After Mujibur Rahman’s assassination in 1975, the received wisdom was that no political party in Bangladesh seeking close ties with India could win a general election. The prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, who visits India this month, has proved that supposition wrong. In December 2008, Bangladeshis turned out in large numbers to hand a massive victory to Wajed’s Awami League and 13 allies which campaigned for Liberation War values, reached out to the younger generation and the Hindus, pledged action against corruption and promised to rid the country of terrorists. The opposition leader, Begum Khaleda Zia, protests about rigging and procedures and absents her Bangladesh Nationalist Party from parliament, but the BNP is in a shambles and in no position to take to the streets. This raises hopes that destructive ‘movements’ may be a thing of the past.

The army that played a central role in Bangladeshi politics from 1975 to 1990, and again in 2007-08, will note that the election produced a clear mandate — which makes it less likely that the previous pattern of political commotion will erase the gains of this election, unless there is externally-sponsored subversion. Despite many threats to her life, Wajed has emerged with credit for her courageous handling of the Bangladesh Rifles revolt, and the military may not aspire for power now as it did during the coups of the 1970s and 1980s. The role of the army has never been as salient as in Pakistan but it harbours similar extremist elements, and these, and the jihadis in the intelligence agencies, will have to be neutralized through sufficient understanding between patriots in the army and the Awami League to give Wajed a fair wind through her term in office.

For India, the stakes in the last elections were high. Khaleda Zia’s regime was marked by growing Islamist militancy that she was neither capable nor interested in curbing, and Bangladesh became a hotbed of terrorism against India and an arms trafficking conduit to our Northeast, with close rapport among the insurgents, the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence, National Security Intelligence, Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh, Islamic Oikya Jote and Lashkar-e-Toiba. The technocrats who ran the subsequent caretaker administration were as inhibited in resolving issues with India as the politicians had been earlier. Wajed’s victory corrects the image of Mujibur Rahman’s party whose secular character was gravely dented over the years. The Awami League has leading figures with sympathy for India’s values, even if they rarely matched their actions with these sentiments when in office. In the now-forward-now-back world of Indo-Bangladesh ties, there are, finally, high expectations from Wajed’s forthcoming visit.

To dispose of caveats, while the rendition of several Northeast militants across the border is welcome, there is more to be done by Dhaka; there remain activists in Bangladesh with nefarious links to militant groups in India, and Paresh Barua managed to escape from Bangladesh last year to head for China. There is yet no action against well-placed criminals clearly identified in the media as being behind the BDR revolt and supplying arms to insurgents in the Northeast. Last year saw the sentencing of the ‘killer majors’ of 1975 and the trial of nearly 4,000 men for the BDR mutiny. The killer majors have always been a part of Wajed’s agenda, and she must hope to lance the boil of the 1975 trauma. The trials of the jail killers and known razakars are to follow, despite high-level threats from Pakistan. The nature of the BDR revolt is still mysterious; can 4,000 persons be part of a clandestine conspiracy? What about complaints about the pay and the conduct of officers that were the ostensible cause? If the whole truth does emerge, will it be palatable? Above all, will these actions detract from the all-important economic agenda? Wajed would argue that the decks must be cleared before real development can be achieved; retribution must take place, and the best time is now. But she has limited time to show concrete progress for her people if she is to be re-elected, which is essential if the political gains are to be consolidated. There may not be a second chance: in no election since 1991 has the same party been returned to power. In that context, having held an election that fulfilled international standards, is it wise to do away with the constitutional provision regarding the caretaker authority? This damages credibility and could be interpreted as preparing the way for election engineering. Some ministers are inexperienced managers, there is no strong second line of leadership, too much depends on one woman, and the bureaucracy, both in India and Bangladesh, is out of tune with the top leadership and will create obstacles — more so in Delhi than Dhaka because here it is much more influential.

But the signs are promising. For the first time since liberation, minorities feel secure, temples are being rebuilt, the Vested Properties Return Act has been ratified and Hindu exodus largely arrested, which will have a salutary effect on the broader issue of illegal immigration. The foreign ministers’ agreement last September signifies an awareness in Dhaka that economic progress requires Indian support, and the erstwhile procrastination and pleading of political difficulties and national sensitivities will no longer be in evidence. On New Delhi’s part, now is the time to forget past grievances and be generous to a fault. Bangladesh, as a big Muslim country, should be regarded as a strategic partner; our security interests will be gravely affected if there is an indifferent or hostile Bangladesh to match the talibanization to our Northwest, and we cannot take Chinese inactivity in our Northeast for granted. Security cooperation will be strengthened by various agreements on criminality and terrorism, but above all, the outcomes of Wajed’s visit must be seen by Bangladeshis as directly contributing to their prosperity, and going far beyond the symbolism of the Indira Gandhi Peace Prize for their prime minister.

If India permits duty-free import of Bangladeshi goods, the fiscal loss is estimated to be $50 million, a trifling amount compared to the goodwill created. Some hundreds of items are still on the negative list under Saarc Preferential Trading Arrangement, thanks to the protectionist mindset of our bureaucrats and businessmen. Heavy congestion, primitive procedures, lack of financial connectivity and corruption plague the Benapole-Petrapole land route, and have encouraged smuggling, which is equivalent to the annual legal trade of $3.5 billion. Such impediments must be removed and to stimulate industrial and commercial intercourse, a substantial credit facility to Bangladesh should be extended.

There are various issues on common rivers. The lowest flows of Teesta are 4,000 cusecs, whereas the canal system in India alone requires 4,400; and the Tipaimukh dam on the Barak cause concern downstream. Both require urgent address if they are not to become another Farraka dispute, whereas if the two countries cooperate, they could make joint approaches to upper riparians for hugely beneficial uses of Himalayan rivers in China, Nepal and Bhutan. Bangladeshi riverways are under-utilized for want of dredging and night navigation, and these are areas to assist Bangladesh promptly. Likewise, our neighbour could assist through its skills and capacity in boat-building to improve water transport in Assam, which has the largest such trade in India.

Bangladesh is in acute need of power. India should agree to supply at least 200 MW from and through the Northeast including Bhutan. New legal frameworks are needed to implement multi-modal connectivity, by which Bangladesh can be a transport service hub for Nepal and Bhutan’s use of Mongla and India’s use of Chittagong. Dhaka could also become a centre for air connectivity with the Northeast, Nepal and Bhutan since only 40 per cent of its capacity provided by the Civil Aviation Agreement is presently utilized. The land and maritime boundaries should be settled. On the former, merely 6.5 km remain, and a deadline should be given to surveyors to complete this task, which includes exchange of adverse possessions and enclaves. On the latter, following the example of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, we could cooperate on exploration for hydro-carbons on a bilateral or trilateral basis including Myanmar, even pending a formal settlement.

Not all of this may happen at once, but there has to be an Indo-Bangladesh roadmap of result-evident cooperation from now until 2018. For the first time in nearly 40 years, the ball is back in New Delhi’s court.