Kargil has unerringly brought the failure of the Indian intelligence into focus. But there are several illusions with regard to the concept. The first is that 'intelligence' is information supplied by state and Central agencies. But the public has also an important role to play. People know more about crime and terrorism than the government. This 'intelligence' can be naturally passed on to the police if the public has a friendly attitude towards the administration. Unfortunately, in India this attitude is a hostile one because the administration is corrupt, inefficient and repressive. The second illusion is that the main target of intelligence agencies is anti-Indian forces or enemies of the nation. But the main target is often the enemies of the party in power, especially the prime minister or the chief minister. Enemies can be located even within the ruling party. Indira Gandhi was famous for her use of the Indian intelligence. Intelligence chiefs are thus often selected on the basis of their personal loyalty. It is an unwritten directive to intelligence agencies that they are to assess the electoral chances of the ruling party and the main opposition parties. Intelligence branches are often involved actively in election work. Former Intelligence Bureau chief, B.N. Mullik, gives a detailed account of such involvement in My Years with Nehru, 1947-64. Informed inaction Mullik writes that before the 1957 general elections, Govind Vallabh Pant, then Union home minister, had asked for an assessment from the bureau about the respective chances of the communist parties and the Congress in the elections. The Intelligence Bureau had made 'thorough assessment seat by seat' and concluded that the Congress could not get an overall majority. Events proved it right. Even now, the practice of identifying the ruling party with the state has not changed. The Janata Party government had once appointed a committee under L.P. Singh to make recommendations about the manner in which the heads of the Intelligence Bureau and the Central Bureau of Investigation should be appointed so that the agencies are not dragged into party politics. The recommendations need to be looked into again. Another illusion, and one which Kargil has highlighted, is that once intelligence is provided to the administration, action is bound to be taken immediately. Often no action is taken on account of electoral politics. One prime example of this is Assam, where, if Mullik is to be believed, it was not the failure of the intelligence, but a poor understanding of the intelligence's information, combined with political motivation, that led to the anti-Bengali riots of 1960. Too many illusions Information about impending violence had been passed on to the state administration, which refused to take it seriously. The result was a terrible bloodshed that left thousands dead and hundreds homeless. The pattern was repeated in the Guwahati riots of 1968 and the riots of 1972. The second example of the failure to act on the intelligence report is provided by Tamil Nadu in relation to the rise of militancy in the state. Former intelligence chief, T.V. Rajeshwar, wrote in an article in a leading national daily on April 9, 1998 that the serial bombing in Coimbatore in February of the same year proved convincingly that 'Islamic fundamentalism had taken root in the state'. The organized manner in which the militants had proceeded showed signs of external assistance in the shape of money, material and guidance. The bombing of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh office in Chennai in 1983 revealed a similar pattern. Ironically, the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam's policies interfered with proceedings against the criminals. There is another illusion. It is often thought that intelligence is secretly collected. But a good deal of valuable intelligence is available in published material that is accessible to all. India would not have been shocked by the Chinese invasion of 1962 had it seen the geography and history books being used to teach Chinese children in schools since 1960. Nowadays, even the print media passes on valuable information that is overlooked. Shouting at Indian intelligence's failures is useless. The public can cooperate with the police, inform it and try to work with it in tandem. Is anybody listening?