Indira Gandhi was preparing for her upcoming election campaign when she received this note from Haksar five days into the new year, on January 5, 1971: PM may kindly see the report placed below prepared by the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW). I have long been feeling a sense of uneasiness about the intentions of Pakistan in future. The recent political developments in Pakistan have added to my anxieties. With the overwhelming victory of East Pakistan wing [Sheikh Mujibur Rahman], the solution of internal problems of Pakistan have become infinitely more difficult. Consequently, the temptation to seek solution to these problems by external adventures has become very great. I think that the time has come when our Armed Forces need to make a very realistic assessment both of Pakistan's capability and our response. I have a feeling that there are many weak spots in our defence capabilities. These need to be remedied without loss of time. I know how busy PM is. And yet, I venture to suggest that PM should call in all the three Chiefs of Staff, Defence Secretary and the Defence Minister and share with them her anxieties and ask them to urgently prepare their own assessment and make recommendations of what the requirements of each of the Services are so that we can feel a sense of security. I suggest that such a meeting should be held quietly and without any publicity...

Just as Haksar was worrying about Pakistan based on his meetings with [Rameshwarnath] Kao, Ritwick Ghatak cropped up again. The eccentric Bengali filmmaker had made a film on Lenin but it had run into controversy. On January 6, 1971, a day after sharing his worries about Pakistan with the prime minister, he told her:

In matters of this sort, one is apt to be carried away by somewhat exaggerated notions that our society, such as it is, would be seriously deflected from its course of evolution by a film on the life of Lenin as produced by Shri Ritwick Ghatak. Generations of people all over the world have seen far more inflammatory films by Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Rossellini and others... I myself saw the film and I cannot say with any sense of realism that Ritwick Ghatak's film on Lenin will bring the revolution even fraction of a second earlier. However, I am rather more oppressed by the poverty of Shri Ghatak who has staked up a little money with the help of some hapless financier and they are both desperately trying to sell this film to the Soviet Union... It is really quite comic that so many hours of official time should have been wasted in considering the solemn question whether the film should or should not be released. I feel that we can well afford to let the film go giving it an "A" certificate [Adults only].

After dictating the note Haksar realised that he may have been carried away by his liberalism and suggested to the prime minister that she may agree to having the film certified "for adults only" subject to deletion "only of that portion of the commentary on land grab sequence". The prime minister agreed!

***

On January 18, 1971, Haksar sent Indira Gandhi a note the significance would be revealed much later. He wrote: I have received a programme drawn up for PM to tour her own constituency on February 1, 1971. I find that helicopter is being used twice. PM has to consider this carefully. Also whether this was done in 1967. Use of helicopter, which West Bengal is advising in the interest of security, is one thing. Its use in going to inaccessible places is also understandable. Whether similar justification exists for its use by PM in her own constituency, requires, I submit, careful consideration.

Some months later after the election results were declared and she had won handsomely in a landslide, her opponent Raj Narain would petition the Allahabad High Court that Indira Gandhi was guilty of a series of electoral malpractices, including the use of government helicopters for her campaign... As it is, she would be held guilty on two counts. There may well have been a third count had she not heeded Haksar's advice on the use of helicopters in her own constituency of Rae Bareili in Uttar Pradesh...

***

Events soon overtook both of them when on January 30, 1971, an Indian Airlines plane flying from Srinagar to Jammu was hijacked to Lahore and destroyed there. India immediately suspended flights of Pakistani civil and military aircraft over Indian territory. Indira Gandhi issued two statements in quick succession, both drafted by Haksar. From Calcutta, on February 6, 1971, she appealed to "all political parties in the country not to use this incident for narrow political ends", and ended by saying "I should like to warn all elements, inside the country or outside, that we stand united in the defence of our national honour and interests and shall not allow them to be threatened or jeopardised under any circumstances". The same day, Haksar sent her a message:

A message has come from Islamabad saying that Pakistan Government has sent a note requesting mutual talks and consultation for overcoming difficulties that have arisen and saying that India should not have acted unilaterally in cancelling civilian and military overflights. This I interpret as a good sign. We have said that we are considering this request made by Pakistan, but in the meantime Government of India's decision in respect of overflights remains, expressing the hope that Pakistan would create a better atmosphere for mutual negotiations by paying compensation for the loss and damage suffered by India...

***

On March 26, 1971, Indira Gandhi, fully briefed by Haksar with extensive talking points, met with leaders of all Opposition parties. Haksar had urged her to be firm and say that India's response to what was happening in East Pakistan should not become a subject matter of public debate as "such a debate would defeat the purpose of giving such comfort as we can to democratic forces in Pakistan as a whole". He asked her to emphasise that while India's sympathy towards the people of Bangladesh was natural, India, as a state had to walk warily because Pakistan was a sovereign member of the United Nations, and "outside interference in events internal to Pakistan would not earn us either understanding or goodwill internationally". From his own personal knowledge he mentioned the Biafra secessionist movement in Nigeria, which had fizzled out because of lack of international support. There were other factors weighing on Haksar's mind while briefing the prime minister - the impact of what India might say or do on its own consistent position on Kashmir and to what extent would Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his colleagues be able to establish their legitimacy in the eyes of the world.

In short, Haksar was advising the prime minister that the Government of India must move with a great deal of circumspection and "not allow our feelings to get the better of us". Evidently, she was in full agreement with this line for she followed Haksar's script largely at the meeting with Opposition leaders. But the Fifth Lok Sabha, which was then in its opening session, was agitated and already voices were being raised for some decisive "intervention" by India. To cool passions, Indira Gandhi moved a resolution in Parliament on March 31, 1971, drafted by Haksar, promising "whole-hearted sympathy and support for the people of East Bengal"...

***

In June 1972, Indira Gandhi was to take a major new initiative on Kashmir, the roots of which can be traced back to Haksar's conversations with her. The fact that a summit meeting was going to be held with President Bhutto of Pakistan at the end of the month gave these conversations added meaning. On June 2, 1972, Haksar wrote to the prime minister:

...We have been lacking in subtlety in handling Sheikh Abdullah. A variety of vested interests have made the task of looking at Sheikh Abdullah, as he is, an extremely difficult one. Nevertheless, it is imperative to make a fresh start and lead him by hand on the difficult and tortuous road whose ultimate destination is reconciliation...

Even apart from the wider considerations of need for reconciliation, there is an imperative necessity of not keeping Sheikh Abdullah in our custody and thus having his skeleton in our cupboard when we talk to President Bhutto and tell him that Kashmir is ours with Sheikh Abdullah in our custody rather than a free man... I mentioned all this to Shri D.P. Dhar several days ago and told him quite frankly that since the original sin of what was done in 1953 [Sheikh Abdullah's arrest and dismissal as chief minister] lay largely on him, he should ponder deeply over the problem of what to do with Sheikh Abdullah... I believe that he subsequently spoke to PM and I was glad to learn from PM last night that the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir feels that the Sheikh should immediately be released...

But releasing Sheikh Abdullah is not enough. Before he returns to the Valley, PM must meet with Sheikh Saheb. The meeting is going to be painful, because PM will have to show extreme forbearance and listen to his long tale of woes; but PM should let him unburden himself and then say we must look to the future... Given this, we can begin, step by step, the long journey towards reconciliation, that Sheikh Saheb should appoint someone and that PM would also appoint someone and two of them can quietly talk things over...

Reproduced with permission from Intertwined Lives: P.N. Haksar and Indira Gandhi by Jairam Ramesh (Simon and Schuster India)