutional reluctance to address settler violence is not merely a failure of enforcement, I would argue, but a deliberate outcome of big social, political and cultural changes that have reshaped Israeli society since at least the mid-1990s.

Settlers’ dream government

The most visible manifestation of this transformation is the composition of Israel’s current government, formed in December 2022.

For the first time, key ministerial positions are held by individuals with explicit pro-settler ideologies and personal ties to some of the most violent streams of the settlement movement.

Hence, it is not surprising that prominent figures such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir — both settlers with what has been described as extremist ideologies — have actively implemented policies that facilitate and legitimise settler violence.

For instance, Ben-Gvir has significantly eased firearm regulations, issuing over 100,000 new gun licenses since October 2023, with settlers receiving preferential access.

Smotrich, meanwhile, has publicly distributed security equipment to illegal outposts and allocated substantial budgets for settler militias. This political backing fosters a climate in which settlers feel emboldened to act with impunity.

Beyond individual ministers, the Israeli government has pursued structural reforms that systematically undermine institutional checks on settler violence.

The transfer of the main Israeli governing body in the West Bank — the Civil Administration authority — from the military central command to Smotrich’s Finance Ministry represents a fundamental shift in governance.

For decades, the Civil Administration coordinated the provision of West Bank services such as health and education. It also served as an instrument for coordinating with the Palestinian Authority, the body entrusted per the Oslo Accords with limited self-rule over parts of the occupied West Bank.

By placing the Civil Administration under political control rather than independent military command, the government has weakened one of the few mechanisms capable of restraining settler expansion.

Similarly, plans to subordinate the West Bank Border Police to Ben-Gvir’s Ministry of National Security threaten to dismantle the unified command structure that has been instrumental in managing tensions in the occupied West Bank since 1967.

Capitulation to settlers Concurrent to these developments has been a blurring of lines between civilian settlers and uniformed security personnel. After Oct. 7, 2023, Israeli authorities distributed 8,000 army rifles to so-called civilian settlement defence squads and regional defence battalions.

These armed settler groups now operate alongside — and are increasingly indistinguishable from — official security forces. Settlers frequently wear official uniforms and carry army-issued weapons during attacks on Palestinians.

Security infrastructure, such as police stations, is often physically located within settlements, fostering close relationships between law enforcement and settler communities.

I would suggest that this geographic and institutional proximity makes neutral policing nearly impossible.

The cultural and social dimensions of this phenomenon run even deeper. Many settlers serve as army reservists, creating overlapping identities between civilian and military personnel.

Civilian security coordinators, who are responsible for coordination between the military and the settlements’ own “defence squads,” actively shape military operational policy. They help define settlement boundaries, determine areas prohibited to Palestinians and occasionally command soldiers.

Soldiers typically interpret clashes as friction between civilians rather than crimes requiring intervention. When violence intensifies, they often declare an “emergency situation” and defend settlers rather than protecting Palestinian victims.

Societal shifts

The transformation of Israeli institutions reflects broader societal changes where the settler movement has evolved from one of many societal factions to a dominant political force.

Settlers hold key positions in government and military leadership and exercise considerable political influence.

As a result, settler violence has become increasingly embedded in the operational logic of state institutions, turning law enforcement bodies from ostensibly neutral arbiters into what international observers increasingly describe as enablers or participants in systematic violence against Palestinians.

It represents, I would argue, a fundamental reorientation of state power in explicit service of settler expansionism.

Moreover, the failure to hold perpetrators of settler violence to account reveals the extent of the institutional capture. Between 2005 and 2023, more than 93 per cent of police investigations into settler violence were closed without indictment, and only 3 per cent resulted in convictions.

In 2021, the last year for which I was able to obtain data, Israeli authorities opened just 87 investigations for “ideologically motivated offences,” while UN monitors documented 585 incidents.

The Israeli police chief in the West Bank has gone so far as to claim that reports of settler violence are fabricated by “radical left-wing anarchists.”

The erosion of judicial scrutiny

The Israeli Supreme Court has formally acknowledged that the West Bank constitutes occupied territory under international law.

Nonetheless, the judicial architecture historically accommodates settlement expansion. Settlers are subject to Israeli civilian law, including the ability to vote in Israeli elections, while Palestinians face military law, producing vastly asymmetrical outcomes in cases involving violence and property rights.

The country’s Supreme Court, while occasionally striking down discriminatory measures against Palestinians, has bowed to security rationales that permit the broader settlement enterprise to proceed.

For example, in 2022, the court rejected a petition to return Palestinian land in the city of Hebron, ruling that an Israeli presence is part of the military’s “regional security doctrine.” Similarly, in many petitions against the military policy of house demolitions, the Supreme Court has adopted a deferential stance toward security authorities.

Impact on the peace process

The implications of this institutional capitulation to settlers’ interests extend far beyond the West Bank itself. Settlers have explicitly viewed the war in the Gaza Strip as an opportunity to accelerate their agenda, forcing over 1,000 Palestinians from at least 18 communities since Oct. 7, 2023.

In addition to the humanitarian concerns, this pattern of violence-driven displacement undermines the viability of a two-state solution, which has returned to international discourse as the centrepiece of “day after” planning for Gaza.

It also undermines any claim Israel might make that, in lieu of a two-state solution, it can enforce the rule of law equally across people living in territories under its control.