Former Bengal chief minister Siddhartha Shankar Ray’s handling of the Naxalite movement in the 70s may have been controversial but few questioned the effectiveness of his methods. The Telegraph asked him in Calcutta how he would have dealt with the Maoist menace had he remained chief minister, his assessment of the Shilda massacre and its fallout, and the challenge of policing in Bengal then and now. Excerpts from the interview:

SS Ray model

You cannot go in for an armed solution to a social problem. By waging an armed battle against so many people (the tribal population of the Maoist-infested districts of Bengal), you are actually further marginalising these poor people and pushing them towards the Maoists. I do not support the armed struggle of the Maoists but the fact remains that tribal people in this country have been historically exploited. Despite living in an area that has a large concentration of natural resources, they have never received the fruits of such resources. I have to accept that this was the case even when I was the chief minister, and it has continued through the Left Front’s rule.

We need to start a development process through credible non-government organisations like the Ramakrishna Mission and Bharat Sevashram Sangha as the people of the Maoist-infested districts (West Midnapore, Bankura and Purulia) have lost trust in the state government.

In fact, all political parties should stay out of the process along with the administration. An apolitical fact-finding body comprising credible NGOs, social service organisations, independent professionals and technocrats may be formed by the Centre. This organisation, after ascertaining the immediate development requirements of the area, should execute the work.

One or two senior central ministers should oversee the process, and the Centre should fund all projects. Once the development process sets in and people start to realise the fruits of such initiatives, then an armed counter to the Maoists can be initiated with central forces by declaring the entire Maoist zone spanning four states (Bengal, Orissa, Bihar and Jharkhand) as a disturbed area. The state police should not be involved in the process in any way.

In the meantime, if the Maoists agree to talk, a dialogue can start. This model, I feel, will also allow the Centre to perform its role under Article 355 of the Constitution, under which it is the mandatory duty of the Union to protect the states against internal disturbances. I have spoken and written about this model to (P.) Chidambaram (the home minister), and he has promised to get back to me after examining the proposal. I await his response.

Shilda mistakes

In Shilda, 24 policemen lost their lives because of complete lack of co-ordination between various police units of the state. The bane of Bengal is that the CPM, during its over three-decade rule, completely eroded the quality and credibility of our policemen by trying to control them for political reasons. They, if allowed to work with freedom, can be among the best in the world. However, I have to accept that given a chance, not only the CPM, but all political parties try to control the police force.

What happened after the Shilda incident was completely uncalled for. The (special) inspector-general of police (Benoy Chakrabarty) showed immaturity by attending a news conference with his face masked, though most of his allegations (about the Shilda camp being set up against his advice and non-cooperation by certain police officers) were correct. However, the government’s appointment of a committee to probe the matter is absurd, laughable and completely contrary to the prerequisite of natural justice. How is it that the people alleged to have committed or facilitated the wrongs have been given the responsibility to probe (the incident)? I feel the government should have approached the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court to get the incident probed through either a sitting or a retired judge.

Naxalite movement

The way the Naxalite movement was countered by the police in the 70s was the requirement of the time. You have to understand the difference between the two situations (the Naxalite and Maoist insurrections). While the Naxalite movement was within a limited boundary and hence easier to control through police operations, the current movement has spread over a vast rural — and difficult — terrain. Thus, it is strategically difficult to contain it through an armed operation.

Moreover, in the 70s, I had to order police action when they were easily succumbing to the Naxalites…. Arms were being looted but they were hardly countering (the offensive). The Naxalites were even killing traffic policemen. Not only were traffic policemen given arms, they were ordered to chain the guns to their bodies to prevent looting. There was complete anarchy.

I told the police three things: follow the Constitution to act, don’t see any political colour while you act and, finally, do not succumb meekly while you have a gun in your hand because you may be killed otherwise. But only bullets did not salvage the situation; there was a lot of backdoor manoeuvring and counselling. Every day after office hours, parents would come and seek protection for their sons. I arranged for so many of them to go out of the state or even the country so that they could be saved.

As for the “mass cleansing”, an allegation the CPM used to make regularly, I recently chanced upon an inquiry report compiled by a commission instituted by the Left Front government. The report says that during that period, 3,000 Congress workers lost their lives against 1,600 CPM workers. At least I cannot be accused of cleansing the Opposition; I actually became quite unpopular with the Congress!