Is 'national consensus' synonymous with 'political consensus'? The significance of this question seems to have been lost - and that is unfortunate - in the euphoria over the recent visit of the Indian prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, to the United States. During this visit, Vajpayee has done something that warrants a national debate. The issue in question is India and the comprehensive test ban treaty. It may be noted that around this time last year, the Vajpayee government was talking of evolving a national consensus before deciding on whether or not to sign the comprehensive test ban treaty. In the October 18, 1999 issue of the Newsweek, Vajpayee said in an interview, 'We were in the process of building a national consensus on the issue of signing the CTBT when domestic political developments forced mid-term general election. That process of securing a national consensus will now be resumed once a new government is in place. Some matching action by our key interlocutors will help build the consensus'. However, soon after the Vajpayee government got a fresh mandate from the people, the external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh, subtly modified this commitment. Talking to journalists on October 17, he said that as far as the CTBT was concerned, the government would 'strive for the widest possible consensus on the treaty'. Subsequently, on various occasions, the officials in the ministry of external affairs further clarified their minister's statement by emphasising that India's decision on the CTBT would follow the 'broadest possible national consensus'. It is against this background that Vajpayee's promise to the US president, Bill Clinton, during his visit that India would do everything possible towards putting the CTBT into force assumes significance. The promise, totally oblivious of 'a national consensus', was very much reflected in the joint India-US statement, signed on September 15. The relevant part of the statement reads: 'The United States and India seek to advance their dialogue on security and nonproliferation issues, building upon the joint statement signed during President Clinton's visit to India in March. They reiterated their respective commitments to forgo nuclear explosive tests. India reaffirmed that, subject to its supreme national interests, it will continue its voluntary moratorium until the CTBT comes into effect. The United States reaffirmed its intention to work for ratification of the treaty at the earliest possible date. The Indian government will continue efforts to develop a broad political consensus on the issue of the treaty, with the purpose of bringing these discussions to a successful conclusion. India also reconfirmed its commitment not to block entry into force of the treaty. India expects that all other countries, as included in article XIV of CTBT, will adhere to this treaty without reservations'. Significantly, the joint statement has talked of 'a political consensus' not 'a national consensus'. The two are not the same. A national consensus goes beyond the country's political class. It involves the country's intelligentsia, scientific community and the military leadership as well. The military of 'a nuclear-weapon power' like India should contribute their views to the debate on the CTBT, since ultimately it is the soldiers who will be using the nuclear weapons, if required. Meanwhile, no less a person than the former chairman of the Indian atomic energy commission, P.K. Iyengar, has argued that India's stated goal of developing a credible nuclear deterrent cannot be achieved without further testing. He is not convinced that our nuclear tests in 1998 have given us enough data to develop a credible nuclear weapon system, having accuracy and safety. So, imagine a situation when the Indian soldiers are given untested weapons. One dreads such a prospect, unless the government, in a transparent national debate, comes out with convincing assurances that the country has in its possession credible weaponized nuclear deterrence. Naturally, in any debate on CTBT, some important questions need to be answered. These are whether India should continue the present standstill policy of honouring its declared moratorium but continue laboratory work to refine the warheads, or whether it should resume testing and then enter the CTBT. For instance, many scientists and knowledgeable senior military personnel with whom this writer has interacted argue that India should sign a limited CTBT, which would not impose a blanket ban, but would cap the number of tests and the yield for such tests over an agreed period of time. Obviously, each of these options has its attendant costs and benefits. The process of hammering out a national consensus cannot shirk addressing these issues. In fact, Iyengar, who has been in the business of nuclear science since 1952, has a point when he demands that the government must first come out with a method of arriving at 'national consensus'. As he told this writer recently, 'There are two ways of arriving at a national consensus: conducting a national referendum on the issue or asking the parliament to pass a resolution. The government must adopt one of these methods. I do not think a few people sitting in the Union cabinet represent national consensus on CTBT'. In fact, now that the Vajpayee government is undertaking a study of reviewing the country's Constitution, it is appropriate that the treaty-making power of the government, which is unlimited at the moment, should be put under adequate checks and balances. After all, a democratic India has an undemocratic provision by which the executive, free from the influences of the legislature and the judiciary, has got the sweeping power to sign a treaty, ratify it and implement it. One can well imagine a situation when a government, without the confidence of the Parliament, signs a treaty and immediately ratifies it, thereby imposing its decision on its successors and the whole country. Because, under international law, the successor government has to abide by the international agreements made by its predecessor. Viewed thus, the Vajpayee government's latest preference for 'political consensus' could be construed as a clear move to avoid a larger debate on the CTBT. It is obvious that the government will only try to convince the Congress party, with the notion that if the Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party agree on the matter then the consensus is said to be arrived at. In a way, if the Congress agrees on such a consensus, it will be taken for a big ride by the Vajpayee government. Because, by reaffirming in black and white that '[India] will continue its voluntary moratorium until the CTBT comes into effect', the Vajpayee government has virtually become a party to the treaty. Since once the CTBT comes into effect, India cannot conduct any nuclear tests, by committing that it would not even test before actually signing the treaty, Vajpayee has ensured India's concurrence with the treaty. Viewed thus, his advocacy for a political consensus is nothing but a redundant exercise. In other words, what the government wants is the support of the Congress for legitimizing its commitment to the Clinton administration on the CTBT. Few would buy the government's logic about the so-called escape clause in this commitment, that India's moratorium of nuclear tests is 'subject to its supreme national interests'. After all, all the international treaties have a similar clause. Even the nuclear nonproliferation treaty has this clause. Why is it then that the Vajpayee government is not talking of acceding to the NPT? Under the US laws, India can get the necessary technology and other material assistance, now denied under various sanctions, only when it becomes party to the NPT, and not to the CTBT. It is not surprising, therefore, that even after all the hype over India and the US becoming 'natural allies', there has been no breakthrough in the two countries agreeing on the renewal of military assistance, exchange of military and strategic personnel and in the removal of all the sanctions and interactions in the field of the civilian nuclear programme. Undeniably, Vajpayee's visit has improved the 'atmosphere' of Indo-US relations. However, as any observer of diplomacy knows, 'atmosphere', unaccompanied by a breakthrough, is always vulnerable to 'change'.