Nearly two decades after the then prime minister, Manmohan Singh, described Naxalism as India’s biggest internal security challenge, the country’s security forces appear to have dealt a devastating series of blows to Maoist rebels in recent times. In a siege on the Karreguttalu hills forest that spans Chhattisgarh and Telangana, they have killed at least 27 suspected Maoist fighters, including the group’s leader, Nambala Keshavrao, alias Basavaraju. In all, security agencies say they have killed more than 400 armed Naxals in the past 16 months. While clashes between security forces and Maoists have often taken a deadly toll on civilians over the decades, it is undeniable that in recent months, the offensive against the rebels has found success. The area under the control of Maoists has shrunk considerably compared to a decade ago. Incidents of Maoist violence have come down significantly in most states where the movement has had influence. There is also mounting evidence that the number of fighters in Maoist squads has depleted. To build on these successes, however, the Indian government and state administrations must draw on the lessons of recent years — to identify both what works and what does not.
The Bharatiya Janata Party, which rules both at the Centre and in key states such as Chhattisgarh, insists that these successes are the result of firm political will. However, the BJP has been in power federally since 2014 and in Chhattisgarh on multiple occasions previously too. If anything, the recent gains against Maoists are a victory of policy rather than politics. These include rehabilitation policies that enabled former rebels to rejoin the mainstream, initiatives that helped involve them in combating Naxalism, and incentives offered to civilians to effectively join the government’s intelligence network. These appear to have worked. Some of these policies are potentially controversial and open to misuse. Yet, on the whole, the approach of treating civil society and former Maoists as allies rather than suspects is welcome. Now, the Central and state governments must transform that partnership to one that goes beyond the hunt for rebels to address the social and economic inequities that allow Naxalism to survive. That political approach must go hand in hand with security operations if India is to find a long-term solution to the Maoist insurgency which, in different forms, has survived in India for more than half a century. The recent gains should be a moment of reflection, not premature celebration.