In the anthology, What China and India Once Were, Sumit Guha and Kenneth Pomeranz have offered a rare glimpse of Chinese ecology and civilization — issues at the core of the Covid-19 pandemic. They noted that “[i]n China, most large animals became extremely rare, and the elephant vanished entirely.” Elephants were extinct in China by 1200 AD, tigers held out for a little longer in the wild, wolves survived in large numbers “but were in retreat”, and the panda, symbolic of China’s soft power, has a restricted range “above 3,000 feet”.
Yet, Guha and Pomeranz argue that the Chinese diet historically had “little meat” with fish, poultry, eggs and bean curd providing most of the protein. The pig remained the “dominant meat animal”. The arrival of maize and sweet potato along with the use of bean cake would reshape the Chinese diet forever. China’s ecology, Guha and Pomeranz conclude, has been “engineered to support... one large mammal — the human...” The Covid-19 outbreak in China allegedly has to do with a taste for wildlife fauna. Has the popularity of wildlife menu in China led to the pandemic? Or does the problem lie elsewhere?
Covid-19 jumped species in Wuhan’s wet markets; from bats to pangolins to humans. But wet markets exist in all of Southeast Asia, Nepal and even India. The line between law and practice being negotiable in much of Asia, any activity that lifted people from hunger found State support. Why single out China then?
But facts first. In 1978, the Chinese government allowed the private farming of animals — limited to poultry and red meat — to cut down on hunger. In 1989, it passed a law on to protect wildlife covering “terrestrial” as well as “aquatic” species. Article 1 noted that its purpose is “protecting” species of wildlife which are “rare or near extinction” while “rationally utilizing wildlife resources” to maintain “ecological balances”. The law defined wildlife as “resources”, encouraging under Article 17 its “domestication and breeding”. Article 21 provided for the hunting and catching of wildlife for “monitoring of epidemic sources and epidemic diseases”.
The 1989 wildlife law sits at the base of a new industry of wildlife farming in China. Small-sized farms ballooned because of global demands for fur. The increased variety of wildlife meant greater vectors of viruses. Handling and consumption created higher chances of inter-species infections. Most problematically, the legal Chinese market for wildlife became a cover for illegal wildlife trade. Among the rich Chinese, rhinoceros horns, pangolin scales, cobra meat and tiger bone-dust are in high demand for their dubious medicinal properties. Illegal trafficking to China soared.
In the aftermath of Covid-19 outbreak, the consumption of “terrestrial wild animals” including those “bred artificially or in captivity” has been banned even though some wet markets, reportedly, are reopening. The use of wildlife for medicinal purpose has, however, eluded the ban. Between 1989 and 2017, the wildlife law has added 16 new provisions. In keeping with China’s overall approach to international law, the 2017 amendment to Articles 1 and 29 replaces ecological “balance” with ecological “civilization”.
Effectively, four things must inform our reactions to Covid-19 then. First, wildlife fauna is not China’s staple diet even though enthusiastic xenophobes may assume otherwise. Second, illegal trade in wildlife for Chinese medicine — much like India’s ‘Bengali Baba’ enterprise — creates opportunities for viral outbreaks. Third, the viral outbreaks are linked more directly than we think with the corruption in licensing for wildlife trade. Finally, capitalism, and not Chinese eating habits, augments the global demand for animal products, thereby creating the ecosystem for viral outbreaks supported in no small measure by poor law implementation.
