August 15 will mark the fourth anniversary of the Taliban re-establishing its rule in Afghanistan after a hiatus of two decades. In doing so, it had, with Pakistan’s assistance, inflicted a strategic defeat on the world’s pre-eminent power, the United States of America, in its ‘forever’ war. Now, four years on, while the regime is still an ‘interim government’, it faces no political challenge within the country or from the elements that constituted the Afghan Republic that it replaced. The leaders of the erstwhile Republic are scattered outside Afghanistan. They do not have the capacity to effectively rouse the Afghan public against the Taliban.
Questions have been raised, though, through these years, on the cohesion of the regime. It is true that the regime is quintessentially Pashtun but there are deep tribal and regional fault lines within this ethnic group. They have the potential, but not sufficiently so, to either break the regime or irretrievably impair its working. Consequently, the regime continues to be capable of resolving its internal differences. All its constituents ultimately accept the decision of its head, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada. He remains ensconced in Kandahar, guarded by at least five thousand armed, faithful followers. In sum, the Taliban is here to stay.
Two noteworthy Taliban-related international developments occurred in July.
On July 8, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Mullah Hibatullah and the regime’s chief justice, Abdul Hakim Haqqani. The Court’s words on why it did so deserve to be fully quoted because they are correct. The ICC stated, “the Taliban have implemented a governmental policy that resulted in severe violations of fundamental rights and freedoms of the civilian population of Afghanistan, in connection with conducts of murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and enforced disappearance. While the Taliban have imposed certain rules and prohibitions on the population as a whole, they have specifically targeted girls and women by reason of their gender, depriving them of fundamental rights and freedoms. Specifically, the Taliban severely deprived, through decrees and edicts, girls and women of the rights to education, privacy and family life and the freedoms of movement, expression, thought, conscience and religion. In addition, other persons were targeted because certain expressions of sexuality and/or gender identity were regarded as inconsistent with the Taliban’s policy on gender.”
The ICC’s arrest warrants and its charges against Hibatullah and Haqqani will not impact the regime’s policies. This is because it is convinced that all that it is doing is in keeping with the teachings of Islam. It is true that Hibatullah is not implementing gender policies like the kind the Emir, Mullah Omar, did during the Taliban’s first stint in power. He is proceeding gradually and is, as of now, allowing the traditions of non-Pashtun ethnic groups regarding how women and girls should receive medical treatment to go on. There are other reasons why the Taliban will simply shrug off the ICC’s warrants. These include the fact that neither Hibatullah nor Haqqani will ever consider travelling out of Afghanistan. Besides, they also know that the warrants will not change other countries’, including India’s, policies towards it.
On July 3, the Russian foreign ministry announced, “We believe that the act of official recognition of the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will give impetus to the development of productive bilateral cooperation between our countries in various fields.” On the same day, Russia accepted the credentials of the Taliban ambassador. Russia became the first country to diplomatically recognise the Taliban when it would have known that hardly any state was likely to follow its lead. Ironically, five days after it recognised the Taliban regime, the ICC joined the Taliban leader and the Russian president, Vladimir Putin: both now have ICC arrest warrants against them. Russia’s recognition of the Taliban is on account of security reasons because it needs the Taliban’s cooperation to deny Afghan sanctuaries to anti-Russia Islamist groups. Like China, Russia, too, wants a piece of the pie of the Hindukush mountain’s mineral wealth and would like a first mover’s advantage. As it is, China has become active in Afghanistan’s hydrocarbon and semi-precious stones mining sectors.
Afghanistan may have receded from the consciousness of the larger international community but not so of Pakistan or India. Its ties with Pakistan have been rocky for the past two years. Pakistan has been deeply disappointed that the Taliban has allowed the anti-Pakistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, sanctuaries from where it is able to cross the Durand Line and inflict damage on Pakistani forces. Pakistan has tried to use its geographical and commercial leverage to temper Kabul’s behaviour. It has not succeeded in doing so. An Afghan leader, who held very high positions in the Republic, told me that Pakistan simply does not understand the symbiotic ties between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. Hence, the group will always remain a negative factor inhibiting the full normalisation of relations between Kabul and Islamabad. There are other resentments too that the Kandahar-based Taliban leaders have towards Pakistan. They really consider it as the land of the Punjabis who have exploited Afghanistan since the 1970s when the country became unstable.
At a time when India remained fully committed to the Afghan Republic and, earlier, to the Northern Alliance, Afghan Taliban leaders sent messages to Delhi, through informal channels, that it should not consider them as Pakistan’s puppets. Indian officials, who had even an elementary knowledge of Afghanistan, knew that anyone in power in Kabul would eventually turn to India but what would happen in the interregnum and how long it would last always caused concern, and rightly so. When it became apparent by early 2017 that the Republic’s cohesion was fatally weak, India should have opened communication channels with the Taliban but it did not do so. Hence, it was compelled to leave Kabul as the Taliban took over four years ago. All that is in
the past now.
While Delhi should not accord diplomatic recognition to the Taliban regime, it needs to become far more active in Kabul. The Taliban wants this as well. While a country may use long spoons, it has to sup with all kinds of people.
Vivek Katju is a retired Indian Foreign Service officer