Is non-alignment still relevant after the end of the Cold War? When the United States of America launched the war against al Qaida and its taliban patrons, a debate erupted in India over the principle and practice of non-alignment. Some commentators questioned whether New Delhi's offer to provide certain facilities to US forces was consistent with India's traditional policy of non-alignment. A rival school raised questions about the relevance of non-alignment in the post-Cold War era. Since mutually hostile military alliances are no longer ranged against each other, between whom are we supposed to be non-aligned, they asked. In order to find answers to these questions, it is necessary first to consider what we mean by the term non-alignment. Before independence and in the early years after 1947, the then prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, frequently used the term 'independent' to characterize India's foreign policy. Thus, in a press conference on September 26, 1946, he declared: 'In the sphere of foreign affairs, India will follow an independent policy, keeping away from the power politics of groups aligned against one another.' The term 'non-alignment' came into vogue in the early Fifties and was employed to convey the same sense as an 'independent' policy. Take, for instance, the following extract from Nehru's speech in the Lok Sabha on December 9, 1958: 'When we say our policy is one of non-alignment, obviously we mean non-alignment with military blocs...This itself is not a policy; it is only part of a policy...The policy itself can only be a policy of acting according to our best judgment...I am not prepared...to give up my right of individual judgment to anybody else in other countries. That is the essence of our policy.' Nehru made it clear that non-alignment did not mean equidistance between the rival blocs. India would develop closer ties with one side if this served her national interests. In an address to the Indian council of world affairs on March 22, 1949, Nehru observed: 'When I say we should not align ourselves with any power blocs, obviously it does not mean that we should not be closer in our relations with some countries than with others...At the present moment you will see that as a matter of fact we have far closer relations with some countries of the Western world than with others.' Finally, non-alignment does not mean foreclosing the option of joining one side in a conflict, if this serves our national interests. It only means that we do not tie ourselves to one party in advance, denying ourselves the right to make an independent decision. As Nehru explained to the constituent assembly on December 4, 1947: 'We are not going to join a war if we can help it; and we are going to join the side which is to our advantage when the time comes to make a choice.' Thus non-alignment is a flexible policy of pursuing our national interests. This is borne out by India's diplomatic history. On more than one occasion, we have shifted course in foreign policy in response to major changes in the international environment. In the period 1947 to 1953, India leant towards Britain and the West. Under Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Union was deeply suspicious of the new Asian 'bourgeois' states, viewing them as only nominally independent. In India, the Telengana uprising was attributed to Soviet instigation. In contrast to the distant relations with the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, India maintained very close political, military and economic ties with Britain. Although India refused to be drawn into a military pact, her defence posture reflected her intention of staying out of a global conflict, if possible, or joining the British side, if necessary. Until 1949 all the three armed services were led by British officers. The air force was commanded by a Briton until 1952 and it was only in 1953 that an Indian naval chief was appointed. Military imports were sourced almost exclusively from Britain. Nineteen fifty three witnessed a dramatic transformation of India's external environment. The US-sponsored network of military pacts was extended to south Asia and Pakistan needed little persuasion to join the alliance. This coincided with a major shift in Moscow's policy towards the Afro-Asian states. Post-Stalinist Russia courted the non-aligned countries with offers of economic and political support. India rapidly built up close political and economic ties with the former Soviet Union. In the United Nations security council, Moscow was ready to cast its veto against pro-Pakistan resolutions supported by the Western powers. Thus, in the period 1954-70, India adopted a more or less equally balanced position between the East and the West. It maintained close relations with both blocs, using the USSR as a countervailing power against the West. India's foreign policy entered a third stage in 1971 in response to a dramatic turn in Sino-US relations. In a radical departure from past US policy, the then American president, Richard Nixon, decided to forge a strategic partnership with China against the USSR, using Islamabad as a channel of communication with Beijing. This resulted in Nixon's famous 'tilt' in favour of Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis. India was quick to understand the implications of the new development. Its response was to sign the Indo-Soviet treaty of peace and friendship. When Nixon ordered the USS Enterprise to sail into the Bay of Bengal, a Soviet submarine also appeared on the scene. For almost two decades after 1971 India maintained closer relations with Moscow than with Washington, though it lost no opportunity to repair ties with the US to the extent possible. Thus, India's foreign policy underwent dynamic changes throughout the Cold War years, in response to changes in the international environment. In the initial post-independence period, India maintained much closer ties with Britain and the West than with the USSR. From the mid-Fifties to 1970, it maintained a more or less equidistant posture between the two superpowers and, from 1971 to around 1989, it had closer ties with Moscow than with Washington. On one occasion - in 1962 - India even sought US military assistance against the advancing Chinese army without, however, binding itself to any long- term commitment in the form of a defence pact. All these shifts were quite consistent with non-alignment since India always maintained independence of action, adopting specific positions in the light of its national interests. Non-alignment is a flexible and dynamic policy, not a metaphysical doctrine. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have transformed the international environment, throwing up new challenges and opportunities for our foreign policy. Moscow is no longer in a position to play the role of a countervailing power against Washington. More important, however, the termination of Pakistan's role of a US Cold War ally cleared the way for closer Indo-US ties. Our national interests require forging new ties with today's sole superpower, the US, in all possible areas, including defence. There are no grounds for criticizing New Delhi's offer of certain facilities to US forces during the Afghan operations as being inconsistent with non-alignment. Our national interests require us to join the war against terrorism, the first stage of which was the Afghanistan operation. The offer of facilities was made in this specific context and it did not entail any future commitment. Non-alignment does not mean rejection of military cooperation, only of alliances which foreclose future options. Those who defended New Delhi's decision on the ground that non-alignment is irrelevant in a unipolar world were equally in error. The essence of non-alignment, as Nehru repeatedly pointed out, is independent decisionmaking and this is as relevant in a unipolar as in a bipolar or a multipolar world. For a country like India, non-alignment is as valid today as it was in the past. The author is former ambassador to China and the US