The West Asia crisis, with Donald Trump’s United States of America and Israel ranged against Iran, is now in its third week. That is indeed a long time, especially for a conflict whose crippling impact on sources of global energy — primarily oil — are being felt widely. Three weeks are perhaps also time enough to assess the relative gains, losses and intent of the principal combatants. And therein lie several illuminating revelations.
The war, quite naturally, has dealt blows to Iran. Several of its leaders, including the former Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have been killed; over 3,000 people are estimated to have died in assaults on that country; public infrastructure, including critical oil installations, have been targeted. Yet, Iran has defied the US’s assumptions of capitulation. The domestic leadership has not been eviscerated, something that Washington and Jerusalem had been hoping for, despite the loss of senior leaders. Most notably, Iran has retaliated with force, widening the scale of the conflict across Gulf nations. An end to hostilities would suit Tehran, but Iran is not willing to cede ground — just yet.
Tehran’s adversary, Mr Trump, has cut a sorry figure. He has dragged America into war despite ample evidence that Iran was not in a position to threaten the US and notwithstanding his earlier reservations about miring his nation in global conflicts. The US’s aggression against Iran, given its overwhelming military superiority, has, of course, been devastating but it has not decapitated Tehran, its military, or its arsenal. Worse, Mr Trump’s statements have, quite often, been contradictory. From describing the US military intervention as a “minor excursion” to stating that the war would end “soon” to — this is revealing — admitting that he did not expect Iran’s response to have a wider geographical arc to, most recently, stating that the US did not have advance knowledge of Israel’s attack on the South Pars oil field, Mr Trump, it must be admitted, has not provided evidence of the conflict going according to plan. The quietest gainer has, arguably, been Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel. Israel has, admittedly, suffered missile attacks and losses to lives. But it would still want to prolong the war. This is because Mr Netanyahu hopes to piggyback on a gullible Mr Trump to defang Tehran militarily in the long run. Additionally, military success would help Mr Netanyahu deflect public attention from the charges of corruption that threaten his political career
at home.
What makes this conflagration particularly potent is that winners and losers are not limited by geography. Gulf nations hosting American bases along with Iran and Israel are fighting the flames. But they are not alone in this. Several Southeast Asian nations — India is among them — are being singed too, given their disproportionate dependence on energy supplies through the contested Strait of Hormuz. Gas prices have risen in Europe and the US too. Strikingly, the loss of Southeast Asia could well turn out to be a gain for Moscow. Washington’s temporary relaxation of rules to mitigate the global oil crunch has meant that Moscow, some estimates suggest, could be on track for a windfall in fuel-based revenues this year.
If the West Asia crisis deepens, its spillover effects would continue to suck in a wider swathe of nations. The writing on the wall is clear. In a globalised economic order, no nation can be totally immune to a catastrophe of this scale and the losers and their losses are likely to be much higher than the winners and their gains.