Will there be war during the Dussehra holidays this year? The festival of Dussehra falls in October every year by the Hindu calendar. The festival is closely linked in Indian mythology and history with war. It is related to war over evildoers and the virtuous are always victorious in such wars. The victory of the virtuous over evil is commemorated during Dussehra through the Ramayana theatre. The virtuous god-king Rama defeats the evil Ravana in battle. The event is commemorated in north India by erecting huge effigies of the ten-headed Ravana and his colleagues. Two mere mortals dressed as Rama and his brother Lakshman shoot burning arrows to set the evil king's effigy aflame. This denouement brings a high mood of virtuous victory. The ceremonies are hugely attended. In Delhi, the prime minister and his cabinet also witness this ritual. Dussehra and its war linkages are observed in their many variants. In south India, a day is marked during Dussehra for venerating the weapons of war. It is the day of ayudha puja, the day of worshipping weapons. Many Indian army regiments observe this event by offering obeisance to weapons. In Maharashtra, the day historically marked the beginning of the campaigning season. Wars were waged to gain territory and to fill the treasury through loot. Today the event is still marked by groups dressed in mock war robes, setting out with swords to strike down a particular variety of plant in the countryside. The leaves of the plant are brought in sacks and distributed amongst friends and family as gold obtained in war. In Mysore, the ceremony of parading the erstwhile royal military appurtenances still continues. In Nepal, the day is marked by animal sacrifices for prosperity. Indian Gorkha regiments mark the day with an orgy of animal sacrifices including buffalo sacrifice. Dussehra seems to energize war plans elsewhere too. China had attacked India in October 1962. The United States of America launched its war against the taliban and Osama bin Laden in October last year. India's armed forces have been kept on war readiness on the borders with Pakistan for the last eight months. An Indian offensive into Pakistan was a real probability. The prime minister confirmed it, going so far as to say that he was quite prepared to accept in the process a nuclear strike from Pakistan. As we have been assured by those who claim to know nuclear strategy, if Pakistan had lobbed one nuclear bomb at us, India would have let loose a nuclear barrage which would have obliterated Pakistan. General Pervez Musharraf, not to be outdone, had assured India of a nuclear strike, if it had dared cross the sacred borders of Pakistan. Later, under pressure and not a little ridicule from the international community, both governments retracted their nuclear assertions. We have been assured by Indian strategists that war was never considered as an option by New Delhi. We are of course yet to be informed of the need to mobilize the army for war, if the plan was not to go for war. General Colin Powell has made his third trip to India and Pakistan in less than a year. He has pleased India by asking Musharraf to end cross-border terrorism and infiltration. He has pleased Pakistan's leader by asking India to accept international observers at the October elections in Jammu and Kashmir. He has asked Pakistan to keep off Jammu and Kashmir and the electoral exercise there. He has told New Delhi that after the elections, the India-Pakistan dialogue should commence. New Delhi has announced that its army will remain on the border until October. It has no intention of reducing pressure on Musharraf. The general seems under no pressure, and is happily touring outside Pakistan. He says Pakistan's conventional military strength is enough to deter India from launching an offensive. It does not suit the general sahib to let the elections in Jammu and Kashmir go through smoothly. That will negate his claim that these elections are being thrust upon an unwilling Kashmiri population. There is every possibility that he will do little to prevent violence and terror being inflicted in Jammu and Kashmir in the coming months. He will of course claim that the violence is part of the Kashmiri freedom struggle and has nothing to do with jihadis based in Pakistan. What would New Delhi's response be if its carefully laid plans for the elections in Jammu and Kashmir are sabotaged? What would be its response, if a series of bomb blasts or terrorist attacks take place between now and October? There are elections being urgently sought by New Delhi in Gujarat. They may well take place around October. If, as is being estimated, terrorist attacks occur in Gujarat, as happened in Mumbai after the pogrom against Muslims there, how will New Delhi respond? The army, poised for war on the border, offers the option of immediate military action. The political temptation of taking all bad news off the front pages by a little war would not be a small one either. Kaluchak effectively achieved that for Gujarat. That brings us back to the auspicious occasion of Dussehra in October. The rains, scanty as they are, would be over. The drought-affected parts of India would be clamouring for relief. Squabbles between states over sharing meagre river waters would be more pronounced. Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir and the murky political goings on about power-sharing in Uttar Pradesh, would all be pressing on the leadership in New Delhi. A sentiment of being besieged would be a likely outcome. How would a leadership under pressure make its strategic decisions? Past precedents neither offer insights nor inspire confidence. The political leadership, which is accountable to Parliament, people and the party cadre, is under compulsion to act and demonstrate resolve. That drives elected governments to act in haste. More often than not governments act by grasping the only instrument that can quickly respond. The military instrument is the easiest to apply and that is what comes into play. The Indian army deployed on the borders is ready for striking against Pakistan. It would be a political lifesaver, if conditions described above indeed come about. What kind of war would New Delhi want to wage against Pakistan? If it must be fought, a war needs to obtain a decisive outcome. A war must force a change of policy on Musharraf's part. He is not going to be forced into that condition unless an Indian offensive makes rapid and substantial gains. These gains may be of territory vital to Pakistan, or a dramatic collapse of the Pakistani military machine. The gains may be of major damage to Pakistan's economic infrastructure. If these are indeed likely to be gained, Musharraf and his corps commanders are very unlikely to wait for it to happen. They will bring or threaten to bring nuclear weapons into play. That catastrophic scenario is not going to be allowed to come about by major powers. New Delhi's war options against Pakistan are thus limited by the presence of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent. There is a group of strategists which recommends 'salami slicing' as a war option. This implies that India captures small slivers of Pakistani territory through a series of small wars. This overlooks the fact that by this approach India would be fighting a number of small wars for a long time to come. That would still not force a change of policy on Musharraf's part. Thus New Delhi may find itself left with its army deployed on the border, and unable to force an outcome. Come October, the government may well have to ask the army to do a major training exercise and return to its positions in the hinterland. The cycle of makebelieve, of playacting a war, and returning with leaves of desert plants as symbols of conquest, would then have been completed. The customs of Dussehra would have been sustained. The author is former director general military operations, and currently director, Delhi Policy Group