The ground offensive of the Northern Alliance has quickly cleared most of Afghanistan from the control of the taliban. The powerful air attacks could not by themselves force the taliban out of their strongholds. They softened the taliban defences, knocked out the command and control facilities, destroyed tanks, guns and helicopters and prepared the ground for a Northern Alliance offensive to start. The taliban had apparently had enough punishment and pulled out as soon as the offensive started. This was proof once again of the adage that a ground war cannot be won by air attacks alone. Wars are meant to bring peace but they usually don't. Military victories often plant the seeds for other conflicts to come in the future. In the last three decades of the 20th century, military victories have in fact continued the conflict they were meant to put an end to. Israeli victories against the Arabs have not brought peace. A spectacular military victory in the Kuwait war against Iraq has only extended the conflict from the battlefields to the political arena. Iraq is still being viewed as requiring more military punishment after the September attacks in the United States of America. Military victories in former Yugoslavia did not end conflict in its ethnic or inter-state form. There is every probability that Afghanistan will follow the same trend. The taliban has lost control of Afghanistan territory. They, however, retain the capability to continue a military conflict of the hit-and-run kind for some time. There is no dearth of small arms, explosives and volunteers to continue an asymmetric war. They can make governance from Kabul difficult, which in turn will make peace the major casualty. The end of the military campaign will see the beginning of a politico-military campaign. The campaign will consist of a series of political gains and failures combined with military successes and setbacks for both the Northern Alliance and the taliban. The military capability of the Northern Alliance will be severely curtailed if the US air support is withdrawn. The nature of the tussle over Kunduz, for example, sums up the nature of military conflict likely to be seen in Afghanistan in the future. The Afghan prefers to fight with the winning side and pledges his loyalty accordingly. There is likely to be a series of defections and re-defections in the weeks and months to come. Battlelines will change and new battlelines can emerge depending on who wins more numbers to his side. There is another war underway in Afghanistan. That is the US campaign to smoke out Osama bin Laden and bring him to justice. These operations will also target al Qaida leadership and cells in Afghanistan. This private war is being fought with US special forces operating with Afghan informers and guides. High technology surveillance, electronic eavesdropping, quick response teams which can be moved by helicopters or dropped by parachute, and all supported by massive air attacks form the core of this force. This war is being conducted with Northern Alliance cooperation but is not going to be governed by their desires. As it is, the Northern Alliance has protested against British special forces operating from the Bagram airport. It has also declared its opposition to foreign forces operating in Afghanistan. It is not clear what the Northern Alliance position would be once it has taken control of the major towns of the country. Will it ask US bombing to stop or would it watch from the sidelines as the US continues to bomb and launch operations to get to bin Laden? There is another war on the cards, by which the taliban will seek to eliminate Pashtun leaders who had fought with the taliban and who may emerge as the reformed or moderate taliban. These would have links with Pakistan and its Inter-State Intelligence which would be unacceptable to the Northern Alliance. There is no clarity on who would be the central authority controlling these multiple campaigns. There is therefore every possibility of armed conflict continuing even as negotiations take place to find a provisional government for Kabul. Jockeying for advantage and for having a greater say in governance can also bring about rifts amongst the Northern Alliance. In the confused situation, Pakistan will make every effort to salvage its lost control over the Afghan situation. Pakistan's border with Afghanistan is a seething mass of displaced and defeated Pashtuns. They are angry with the US for having targeted the taliban and with Pakistan for having let them down by siding with the US. This mass of people can be a potentially destabilizing element in the peace initiatives which are underway now. Pakistan can be expected to be active in using this large and restive bit of population to minimize the advantage to the Northern Alliance. All in all, there are unsettled times ahead in Afghanistan. If however bin Laden is eliminated, there is no guarantee that the US will continue to retain its major military presence or continue to operate in Afghanistan. If it pulls out its air support to the Northern Alliance, the taliban can regroup and attempt to regain some of the lost territory. In that eventuality, a civil war condition will take root where all possibility of a responsible and accountable government will vanish. War lords will then rule over the country. If the US is unwilling to play a major role in future in Afghanistan, partition of the country amidst many contenders will become a distinct possibility. Whether that becomes the harbinger of peace or decades of internecine wars is an open question. The worst sufferer from that situation would be Pakistan whose already fragile polity would be further buffeted. Instability in Pakistan cannot but have an impact on India. We come back to the question of whether wars or armed conflicts lead to peace. Since absence of wars is not peace, and local armed conflict can be continued indefinitely, peace is not feasible without a political solution. Afghanistan is not given to political settlements. Its history, its ancient animosities, the foreign interference inevitable in such confused circumstances, all make for a volatile cocktail in the country. The only way out would be for three or four major groups, each with military clout, to rule over the different regions of Afghanistan. Much therefore depends on the outcome of the negotiations about to begin, and the ability of the US and United Nations to knock together a coalition for peace in Afghanistan. The author is director, Delhi Policy Group, and former director general (military operations)