The United States of America and Pakistan have been the operational focus of India's foreign policy since the terrorist attacks on the US in September, 2001. The focus on Pakistan increased after the Jaish-e-Mohammed's terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13 last year. The major powers whose attitudes and policies are of importance to India are the US and China. There has been a greater clarity in US policies in this regard in Indian perceptions owing to two reasons: links between al Qaida, the taliban and Pakistan-based terrorist organizations active against India, and the continuous high-level interaction between the governments of India and US since September last. In contrast, there have been ambiguities regarding China's attitudes and policies in Indian perceptions. The visit of the Chinese prime minister, Zhu Rongji, to India early in January has, to some extent, clarified these ambiguities. India has been host to two senior Chinese leaders since the second half of 2001. The former prime minister and number two in the Chinese Communist Party's hierarchy, Li Peng, was in India with a large Chinese business delegation earlier and Zhu Rongji was in India early this January. Both Li Peng and Zhu Rongji came to India amidst the changing strategic and security environment in subcontinental Asia in the context of the US-led campaign against international terrorism. Discussions between these leaders and the Indian leaders signified, first, that the controversies which afflicted Sino-Indian relations in the aftermath of India's nuclear weapon tests in 1998 have been set aside and that both countries are trying to get bilateral relations back on track. Second, the discussions emphasized the revival of continuity in Sino-Indian relations which began with the visit of the president, K.R. Narayanan, to China. Zhu Rongji's visit has been interpreted in positive terms by sections of the media and political analysts. His visiting India at a point of time when India's relations with Pakistan are in a state of high tension has been interpreted as reflecting China's desire to have an even-handed and impartial relationship with India and Pakistan in contrast to the close political and strategic involvement of China with Pakistan. One must examine whether this assessment is entirely accurate. Recalling the immediate background of Rongji's visit would be pertinent. Pervez Musharraf visited Beijing twice recently. The first at the end of last year; the second took place in response to Indian diplomatic and military pressure on Pakistan in reaction to the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. Although media reports asserted that Musharraf got a 'frosty reception' in Beijing, and that unlike in 1965 and 1971, the Chinese did not generate any overt political and military pressure on India, the fact is that China has given both financial assistance and defence supplies to Pakistan in recent months since September 2001 to the tune of about half a billion dollars. This has been done on the rationale that China, apart from continuing its traditional defence relationship with Pakistan, is strengthening Pakistan as a partner and ally in the global struggle against international terrorism. It is interesting to note that the US government and media have interpreted this recent assistance as proof of China's support to the US-led coalition against terrorism. Whatever the interpretation, the net result is that Pakistan's military capacities are sustained and enhanced by this assistance. This cannot be ignored by India. We must realize that while sustaining its close substantive strategic relationship with Pakistan, China is engaged in an exercise of structuring a political balance in power equations in the subcontinent by simultaneously engaging the Indian government. Rongji came at a point of time when the US's strategic presence was increasing in south and central Asia. The Kuwait war in 1990-91 initiated this process. While forces of the Pacific and central commands of the US converge in their jurisdictional role across the Pacific and the Atlantic, in the Indian Ocean and west Asia, the US central command's physical presence is now there in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The chief of the US central command, Lieutenant General Tommy Franks, stated during his recent visit to Pakistan that the US will continue its military presence in the south Asian region for some time to come. George W. Bush's state of the union message on January 30 underpins this indication. He stated that the campaign against terrorism is just beginning and is to last a long time. He indicated that North Korea, Iraq and Iran, could be the subsequent targets of the US campaign. There is US military presence now in Peshawar, Abbotabad and at the ports of Pasni, Gwadar and Karachi. The US's military presence at Gwadar has complicated China's naval presence at that Pakistani port. It is logical, therefore, for China to structure its south Asian policies in the context of the challenge which the US poses to Chinese influence in the area by the US's planned long-term strategic presence. This, in a manner, could encourage China to have a practical and stable relationship with India, while sustaining its equations with Pakistan to the maximum extent possible. This is the logic of Rongji's recent visit to India, more than China's desire to be impartial to Pakistan and India. We would do well to remember that in relative terms, relations with the US and Pakistan remain a matter of higher priority in Chinese foreign policy, owing to economic and political reasons. This is the context in which one has to assess the short-term prospects of India's relations with China. Six significant bilateral agreements were signed with China during Rongji's visit. These were on resumption of direct civil aviation contact between Beijing and New Delhi, on cooperation in the fields of tourism, space, science and technology, and to cooperate in countering terrorism through the creation of a Sino-Indian joint and comprehensive disarmament, an agreement on working towards a just and fair economic order and the potential for bilateral technological cooperation. There is a basis for structuring a durable and practical relationship between India and China despite the undercurrents of competition and the legacy of mutual suspicions. Rongji's coming to India at a time of subcontinental crisis and his statements here indicate that possibilities of such Sino-Indian cooperation exist. The author is former foreign secretary of India