The recent armed conflict between India and Pakistan underlines an interesting battle of political ideas. The Pakistani Establishment seems keen to assert a conventional and outdated Europe-centric imagination of the nation-state, which is based on one religion (Islam), one culture (Muslim), and one language (Urdu). To sustain and justify this foundational principle, the ruling classes in Pakistan inevitably rely on M.A. Jinnah’s two-nation theory. It helps them represent India as a Hindu nation-state, while conveniently ignoring the existence of Bangladesh — an unwanted rupture in the Pakistan story.
India, on the other hand, represents a two-fold challenge. The Indian Constitution does not subscribe to the ideals of the European nation-state model; it celebrates India’s social, religious, and cultural diversity as a political strength. The present armed conflict, in this sense, is not merely a war between two nuclear powers. Instead, it is an outcome of an ideological conflict that has been going on for almost eight decades.
Let us unpack the chronology of the present clash. The Pakistani army chief, Asim Munir, delivered a highly provocative anti-India speech prior to the Pahalgam attack. Munir made it very clear that Pakistan’s anti-India position stemmed from its uncompromising adherence to the two-nation theory. Munir asserted that the differences between Hindus and Muslims constituted the philosophical foundation of Pakistan; and, for that reason, Muslim Pakistan would continue to support the militant struggle in Kashmir in the name of Islam to defeat Hindu India.
The Pahalgam massacre was the logical outcome of this assertion. There were three aspects to this terrorist attack which made it rather unprecedented. First, the terrorists discovered a new soft target — common, non-Muslim tourists. The presence of these visitors in Kashmir posed a serious challenge to the Pakistan-supported terrorist networks. The enthusiastic participation of Kashmiri people in the recent elections had already delegitimised the Pakistani claim that Kashmiri Muslims did not have faith in Indian democracy. It was clear that the Pakistan-supported terrorist groups did not represent the aspirations of ordinary Kashmiris. The terrorists wanted to re-establish their dominance and innocent tourists were the easily available targets.
The communal nature of the Pahalgam terror attack was the second important feature. Terrorists asked the tourists to reveal their religious identity. They even forced people to recite the Kalima before killing them. This overemphasis on the religion of the victims provided a clear Muslim versus Hindu framework to the event, something which was highlighted by Munir in his speech as well.
Finally, the presentation of violence was the third unique feature of the Pahalgam terror attack. Terrorists knew that this violent event would be recorded and disseminated widely. They, it seems, were clear that this mass killing would produce a number of horrifying images — pictures, videos, reels, and memes. They wanted to use these troubling imageries to reproduce the central premise of the two-nation theory: that Hindus and Muslims are involved in a permanent war.
Interestingly, the Indian responses to Pahalgam were different. Local Kashmiris, religious leaders, political elites, and Kashmir’s civil society groups strongly condemned the Pahalgam massacre. It has been strongly asserted that Kashmiri Muslims do not want to be linked either to Pakistan or to any self-claimed jihadi terrorist group. The sacrifice of Syed Adil Hussain Shah, the only local Kashmiri killed in the Pahalgam bloodshed, was portrayed as evidence of Kashmir’s resistance against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.
The Muslim response to Pahalgam outside Kashmir was almost similar. Sermons condemning the Pahalgam massacre were delivered from mosques across the country on the very next Friday congregational prayer. Muslim worshippers wore black bands on their shoulders to express their disapproval of terrorism. Muslim religious organisations, prominent Muslim civil society leaders, and even political leaders, including the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen’s Asaduddin Owaisi, strongly objected to the Pahalgam attack, urging the Government of India to take strong action against Pakistan.
This overwhelming Muslim reaction should not be seen merely as a strategic move by Muslim communities to survive in an overtly anti-Muslim environment. It underlines a very different kind of realisation. The present generation of Indian Muslims does not have any emotional, political, or psychological association with Pakistan or, for that matter, with the so-called two-nation theory. CSDS-Lokniti surveys over the years have shown that not even a single Muslim would like to leave India and settle down in Pakistan. The experiences of Indian Muslims, especially those who have families in Pakistan, are equally bad. They often report that Pakistani authorities always maintain a hostile attitude towards them simply because of their national identity as Indians. Despite having this unpleasant impression of Pakistan, Indian Muslims are always abused for being a pro-Pakistan social group. The Pahalgam assault gave them an opportunity to assert their Indian Muslim identity in its uniqueness and entirety.
The official reaction of the Government of India to Pakistan, it seems, has recognised this widespread anti-Pakistan feeling in the wake of the terrorist strike. ‘Operation Sindoor’ is not merely an army-led operation; it has a symbolic meaning of its own. Two aspects of this military-diplomatic mission need to be highlighted. First, it uses the term, sindoor, very strategically. The terrorists killed non-Muslim men to send a clear message to their wives, partners, families, and communities across the country. This imaginary Muslim manhood is answered very differently by evoking sindoor as a weapon. One may agree or disagree with the symbolic use of this term. Yet, it proves the point that killing innocent people cannot be celebrated as an instance of portraying manhood. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the army authorities assigned Colonel Sofiya Qureshi and Wing-Commander Vyomika Singh to brief the press about Operation Sindoor. The choice of women officers to introduce the armed operation is clearly understandable. It shows gender sensitivity and respect. At the same time, it also highlights a much deeper claim: unlike Pakistan, India belongs to all religious communities, including Muslims.
The outcome is clear: Pakistan has already lost the war of ideas primarily because India has refused to become a Hindu Pakistan.
Hilal Ahmed is Associate Professor, CSDS, New Delhi