Ulfa leader Maradona Russell (left) with a member at their camp at Amarpur in Sadiya subdivision of Tinsukia on Thursday. Picture by Pronib Das

The “unilateral ceasefire” by Ulfa’s 28th battalion raises a few questions. Is it imposed or is it a realisation on the part of the strongest fighting wing about the futility to fight a war which has lost its direction? However, effort for peace becomes more sustaining when it has the blessings of the whole organisation, particularly its leadership.

Ulfa became more dangerous after 1992-93 and the division by Hiteswar Saikia could hardly weaken the organisation. However, there is a major difference this time: on earlier occasions the logic for surrender was that they were “fed up with violence” and wanted to join the mainstream.

Organisationally, a battalion of Ulfa has never ever raised questions about the modus operandi of the organisation; never has any group asked so many valid questions, hitting the leaders on some very fundamental ideological points.

It will certainly make Ulfa commander-in-chief Paresh Barua ponder on the future course of action. He may join hands with Arabinda Rajkhowa, the chairman, for an honourable settlement through dialogue. Or he may hit back with a vengeance and if other battalions of Ulfa follow on the lines of 28 battalion, we shall witness a range of terrorist strikes where mercenaries could be involved in the act of attrition.

This is because Ulfa’s insurgency today is no longer dependent on grievances of the Assamese people; it has become an independent variable and can find its own logic, clientele and audience. We may see more divisions in the organisation, not necessarily out of any diabolical game plan by the government and security agencies but because of contradictions that the cadres are facing today.

The issues which the 28 battalion have cited as the factors responsible for the “ceasefire” cannot be brushed aside as a concocted story of the government.

These are questions which the Assamese middle class has been asking for quite some time. Ulfa’s stand on illegal migration is quite controversial keeping in mind that it is the single most variable that has shaped Assamese identity discourse in the post-colonial period.

Besides, Ulfa’s alleged connivance with trans-national forces like the ISI, the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence and other fundamentalist forces in Bangladesh are no longer considered to be some “state-directed propaganda”. On the basis of my interaction and long association with the grassroots people in Upper Assam, — a stronghold of Ulfa — I can say that people are disillusioned with the compromises of the outfit.

People believe that the “utopia” that Ulfa has been promising is too costly for the Assamese people.

The sooner Ulfa realises this, the better it is for the organisation and for the people of Assam. However, the government’s role to tackle insurgency has so far been lopsided, myopic and security oriented.

Three things are required to tackle insurgency — political strategy, policy and policing.

Unfortunately it is the policing part that has been attempting the peace process in Assam — bypassing both political strategy and policy.

The political leaders must understand that “a heart and mind approach” always works better.

Here we must learn from Indira Gandhi, who took the initiative to settle the Mizo insurgency.

If we plan to settle insurgency by strict norms — like no third-party mediation, surrender first, confining cadres to camps and must accept Constitution first — peace (which we unfortunately understand as the absence of violence) will never come. We cannot resolve insurgency by a typical Weberian legal rational framework.

We may curse insurgents as the fundamentalist, alienated, frustrated lot, but ultimately, it’s persuasion, concession, reward, dialogue and political will that can resolve it.