The former military ruler of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, had kept even Ashfaq Parvez Kayani - his successor as army chief - in the dark while carrying out the Kargil operation in 1999, according to a new book by the retired Lieutenant General Abdul Majeed Malik. Major General Kayani being the then General Officer Commanding 12 Division, Murree 'did not know anything about the operation' and, at a later stage, Kayani 'opposed the operation'. The author's conclusion is in line with the contention of the prime minister of Pakistan at the time, Nawaz Sharif, who, too, feigned ignorance, blaming his army chief, Musharraf, for the fiasco of the Kargil misadventure.
This is all very good to read. But what was the reality? Is it the factual stuff which the author would like Indians to believe? Or is there a hidden agenda to spread misinformation to gullible Indians?
One has to refer to the command structure and deployment of Pakistan's troops on the eve of Kargil along with the military-ethos-cum-political-chemistry between Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf. Thus, whereas Musharraf as the army chief was a four-star officer, Kayani in early 1999 was only a two-star general, and nowhere in any disciplined and normal army in the world is the four-star chief obliged to talk directly or order or inform a two-star officer commanding a division, thereby bypassing his three-star officer and sowing the seeds of dissension, indiscipline and insubordination.
Hence, the contention of Malik that four-star Musharraf kept two-star Kayani 'in the dark' has no meaning. It is simply a hollow stunt meant to fool 'ignorant civilians'. Second, Kayani was in no way connected to the Kargil plan of action, the deployment of his 12 Division in Murree notwithstanding. It is the three-star commander of Rawalpindi-based X Corps which is directly responsible for Northern Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir. Apart from three divisions deployed in Murree (12 Div), Jhelum (19 Div) and Gujrat (23 Div), there is a Force Commander Northern Area under a two-star officer, the strength of which is equal to, if not more, than a division, under the administrative command of 10 Corps and operational command of the general headquarters of the Pakistan army chief's office.
Thus, on the eve of the Kargil invasion by Pakistan's army, there were six (virtually independent) brigades with their headquarters in Skardu, Astor, Siachen glacier, Gilgit, Dansam and Gultari, and most infantry units belonged to the Northern Light Infantry. And it was the latter that launched their clandestine and long-drawn assault on Indian territory from Gultari, located north-west of Kargil and the ridge thereof. The army took full advantage of the then Indian defence higher command's monumental failure.
No doubt India launched a fierce counter-attack and got back its position; but at what colossal cost? And how? No 'guilty' man of the initial failure regarding Kargil was ever brought to justice. And the Indian diplomatic endeavour, too, subsequently became eager to mend fences, demonstrating once again the faulty north-west frontier policy of the Indian establishment down the ages: from Alexander to Kargil and beyond - the story goes on.
It has often been enthusiastically argued that Nawaz Sharif, then Pakistan's prime minister (he is holding the same office again) knew nothing about his army's invasion of India in Kargil. How far is it true? The strategy began during the time of Musharraf's predecessor, Jahangir Karamat, who says, 'Kargil came up several times. The Dras-Kargil road was an interdiction target for indirect artillery fire. During my tenure, we decided interdiction on Dras-Kargil Road. This did not work. It would create problems for locals and hamper covert operations in Indian Held Kashmir.' With the arrival of Musharraf, 'the momentum for action was carried forward by the Generals, with the Prime Minister (Nawaz Sharif) and his coterie acquiescing'.
Initially, Musharraf had very cordial relations with Nawaz Sharif as he first visited the Northern Areas with the army chief and was briefed on January 29 and again on February 05, 1999 in Kel regarding the Indo-Pak turbulent spot. Official records and credible contemporary documents reveal that Nawaz Sharif continued to be fully kept in the loop by the army and was briefed in detail on March 12 and May 17, 1999. Hence, to suggest that Nawaz 'knew nothing' and was as innocent as a girl of three would be the height of perjury on the part of a prime minister of a sovereign state.
Understandably, therefore, although Pakistan's prime minister had the necessary foreknowledge, it can at best be argued that perhaps he was not necessarily the architect of the Kargil plan of action. Who, then, were the people to initially conceive of the Kargil operation? This group consisted of Major General Javed Hasan, Force Commander Northern Area; Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed, the boss of X Corps Rawalpindi (who later became a full-time member of the Tabligh-i-Jamaat); Lieutenant General Mohammad Aziz Khan, chief of general staff; Brigadier Salahuddin Satti, posted just across Kargil (who later rose to become X Corps Commander Rawalpindi); Major General Tauqir Zia, director general, military operations; Lieutenant General Ziauddin and Major General Jamshed Gulzar, both from the Inter-Services Intelligence, and the army chief, Musharraf.
Let us now have a final look at the activities of the prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. It was May 17, 1999. Sharif was accompanied by two retired lieutenant generals, Abdul Majeed Malik and Iftikhar, to the meeting with army top brass. 'The briefing map indicated the location of 108 bunkers that Pakistan had occupied or constructed, and the briefing stated that the 'Indians could not oust us'.'
Before dispersing, Sharif categorically maintained: 'This is a military operation. All I can say is that... there should be no withdrawal, no surrender of any post because that will greatly embarrass us.' He asked if 'we could hold on'. Both lieutenant generals Aziz Khan and Mahmud Ahmed confirmed that they could. According to Major General Tauqir Zia, 'The PM left everything to the army to decide' and yet 'asked questions as did Abdul Majeed Malik', the author who now fiercely defends Nawaz Sharif.
It would, therefore, be in the fitness of things if Abdul Majeed Malik now came out to state clearly who is telling the truth and who is telling lies, instead of trying to reconstruct or destroy the history and the failure of Pakistan in Kargil in 1999.
