The Donald Trump administration has triggered tremors around the world with its latest National Security Strategy, which articulates a sharp break with decades of American foreign policy. The NSS fundamentally positions the United States of America as a nation that must strengthen itself at home and in its neighbourhood rather than trying to shape the world in its image. It seeks strategic stability with Russia and is devoid of the Cold-War rhetoric that has long shadowed Washington’s approach to Moscow. It advocates against trying to impose the American interpretation of democracy on other societies, especially in the Middle East. It accepts that other countries too will — and must — act in their national interests. And it projects a tough border rather than the Statue of Liberty as America’s symbol to the world: the era of mass migration, the NSS says, is over. The document has elements of foreign-policy priorities that have been inculcated from other recent administrations. It identifies China as America’s biggest strategic rival because of its dominance of global trade, supply chains, critical minerals and the threat it poses to the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. But here too, the NSS’s prescription is different: instead of pivoting US military presence to the Indo-Pacific, the security strategy argues that regional partners must do more to push back against Beijing while avoiding a conflict over Taiwan.
The new security strategy talks of non-interventionism as a guiding principle. Yet it, like much else under Mr Trump, is riddled with contradictions. It speaks of bolstering military presence in the western Hemisphere and of re-establishing the Monroe Doctrine: the US, it says, will no longer allow competitors to have a military presence in the Americas, nor will it let them control strategic assets. This could force countries to choose between Chinese investment and American coercion. Ironically, while arguing against attempts to impose American traditions on others, it does exactly that with Europe. The NSS criticises the Continent’s dominant liberal leadership and makes it clear that Mr Trump’s administration will actively support right-wing political groups in Europe.
India is treated as an important partner in the document: perhaps that is a bit of a relegation given the greater import that was accorded to the country in the last version of the NSS. New Delhi will not mind a more inward-looking US though. This is because that may give New Delhi some breathing space to pursue strategic autonomy in its neighbourhood and in the broader world. Widening its baskets of allies would not only be consistent with New Delhi’s tradition of not aligning itself too closely with the US but also help India navigate a global order in churn.