In the immediate aftermath of the BJP’s electoral victory in Bengal, Suvendu Adhikari, the new chief minister and a primary architect of the party’s state strategy, issued a directive that signalled the end of the border’s status as a porous transition zone.
Suvendu announced the handover of 45 acres to the Border Security Force (BSF) within 45 days to eliminate gaps in the fencing along the Bangladesh frontier. This move was framed as a corrective measure against what the BJP characterises as decades of “demographic aggression” and state-sanctioned negligence.
This hardening of the frontier has met with an unyielding response from Dhaka. Foreign affairs adviser Humayun Kabir in Bangladesh had publicly asserted that the country will not be intimidated by what they perceive as India’s unilateral shift towards a more confrontational border policy.
Kabir’s statements reflect a broader hardening of sentiment within the Bangladeshi current political leadership, emphasising that national sovereignty will not be compromised by the “saffronisation” of Indian regional policy.
For years, Bengal acted as a political buffer in India-Bangladesh relations. Under the Trinamool Congress and Mamata Banerjee, the state government frequently leveraged its constitutional role in land acquisition and water rights to stall New Delhi’s more aggressive impulses.
While this often frustrated bilateral progress — most notably regarding the Teesta water-sharing treaty — it also blunted the impact of the BJP’s rhetoric concerning “infiltration”.
With the BJP now controlling both the central government in New Delhi and the state administration in Calcutta, the “double-engine” governance model has removed the institutional friction that previously mediated border politics. The frontier is now an arena of direct ideological application.
The India-Bangladesh border is already one of the most heavily securitised in the world, yet the BJP’s victory has transformed its purpose from simple territorial management to a project of national identity.
The party’s campaign in Bengal explicitly linked undocumented migration to religious demographics, portraying the border as a sieve that threatened the cultural integrity of eastern India. Consequently, the fence is now viewed by Indian policymakers as an instrument of “demographic security”.
The reaction in Bangladesh has been one of defensive mobilisation. The country’s foreign minister Khalilur Rahman and home minister Salahuddin Ahmed have issued warnings against any attempted “push-ins” of individuals India deems to be undocumented migrants.
The Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) has been placed on high alert, reflecting a fear in Dhaka that a BJP-led Bengal will facilitate mass deportation drives that could destabilise Bangladesh’s internal security. This creates a dangerous symmetry: as India seeks to “purify” its census through border control, Bangladesh views every Indian move there as a potential threat.
This dynamic is increasingly captured in the rhetoric of figures such as Nasiruddin Patwari, a politician from the new Opposition National Citizen Party (NCP) who has emerged as a vocal critic of Indian border conduct.
Following the killing of two Bangladeshi nationals by the BSF in the Brahmanbaria district this week, Patwari accused Dhaka’s current political establishment of passivity and of adopting “Indian narratives” that label every victim a smuggler.
Border killings remain the most persistent wound in the bilateral relationship. Human rights organisations have documented hundreds of fatalities over the last decade, and while India maintains that its forces only use lethal force when attacked by criminal syndicates, the Bangladeshi public views the high body count as evidence of institutionalised impunity.
The absurdity of the border’s current state is underscored by the deployment of increasingly extreme deterrents. Indian security agencies have explored the use of “natural barriers” in difficult terrains, including the introduction of crocodiles in riverine stretches and the maintenance of snake-prone marshes, as reported by Al Jazeera.
These measures, alongside high-intensity floodlighting and thermal sensors, reflect a state of permanent mobilisation. Yet, this physical hardening stands in stark contrast to the economic realities of the region.
Bangladesh is India’s largest trading partner in South Asia, and the two countries are deeply integrated through energy grids and transhipment agreements. India’s “Act East” policy depends entirely on a stable and cooperative Bangladesh to provide the transit routes
necessary to develop its landlocked Northeast.
The paradox of the current moment is that the removal of Mamata as a political obstacle could, in theory, have resolved long-standing disputes like the Teesta water-sharing agreement, which requires state-level concurrence.
However, the ideological heat generated by the BJP’s focus on the border may make it politically impossible for any government in Dhaka to sign major treaties with India. The perceived hostility of the Bengal administration
creates a domestic cost for Bangladeshi leaders who seek pragmatism.