India’s quest to modernise its air force should be a story of strategic foresight and institutional resilience. Instead, it has become a tale of missed opportunities, political expediency, and systematic failure under the Narendra Modi government. The Indian air force is sanctioned 42 squadrons but is struggling at barely 29 squadrons of fighter jets; it is being forced to manage a chaotic mix of different platforms which increases the cost of logistics and training. Nothing exemplifies the IAF’s crisis better than the Rafale saga, which is a testament to how institutional memory has been sacrificed at the altar of Modi’s political grandstanding.
The seeds of this decline were sown when an IAF proposal to procure the Mirage 2000 manufacturing line after the Kargil war in 1999 was shot down by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government. That decision forced the air force into the marathon that was the medium multi-role combat aircraft tender. It was one of the most thorough and technically rigorous evaluations in the history of global aviation. Every major fighter was tested in the heat of Rajasthan and the icy heights of Leh. When the Rafale finally emerged as the winner, the path seemed clear. India was to get 126 aircraft, with 108 of them being built by the public sector company, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, as part of the offsets package.
Negotiations on the indigenous production had proceeded for a prolonged period when, with a single announcement in Paris in April 2015, Modi scrapped years of technical and financial negotiations. The 126-jet deal was replaced by a sudden purchase of just 36 aircraft. Officials at the time claimed this was faster and cheaper but, as
was proved over time, the purported savings were a mirage. India spent roughly 1.3 billion euros on India-specific enhancements for the 36 jets. Spread over 126 aircraft, this cost would have been manageable. Concentrated on just 36 jets, it became exorbitant. India paid for the research and development of a customised jet but
bought too few to benefit from the investment. Even then, India did not have access to the source code or the ability to integrate Indian weapons on the Rafales, a vulnerability which proved costly during the military clash with Pakistan
in May 2025. India’s skies are shrinking while Modi’s promises soar.
This brings us to the current hype surrounding the multi-role fighter aircraft deal for 114 more Rafales. It is effectively the same tender that started two decades ago. Having spent 10 years in a complete political circle, the Modi government has arrived at the same requirement as that by the United Progressive Alliance government. The difference is that the price has tripled, and India’s security environment has worsened — China now provides Pakistan with its most modern aircraft at very reasonable rates. Meanwhile, the indigenous programmes in India are faltering. The LCA Tejas was supposed to be the backbone of the IAF fleet but is plagued by production and engine delays. The AMCA fifth-generation fighter is little more than a set of drawings. The joint Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft project with Russia was quietly shelved during Modi’s first term and has not been revived since. If the Modi government continues on this path while loudly shouting atmanirbharata, India’s defence forces will remain perpetually dependent on foreign suppliers.
Questions also swirl around who will manufacture these jets in India this time. The previous deal had brought Anil Ambani’s defence company, a private player with no prior aerospace experience, into the spotlight. This controversial choice has been further tainted by revelations of Ambani’s connections with the sex-offender, Jeffrey Epstein, and his efforts to access influential political circles in the United States of America. While the Modi government dismisses these as distractions, the question as to why a bankrupt entity was chosen over an established, State-owned firm remains unanswered. If the new 114-plane deal follows the same path of favouring a specific private player and the current regime’s favourite, Gautam Adani, why should the outcome be any different? Alternatively, if HAL leads manufacturing, it raises questions about why the government abandoned HAL’s central role in the original MMRCA?
The choice of manufacturing partner matters deeply for technology transfer and strategic autonomy. The country is being told that this deal will bring in transformative technology. After his State visit to the US, Modi boasted of the transfer of GE’s F414 engine technology to India but nothing has materialised till date. The US refused to transfer core hot-section engine technology, licensing only assembly and
manufacturing blueprints. France’s case will be no different. Its companies will prioritise commercial profits over political pledges.
The Modi government has touted that this will be a government-to-government model, which will safeguard against middlemen and corruption. A government-to-government deal may simplify negotiations but it does not cleanse corporate behaviour or eliminate the need for rigorous scrutiny and enforceable anti-corruption conditions. By sidestepping the competitive bidding process, the government also avoids integrity pacts that help prevent corruption. This model shields both the vendor and the buyer, turning a critical and costly national security transaction into a closed-door affair. Corruption dressed as nationalism is still corruption.
France’s anti-corruption agency uncovered multiple compliance failures at Dassault, including suspicious payments linked to the Rafale sale and the procurement of costly replica models from a company owned by a key middleman. Investigations revealed at least 7.5 million euros in secret commissions routed through a shell company
in Mauritius connected to the same intermediary. Indian investigative agencies were alerted to this evidence in 2018 and 2019 but chose not to pursue them despite existing rules that should have led to Dassault’s blacklisting. It revealed that the Modi government lacks the will to enforce anti-corruption standards in major deals. Some
fear that it may even be connected to the now-banned electoral bonds and the opaque PM-Cares fund where many corporates are donors.
National security cannot be managed through photo opportunities and press releases. India needs a return to transparent, competitive tendering process in major projects that encourages accountability. Public sector enterprises like HAL should be empowered to lead while fostering a competitive but level playing field for private industry. When billions are spent, they must translate into maximum numbers of modern fighter aircraft and meaningful technology transfer. Anything less is a betrayal
of the brave pilots defending the nation and the citizens who fund their efforts.
India’s air power today stands at a crossroads. The choices made in the past decade have compromised its future. When the next crisis comes, official press releases and political speeches won’t defend Indian airspace. India needs a robust and modern air force, and it needs it now. The real turbulence isn’t in the air — it is in the deal itself.
Sushant Singh is lecturer at Yale University