On a cool December night in Delhi, Narendra Modi dispensed with diplomatic protocol to personally welcome the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, on the tarmac. The two then drove out in Modi’s official car. What followed was the ‘guiding star’ rhetoric about a time‑tested partnership, and the message went out to Washington and to European capitals that Putin’s Russia is not a pariah in all of Asia. For Moscow, that alone made the visit a success. For New Delhi, that was precisely the problem.
The outcomes of the India-Russia Annual Summit were modest. There was a revised trade target of 100 billion dollars by 2030, a “Programme 2030” economic roadmap, pledges on long‑term crude supplies, co‑production of spares for Russian‑origin platforms, mobility and migration agreements, and talk of tourism and Arctic cooperation. Useful, yes; transformational, no. No major new defence contract was announced. The defence narrative was carefully rebranded as co‑development, but this is largely about keeping old hardware serviceable rather than vaulting India into a new technological league.
When it comes to foreign policy, 2025 has been a year from hell for Modi. India currently faces three hard constraints that will shape its grand strategy for a decade. First, an openly adversarial China with a live, militarised border and a near‑term military balance that favours Beijing. Second, an economy that grows respectably in headlines but struggles with jobs, productivity and manufacturing depth. Third, a world where access to capital, high technology and critical supply chains is increasingly mediated by the United States of America and its network of allies.
On each of these axes, a heavily advertised ‘reset’ with Russia delivers less than the photo‑ops suggest. Take China. India‑China relations are in a state of low trust. Russian policy is now structurally joined with Beijing. Moscow’s dependence on Chinese markets, finance and technology after Ukraine is no longer a debating point; it is a structural reality. India’s principal continental adversary and its ‘time‑tested friend’ are joined at the hip in ways New Delhi cannot influence.
Under those conditions, doubling down on Moscow provides at best a tactical hedge and at worst a strategic blind spot. The Kremlin will never side with India against China in any meaningful way. In an actual escalation on the Line of Actual Control, Russia offers neither deterrent weight nor diplomatic leverage against Beijing. The Modi-Putin summit did nothing to change that.
Now consider the economy. The Indian growth story is under strain at the point where it matters most: employment and productivity. India needs manufacturing at scale, advanced technology, and investment in green and digital infrastructure to absorb its labour force and lift incomes. Russia, under sanctions, with a shrinking economy, and restricted access to Western technology, is not a credible partner for India’s growth transformation.
Yes, there are long‑term crude supply pledges and talk of discounted energy. But even there, Indian officials were careful not to sign away flexibility, stressing that energy companies will respond to “changing market dynamics” and sanctions‑linked commercial constraints. At best, crude oil arbitrage is a useful opportunistic play; it is not a development strategy. Urea plants in Russia, some minerals and hydrocarbons, Arctic observations, and a bit of digital cooperation cannot substitute for integration into global value chains anchored in the US, Europe and East Asia.
On technology, the gap is even starker. The frontier capabilities India needs — advanced semiconductors, cutting‑edge telecom, Artificial Intelligence chips, sophisticated aerospace and naval systems — are controlled by the very Western and East Asian ecosystems that are simultaneously trying to constrain Russia. The joint statement language with Moscow is full of promise on science, nuclear energy, space and innovation, yet almost all of this rests on legacy platforms where Russia’s edge is eroding. Betting political capital on that ecosystem while the world’s real technology networks are consolidating elsewhere is not strategic autonomy. It is strategic neglect.
This is where the US enters the picture. One purpose of the Modi-Putin spectacle was to signal that India will not be bullied, especially after the Donald Trump‑era experiment with high tariffs linked to India’s purchases of Russian oil. The optics also told Washington that public hectoring on Ukraine will not work. That signalling has some utility. But theatrics have a cost. Washington’s system — the US Congress, bureaucracy, industry — watches those rhetorical flourishes and asks a simple question: is India serious about aligning its long‑term hardware, software and standards with the US‑led ecosystem, or does it want indefinite exceptionalism?
The risk is not that the US will punish India tomorrow morning. The risk is slower, subtler and more corrosive. The more India stakes its prestige on giving cover to Moscow’s defiance of Western sanctions, the harder it becomes for Western capitals to make the case for India‑specific carve‑outs, technology waivers, and sensitive co‑development projects. Quietly, prudential limits will appear on how far Washington and its allies are willing to go on high‑end tech, intelligence fusion, and supply‑chain relocation to India, even as the rhetoric of ‘natural partners’ continues.
The defenders of Putin’s visit argue that India is simply leveraging contradictions in the system and preserving options. In theory, this is exactly what a mid‑level power should do but what good is it if the options on the table actually do not solve the core problems?
What did this summit add to India’s ability to deter China along the border, to accelerate structural transformation of the economy, or to secure a larger share of future‑proof industries? The answer is unflattering. A trade target that may or may not materialise, some incremental crude oil comfort that can be wiped out by one round of sanctions or shipping pressure, and a re‑badged defence relationship focused on keeping ageing Russian platforms alive. That is a tidy little package, but it is not a grand strategy.
By Russian diplomatic metrics, Putin’s visit was a success. The choreography worked, the joint statement was expansive, the “special and privileged strategic partnership” was reaffirmed, and Putin got the global images he craved of a leader not wholly shunned. Yet, by the harder metrics that should concern India, the success underlined a deeper failure. It showed that despite the setbacks of 2025, Modi’s foreign policy is still organised around optics rather than outcomes.
Sushant Singh is lecturer at Yale University