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Regular-article-logo Saturday, 26 April 2025

Defamation a crime, rules apex court

The Supreme Court today upheld the constitutional validity of criminal defamation provisions, saying individuals' right to reputation was part of their fundamental rights.

Our Legal Correspondent Published 14.05.16, 12:00 AM

New Delhi, May 13: The Supreme Court today upheld the constitutional validity of criminal defamation provisions, saying individuals' right to reputation was part of their fundamental rights.

The order came as the court rejected pleas by Rahul Gandhi, Arvind Kejriwal, Subramanian Swamy, some media professionals and a few NGOs against Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC and Section 199 of the CrPC. They had contended that the sections violated an individual's fundamental right to free speech and expression.

"Right to free speech cannot mean that a citizen can defame the other. Protection of reputation is a fundamental right. It is also a human right. Cumulatively, it serves social interest. Thus, we are unable to accept that provisions relating to criminal defamation are not saved by the doctrine of proportionality because it determines a limit which is not impermissible within the criterion of reasonable restriction," Justices Dipak Misra and P.C. Pant said in a 268-page order.

While Congress vice-president Rahul faces a defamation case in Maharashtra filed by a RSS leader for allegedly linking Gandhi's assassination to the organisation, Delhi chief minister Kejriwal has been sued by Union finance minister Arun Jaitley for accusing him of corruption. BJP leader Swamy is battling a plethora of cases in Tamil Nadu filed by the Jayalalitha government, and another in Assam for purported anti-Muslim remarks.

The court rejected the petitioners' arguments that defamation could only acquire an element of criminality if the statement incited an offence. "Reputation is an inextricable aspect of the right to life under Article 21 (right to life and liberty) of the Constitution and the State in order to sustain and protect the reputation of an individual, has kept the provision under Section 499 IPC alive as part of law," the bench said in its order.

The seminal point, the court stressed, is the permissibility of criminal defamation as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2) - on freedom of speech - of the Constitution. "Reputation being an inherent component of Article 21 (right to life and liberty), we do not think it should be allowed to be sullied solely because another individual can have his freedom. It is not a restriction that has an inevitable consequence which impairs circulation of thoughts and ideas," Justice Misra, writing the order, said.

While Section 499 of the IPC defines defamation, Section 500 prescribes punishment up to two years or fine, or both. Section 199CrPC is a special provision under which a public prosecutor can file a complaint on behalf of a public servant - such as governors or chief ministers - if they are "defamed".

The bench said the provisions gave persons wronged and abused the right to move court to retrieve their reputation. "A balance between the two rights needs to be struck. Reputation of one cannot be allowed to be crucified at the altar of the other's right of free speech. The legislature in its wisdom has not thought it appropriate to abolish criminality of defamation in the obtaining social climate", Justice Misra said.

The court said the two IPC sections were not a restriction on free speech that could be deemed disproportionate. "It (the legislature) has kept criminal defamation on the statute book as in the existing social climate, it subserves the collective interest because the reputation of each is ultimately inhered in the reputation of all."

Nothing is wrong with Section 199of the CrPc either as it does not provide any special powers to public servants, the bench said. "Public function stands on a different footing than the private activities of a public servant. The provision gives them protection for their official acts. There cannot be defamatory attacks on them because of discharge of their due functions. In that sense, they constitute a different class."

The court "clarified that criticism is different from defamation". "One is bound to tolerate criticism, dissent and discordance but not expected to tolerate a defamatory attack," Justice Misra said.

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