In an age when Parliament seems incapable of discharging its basic constitutional responsibilities, it will come as no surprise to be informed that Parliament has virtually abdicated its function of monitoring international treaties signed by India. If Parliament is the premier representative institution through which the sovereignty of the people is given concrete expression, nowhere has that sovereignty been more at risk in recent times than in the matter of signing international treaties and incurring international obligations. As India integrates more into the global order, by signing treaties and by joining more multi-lateral institutions with the binding power of sanctions, it is becoming increasingly clear that Parliament's role in the incurring of these international obligations is quite minimal. This is despite the fact that the Indian Constitution expressly puts treaty-making powers within the jurisdiction of Parliament. But it has been generally assumed that while Parliament has constitutional control over the executive, it cannot be disputed that the creation of obligations undertaken in treaties are functions of the executive alone. Leaving international treaties entirely to executive prerogative is untenable on two grounds. First, this is against the intent of the Constitution. Parliament is given power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in list I of the seventh schedule of the Constitution. This list includes items such as 'entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementation of treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries'. Treaty-making is within the competence of Parliament and is not limited to the executive. But Parliament has not enacted any laws that regulate the manner in which the executive shall sign or ratify international treaties and covenants. Nor does Parliament decide the manner in which these treaties should be implemented, except in cases where such implementation requires Parliament to enact a law. The second reason the status quo is untenable is this. The impact of international treaties on domestic policy is vastly increasing in both scale and scope. Many of the international treaties that India has signed during the last decade have profound ramifications not only for economic policy, but for the structure of the Indian polity as well. Let us take one example. Under the Indian system of federalism, certain items are placed within the jurisdiction of the state government, some within the jurisdiction of central governments, and some are on a concurrent list. Notwithstanding this separation of jurisdictions, Parliament, under Article 253 of the Indian Constitution has 'the power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any country or countries or any decision made at an international conference, associated or other body'. This provision, if extended to all domains, has the odd effect of allowing the provisions of an international treaty trump the basic architecture of the Indian Constitution. For instance, under the allocation of subjects, under the Indian Constitution, agriculture is a state subject. There is a case to be made that India's signing of the agriculture related provisions of the World Trade Organization not only has an impact on Indian economic policy but also transforms the nature of Indian federalism. In effect, crucial parts of agricultural policy, a matter left to the states by the Constitution, is now being determined by international agreements which have not been discussed, let alone authorized by state legislatures. The point is that the lack of parliamentary involvement in formulating, authorizing and ratifying international treaties may also diminish the Parliament's capacity to define the terms of Indian federalism. Most treaties signed these days obliterate the distinction between domestic and foreign policy. In an environment where international agreements determine the range of policy choices on issues from agriculture and tariffs to the structure of property rights, Parliament can maintain an important legislative role only if it is an effective part of the treaty-making process. The substantive merits or demerits of particular treaties are not under consideration here. But the process of formulating and signing international treaties is posing a significant challenge to all representative institutions. Parliaments of New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom have all democratized treaty negotiations so that they do not entirely bypass parliament. Subjecting treaties to parliamentary supervision is not an easy task. This makes international negotiations more complex and potentially endless. Parliament itself has to have institutional capacities to participate in such a process. Often parliament itself has an interest in not democratizing the treaty-making process. Treaties can, after all, give parliaments cover, to push through legislation in the face of political deadlock. There have been intermittent attempts to formally bind the executive to a ratification procedure. In 1993, George Fernandes introduced a bill for amending Article 253 of the Indian Constitution, to provide that treaties and conventions be ratified by not less than one half the membership of each house of Parliament and by a majority of the legislatures of not less than half the states. But Fernandes's bill, like similar ones since, was not even brought up for consideration. It could be argued that the fact that Parliament has not taken an active role in monitoring the executive on the matter of international treaties does not imply that the executive has been given a free hand by the legislature. In a parliamentary system with party government, presumably no government will enter into treaties that do not have significant support within their own parties, and by implication amongst the legislators. In practice political parties, even of the government in power, are not very widely consulted. There is a great deal of secrecy surrounding international negotiations and members of most political parties admit that they learn of international treaties after the fact. The interesting analytical puzzle is this: would a formal ratification procedure strengthen India's hand in international negotiations? Would it be the case that in international negotiations India could use the fact that treaties it signs will have to be ratified, to put pressure on those with whom it is negotiating to change the terms of the agreement? Certainly, the American government uses the argument that a treaty will have to be ratified by congress as a bargaining tool. In the Indian case it is difficult to imagine what the counterfactual would look like, but there is very little evidence that Parliament and the executive could have strategically joined hands to strengthen India's bargaining position. The second reason why one might not be quite alarmed at the lack of parliamentary oversight of treaties is this. Most treaties require incorporation into the national legal system via legislation approved by Parliament. Such is, for instance, the case with many of the provisions that accrue from joining the WTO. It could be argued that even if Parliament did not have a role in signing a treaty, Parliament will exercise its sovereign authority to decide whether or not an obligation stemming from an international agreement will become Indian law. Theoretically speaking, Parliament can, at that stage, refuse to incorporate the provisions of a treaty into domestic law and render the treaty ineffective. In principle this argument has merits. But in practice, a treaty already signed, is something of a fait accompli, since non-compliance results in sanctions. If Parliament is to survive as an authoritative legislative body, it will have to think about addressing the following questions. How does Parliament make treaty making subject to accountability? How does Parliament create clear norms that require prior consultation with Parliament on particular classes of treaties? Should Parliament legislate something of a formal ratification proposal? Parliament's viability as a key decision-making body will depend upon finding some procedures that address these concerns. The author is professor of philosophy, law and governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University,New Delhi