A Chinese strategist, Zhan Lue, has reportedly propounded in a recent article the need for Beijing to break India up into 20-30 independent states with the help of friendly countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan.

Who is Zhan Lue? What are his credentials? Going by the English translation of the Chinese text, the mind of Lue seems to be guided by a nation in the midst of a long-term war with an adversary, which, if not cut to size now, is likely to pose a serious threat to the very existence of the nation in the near future. And, as the ‘enemy’ still appears to hold its own despite odds, a revised strategic planning is being thought of to end the hostilities once and for all. Lue’s ideas are in tune with those codified in the classic, The Art of War, by the sixth-century Chinese philosopher-general, Sun Tzu.

In consonance with the principles of Sun Tzu, Lue thinks warfare to be the “greatest affair of the state, the basis of life and death, the way to survival or extinction”. Understandably therefore, the “primary objective” of the state is to “subjugate other states”, without actually fighting, thereby realizing its ideal of complete victory. Hence the need to operate against India through friendly and “vassal-type states”. The aim is to achieve maximum result with minimum risk, limiting destruction as far as possible. Lue does not seem to propound direct warfare with India, but speaks of its dismemberment through the “Strategy, Indirect Approach” of Basil Liddell Hart, whose ideas too were greatly influenced by those of Sun Tzu.

The history of 20th-century South Asia is too well documented to be re-described. India has learnt to live with the threat of terrorism, turbulence and fundamentalism posed by the neighbouring countries. But the internal dynamics of the Indian polity should be recapitulated. Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism (2008) has identified at least 10 non-state actors constituting an important threat to the Indian State.

The Communist Party of India (Maoist) poses a challenge because of its “objective to overthrow the perceived repressive state governments through peasant-based guerrilla warfare”. The Gorkha National Liberation Front, operating in Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and China, is a group of “national separatists” which began campaigning for a Gorkha state in 1977. Although Nepal has been scrupulous in “never” openly showing “any official support for militants attached to the GNLF”, there occurred several “diplomatic rows following incidents where Indian security forces pursued militants across the border into Nepal, where the latter are believed to have safe houses”.

Two formidable “national separatists”— the Isak-Muivah and the Khaplang factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland — “aim to establish an independent state, Greater Nagaland or Nagalim, consisting of Naga populated areas in India and Myanmar”.

The Sikh extremist movements may be dormant but are not dead yet. Their aim continues to be the establishment of “an independent Sikh state in the Punjab (including Pakistan Punjab) called Khalistan”. The objective of the United Liberation Front of Asom is “to liberate Assam through armed struggle... and to establish a sovereign independent Assam”.

The above discussion would give some idea about Sun Tzu’ strategy, Lue’s analysis, and the political situation within and without India. Lue has brought a sensitive subject into open by focusing on the faultlines, which might be exploited by outsiders in the future. Since to be “forewarned is to be forearmed”, one should thank Lue for his article.