The assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, marked a terminal point for the post-Cold War order. Beyond its military shockwaves, this escalation forces a reckoning with the failure of the United Nations Security Council and the fragility of ‘strategic partnership’ in a world defined by transaction rather than principle. For much of the Global South, however, this is not an isolated episode of Western aggression but the culmination of a decade-long erosion of international law.
The memory of 1990s Iraq serves as a grim prologue. For over a decade, the UN structure facilitated a near-apocalyptic humanitarian crisis under Saddam Hussein. While the United States of America and the United Kingdom led those measures, China and Russia — despite rhetorical opposition — allowed them to persist. The pattern resurfaced with UNSC sanctions on Iran in 2010: Beijing and Moscow first signalled resistance, then backed diluted resolutions that still devastated the Iranian public.
These episodes reveal a bitter irony. The West, for all its faults, acts on a clear principle — defend allies — whereas the East often limits itself to virtue signalling that fades under pressure. China and Russia project themselves as defenders of sovereignty and non-interference, and many in the Global South have welcomed that stance as an antidote to Western imperialism. Yet their practices differ: partner nations become commodities in a ledger of resources and influence. When the cost of protection outweighs immediate benefit, partners are left exposed. In contrast, the West’s hegemon-vassal model is interventionist and morally flawed but predictable. It offers tangible guarantees through intelligence sharing, military umbrellas, and financial support. However unequal or morally ambiguous, Western alignment provides a form of strategic currency partners can rely on.
China’s rise reshaped global economic geography, and Iran was to be the centrepiece of a new ‘Eastern Shield’. Its strategic agreement with Beijing assumed economic depth would yield strategic backing. Yet, as Tehran faces Operation Epic Fury, Beijing’s response shows opportunism. China’s passivity on Iran proves trade partnerships do not become security guarantees.
India’s conduct during the crisis raises similar doubts about the durability of old regional ties. For decades, New Delhi’s pragmatic relations with Tehran rested on energy and connectivity. Yet as tensions rose, it deepened defence links with Israel and drew closer to Western frameworks. The maritime dimension sharpens these contradictions. The US’s sinking of the Iranian naval vessel, IRIS Dena, in the Indian Ocean soon after returning from the multinational exercise, MILAN 2026, hosted by India exposed the instability of regional security partnerships amid escalating conflict.
Meanwhile, Washington quietly granted India a waiver to keep purchasing Russian oil shipments already at sea despite sanctions. Bloomberg reported that the decision underscored India’s dependency on Washington’s regulatory discretion for its energy security during the Iran crisis. For a nation long advocating ‘strategic autonomy’, such dependence underscores the transactional nature of great-power relations today.
The Global South need not remain trapped between Western imperialism and Eastern indifference. There exists a third model — one that rejects both interventionist clientelism and rhetorical non-commitment, favouring mutual, consent-based protection. Trade and military depth would serve as a security umbrella that respects sovereignty without demanding political submission, provided commitments remain reciprocal and transparent.
If China and Russia aspire to lead a truly alternative Global South order, they must move beyond treating partners as expendable assets and provide credible protection and solidarity.
Ismail Y. Syed is a London-based columnist and research scholar