Brexit offers a windfall opportunity to realize Narendra Modi's vision of India's relations with the Gulf. The history of India's past initiatives in the region, going back to the 1970s, is a long story of failed initiatives. As a result, while major nations in every continent transformed and upgraded their links with the Gulf states, India's policies - like those of Bangladesh and the Philippines -were confined to labour export and offering consular services or relief to its nationals. It is to Modi's credit that he has tried to realize the untapped potential of this country's extended neighbourhood since he came to office nearly three years ago.
However, given a history of all-round failure - especially in meeting even half way the long-standing desire of governments in the Gulf to deepen and expand relations with New Delhi - there is no reason to believe that what the prime minister wants to do in the region will be crowned by any higher degree of success than efforts in the chequered past.
Partnering with the United Kingdom offers an unexpected opportunity to change that. With its impending withdrawal from the European Union, the UK is looking afresh for partnerships outside the Continent. Credited by history and aided by a reservoir of goodwill and trust that Britain continues to enjoy in countries like Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, the Gulf is now a region of choice for the new British government led by Theresa May.
Three months ago, as the new occupant of 10 Downing Street was toying with alternative policy options following the shock vote for Brexit, Britain and the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council held their first joint summit. Meeting in Bahrain, the two sides agreed to launch the GCC-UK Strategic Partnership to "foster closer relations in all fields, including political, defence, security, and trade, as well as enhancing people-to-people contact and developing collective approaches to regional issues to advance their shared interest in stability and prosperity."
Speaking at this summit, May said, "As the United Kingdom leaves the EU, I am determined that we should seize the opportunity to get out into the world and to shape an even bigger global role for my country: yes, to build new alliances but more importantly, to go even further in working with old friends, like our allies here in the Gulf, who have stood alongside us for centuries."
Within days of that summit, Britain's foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, speaking at the annual Manama Dialogue that was organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, declared in his typically articulate and forceful style that "Britain is back east of Suez."
A month later, Johnson arrived in New Delhi and made it a point to stress at the government-backed Raisina Dialogue on geopolitics and geoeconomics, organized by the Observer Research Foundation, that Britain had "just decided to restore our military presence east of Suez with a £3 billion commitment over ten years and a naval support facility in Bahrain."
The £3 billion commitment that Johnson referred to in New Delhi had been announced by the British prime minister at her Manama summit with the six GCC heads of state. "... we will invest in hard power, with over £3 billion of defence spending in the region over the next decade, spending more on defence in the Gulf than in any other region of the world," she had announced in December.
At a time of uncertainties in overseas defence commitments by the United States of America following the election of Donald Trump as president, May stepped up to assure Gulf governments that "we will create a permanent presence in the region, the first such facility east of Suez since 1971, with more British warships, aircraft and personnel deployed on operations in the Gulf than in any other part of the world."
Forty six years later, almost to the day when the Royal Navy's former Gulf squadron sailed away for the last time from their base of HMS Jufair in Bahrain's Mina Salman, British warships will return to their own permanent base, the same HMS Jufair, in what May acknowledged was "thanks to the generosity of the Kingdom of Bahrain."
Simultaneously, a regional land training hub being established in Oman will create a permanent British army presence in the region. Additionally, the largest UK-Omani military exercise for 15 years - Saif Sareea III ('Swift sword' in Arabic) - will take place early next year.
Those who know the strengths of British diplomacy are aware that the UK's foreign secretary does not speak off-the-cuff unlike some of India's past foreign ministers who qualified to be treated for foot-in-mouth disease. So when Johnson spoke at the Raisina Dialogue about the UK's new diplomatic and strategic push east of Suez, there was a deliberate message in it for the Modi government.
Besides, the foreign secretary prefaced what he said about 'east of Suez' with an offer that Ajit Doval, the national security adviser, and his team will find tempting. "Like India we know the threats of terrorism... and we are already working together to tackle those threats with ever greater intelligence sharing and we have some of the most formidable intelligence capabilities in the world; and we have no inhibitions in sharing our most advanced technology with India."
Every country - even Pakistan - will pay lip service to cooperation on fighting terrorism. But when it comes to intelligence cooperation, let alone "sharing our most advanced technology with India" many foreign governments are tight-fisted and miserly. Britain's willingness to share intelligence is a potential jackpot because no country outside the region has as much intelligence in the Gulf as the UK, and they also have the unique ability to put such intelligence in a local, historical context.
Johnson said, "India can be a vital force for stability in this region, the keystone of a giant natural arch, created by the Indian Ocean running from Perth in the east to Cape Town in the west." A big part of this geographic area is covered by the Gulf.
It is clear that much thought has gone into the new British government's public pronouncements about post-Brexit strategies because May herself referred to the historical context of Indo-British cooperation in the Gulf when she spoke at her summit with GCC leaders. "We have a rich history on which to build. From the very first treaties, in the mid-17th century, which saw the East India Company reach agreements on British trade and a military presence in Oman... the UK has been proudly at the forefront of a relationship between the Gulf and the West that has been the bedrock of our shared prosperity and security."
There may be some squeamishness in sections of India's intelligence and strategic community about partnering with the UK in the Gulf. It may be prudent for the government of India to begin this process through Track 1.5 or through Track II meetings by co-opting British think tanks of repute such as the IISS, which not only has a robust and visible presence in Bahrain but also enjoys trust at the highest levels in countries like Oman and the UAE.
Every Gulf think tank has a strong British resource to it, providing deep intellectual content. So it makes eminent sense for New Delhi to deepen the engagement with British organizations like the IISS instead of inserting Indian think tanks into the Gulf on grounds of false national pride. Not just in the area of think tanks, British influence is unparalleled in every sector in every Gulf country, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait - the latter after the war to expel Saddam Hussein following the 1990 invasion of the emirate. Modi has nothing to lose and potentially much to gain by trying out a unique partnership with post-Brexit Britain in the Gulf.