Are Calcuttans looking jealously at the Delhi Metro? Especially after the way the Calcutta Metro seems to have become a snag-a-day affair? It’s not just the shocking October 20 derailment which capped eight disturbing incidents in 50 days. Earlier this week, a Dum Dum-bound airconditioned rake started emitting smoke, leading to the evacuation of passengers. In comparison, Delhi’s Metro, the only other underground mass transit system in the country, seems to be leading a charmed life.

So has Calcutta’s faltering Metro been completely outclassed by the one in Delhi? That would appear to be the case. Though the Delhi Metro has not been completely snag-free either — last week, there were two incidents of technical failure holding up trains for hours and there were two minor derailments in 2009 as well — it seems to have a clear edge over Calcutta’s on a range of parameters.

Derailed: Calcutta Metro is facing glitches while (top) Delhi Metro has a smoother ride

First of all, it’s bigger. The Delhi Metro has 156km of operational lines criss-crossing the capital. After its second phase is completed it will have close to 190km. A third phase is expected to add another 65km. Calcutta Metro, in contrast, has only 25km operating in a single direction. Even when the Metro is expanded the total length will still be only 111km.

The Delhi Metro also scores over Calcutta on the number of riders. The former carries 1.5 million people a day, against Calcutta Metro’s 6,00,000. What’s more, Delhi Metro’s first phase got constructed two years and nine months ahead of schedule whereas Calcutta Metro’s first phase was 17 years behind schedule.

Even in terms of cost, the Delhi Metro trumps the Calcutta Metro. Phase 1 of Delhi Metro stayed within the estimated cost of Rs 10,500 crore. In contrast, Phase 1 of Calcutta Metro had a cost overrun of Rs 1,577 crore.

Moreover, the trains of the Delhi Metro have been air-conditioned from the start. Calcutta Metro got its first air-conditioned train just a month ago — 26 years after it came into being in 1984. Besides, out of its total fleet of 20 rakes, only two are air-conditioned.

Again, with only 34 employees per kilometre, the Delhi Metro would appear to be a leaner organisation. The Calcutta Metro is bloated, with 149 employees per kilometer.

Still, there are those who feel that perhaps the comparison is not entirely fair. “There is a 20-year gap between the two; there has been a sea change in technologies over this period,” notes A.K. Arora, executive director, urban infrastructure at RITES, a public sector infrastructure consultancy firm.

Conceived in 1948-49 by the late B.C. Roy, construction work on the Calcutta Metro began in the early 1970s. The 16.45km project from Dum Dum to Tollygunge was to be completed in 1978. But funds came in dribbles and the project never got the support of the state government, which saw it as a central government project, since it is under the Indian Railways. The first 4km section from Esplanade to Bhowanipore opened only in 1984 and the entire stretch got completed in 1995.

In the case of Delhi Metro, though, the Centre and the Delhi government put in money in the form of equity, land was given at concessional rates as interest-free subordinate debt, property development was to fund part of the construction, and 60 per cent of the funding of the first phase came from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) at a cut-price interest rate of 1.3 per cent.

Besides, a separate agency — the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) — was set up to construct and run the Metro. A 50-50 joint venture between the Centre and the Delhi government, DMRC is not under the administrative control of any ministry, unlike all public sector undertakings. This gives the management, headed by managing director E. Sreedharan, unprecedented autonomy.

Calcutta Metro, in contrast, is part of the Indian Railways and doesn’t get the focus an urban transport system needs. With no railway minister after A.B.A. Ghani Khan Chowdhury (1982-84) from West Bengal, it was never a priority for the Indian Railways honchos in Delhi till Mamata Banerjee got the portfolio.

“Metro systems usually fall under the purview of local governments,” says Annapurna Shaw, professor of public policy management at IIM, Calcutta. “The Calcutta Metro is organisationally in a no-man’s land.” Moreover, it became a victim of the operational inflexibility typical of its parent.

Nothing brings this out more than fare revisions. The Calcutta Metro has had three fare revisions in its 26-year history, the last one in 2001. The fare — Rs 4 for the first 5km — is the lowest in the world. The Delhi Metro (which has the second lowest fares, with Rs 8 for the first 2km) has had three fare revisions since it started eight years ago.

The Delhi Metro is also one of the few metros in the world to make pre-tax profit. For every rupee it earns, it spends only 36 paise. The Calcutta Metro, on the other hand, has been spending Rs 2 for every rupee earned. “It should charge at least Rs 10 for up to 5km to recover costs,” says Bhaskar Chaudhuri, former chief operations manager, Calcutta Metro.

But P.B. Murty, the Calcutta Metro’s general manager does not agree. “Such an increase has an adverse impact on ridership and may not be feasible in the present socio-economic scenario,” he says.

The Calcutta Metro has also been severely hamstrung when it comes to funding. “It is Calcutta’s misfortune that it functions under the railway board,” rues Chaudhuri. The general manager’s financial powers, a railway board official notes, are limited to contracts of Rs 200 crore.

That’s not a constraint, counters Murty. “Every zonal manager of Indian Railways has a certain level of sanctioning authority. If we need extra money, we can always ask the railway board.”

This lack of attention from the Railways leadership and constant Centre-state conflicts has led to poor maintenance of the Metro’s assets, says Dilip Haldar, president of the National Institute of Transport and Urban Environmental Studies.

But though the Delhi Metro may shine in comparison to Calcutta’s, its financial picture may not actually be as rosy as it is made out to be, say critics. The balance sheet is healthy not because of sound financial management but sops from the government, sneer sceptics. Apart from getting concessional loans and land, DMRC is exempted from paying a slew of taxes and duties and dividend on government equity for 30 years. Non-operational revenue (from consultancies for metro projects in other cities, property development, advertisements and so on) accounts for 15 per cent of total earnings and Sreedharan wants to increase this to 30 per cent.

“If the capital cost of a taxi is not taken into account and the hire charges only cover the cost of fuel and driver, can we call it a financially viable effort,” asks Gajendra Haldea, advisor to the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission.

Besides, several costs haven’t started kicking in. Maintenance costs are low now because the assets are new.

Secondly, DMRC isn’t spending as much on coaches and trains as it needs to. It currently has 129 four-coach trains which are not enough to cater to peak hour rush. However, DMRC plans to increase its fleet to 112 four-coach trains and 89 six-coach trains by end-2011. Naturally, this will push up costs in the near future.

Repayment of the JICA loans will be another significant cost whose effect is yet to be felt. Repayment has started on the first tranche (the loan has come in 11 tranches). “The strain will start showing when all six tranches of Phase 1 are due for repayment,” says a government official.

So it may be too early to judge the Delhi Metro’s financial success or failure. “It is still in the project phase; the real success can be judged only after all phases are complete,” says Arora.

But till then Delhi Metro will clearly have the upper hand over its counterpart in Calcutta.