Retired career diplomat Dinkar P. Srivastava dives deep into the transactional nature of Pakistan’s domestic politics and foreign policy, which has shaped the country under the near-perpetual stranglehold of the army, the periodic trappings of democracy notwithstanding. Excerpts from an interview based on his latest book, Pakistan: Ideologies, Strategies and Interests, brought out by Bloomsbury India.
Q: Your thoughts on the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement and how it could impact India. Is it part of an ideological project or just a strategy to serve mutual interests?
A: Saudi choice is driven by strategy. Pakistan’s decision is based on financial interest. There is no element of ideology despite the rhetoric of Islamic solidarity. Historically, Saudi Arabia’s partner of choice to provide security has been the US, a Christian power. The shock of seeing American inaction in the face of the Israeli strike on Qatar is the immediate reason to look to Pakistan for security. There could be other factors at play. There was no American reaction to strikes against Abqaiq and Khurais refineries in 2019 under the first Trump administration. Pakistan’s motivation is purely mercenary. The agreement with the oil-rich kingdom is a financial bailout for a sinking economy.
There could be a nuclear dimension to this equation. The prospect of Iran going nuclear at some point could be part of Saudi calculations. Would they be satisfied with Pakistan extending the nuclear umbrella? Or they would prefer to have a nuke under their control? Pakistan has indulged in nuclear proliferation in the past — to Iran, Libya and North Korea. They would not mind attracting American wrath for proliferating to West Asia. But the price has to be right.
Pakistan’s choices turn deeply ideological nearer home. Promoting the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan in the 90s after American withdrawal or covertly supporting the Taliban against the American presence after 9/11 does not answer to any definition of interests. Sustaining a terror campaign in Jammu and Kashmir and confronting India has been a major drain on the Pakistani economy. Military strategy is employed to serve ends which are defined by an ideology anchored in faith.
Q: Your book mentions how the Pakistan Army’s legitimacy had been challenged by the attack on GHQ in May 2023. Has Operation Sindoor helped the Pakistan Army reclaim some ground despite the visible blows it has taken?
A: After Operation Sindoor, there was a conscious attempt by the Pakistani establishment to cover up their military debacle. It is ironic that Pakistan elevated army chief Asim Munir as he has essentially been promoted for losing a war.
No doubt, Munir got an unprecedented honour of lunching at the White House with the US President. That had nothing to do with India. At that point, America was focused on Iran…. In the midst of Operation Sindoor, the IMF had announced a $1.4-billion assistance to Pakistan for countering climate change in addition to releasing a billion dollars under the existing IMF loan. The IMF is controlled by the US, so this generosity obviously had some payback. And, the only payback is in terms of Pakistani support to the US action against Iran.
Pakistan’s position has not improved. In fact, these actions by Pakistan have created some major complications for Pakistan, especially Munir, because a pro-America tilt in Pakistani policy would run counter to the narrative they have fed to the Pakistani public of fighting against what they call a Jewish state…. If this thing leaks out, it will have explosive consequences for Munir and the Pakistan Army. A flirtation with America also creates complications in its relations with Iran, which are in any case complex. The two countries have exchanged missiles in 2024 and earlier. Third, it creates uncertainty in their relations with their biggest foreign policy partner — China.
Look at the domestic dynamics. Pakistan has succeeded in getting America to declare the Baloch Liberation Army a terrorist organisation. It is a plus for Pakistan, but this underlines once again that the Baloch insurgency continues. And, while the Baloch insurgency is continuing, the Pakistan Army has had to start a new operation in Bajaur in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). So the domestic situation remains as troubled as before for Munir.
Q: But the Pakistan Army never seems to pay the price for its mistakes.
A: Yes, but the country pays a price. And, it has paid a major price.
Q: There is no mention of the Hindu Right wing’s advocacy of the two-nation theory in your book. Likewise, you seem to absolve the Congress of Partition, blaming the Muslim League entirely for it.
A: Hindu Right was a fringe element within the Congress, and it continued to be so for decades after Independence. Otherwise, you would not have got the kind of Constitution which India has.
And, it is not just a question of the Constitution; look at the facts. In Pakistan, within four years of Partition, the minority population had come down from 26 per cent… to 3 per cent in 1951. The Muslim population, in terms of not just numbers but percentage, has gone up from 9 to 14 per cent, in India….
Let’s assume, whatever the Muslim League demanded was a reaction to the Hindu Right. Alan Campbell Johnson, press attache to Mountbatten, in his book Mission with Mountbatten has mentioned that much of the Muslim League propaganda about minority treatment had no basis…. They went on a spree of accusing the Congress of minority suppression...
It was simply to muddy the waters and exculpate the League leadership from the responsibility of this disastrous event, which has affected not just the subcontinent but Muslims of the subcontinent in particular.
Q: You have written that the conception of a state based on religion is inherently flawed. Isn’t that what is also being attempted in India slowly?
A: There’s absolutely no comparison. My book is about Pakistan. I don’t think that link is justified. The Muslim population has grown in India. This is a healthy thing. There, the minorities have disappeared. My book has a chapter on Muslims for United India. This was a conscious choice on my part, even though the book doesn’t deal with India.
And, I have brought out the role of Maulana Madani, who was head of Deoband, India’s largest and oldest Islamic seminary, and a great scholar of the Quran. He wrote a book on composite nationalism in 1938 in which he showed on the basis of verses from the Holy Quran that Prophet Mohammad used the word Qaum — which means nationality — in a religion-neutral sense. This was a slap on the face of the Muslim League, which was arguing for a two-nation theory.
Iqbal countered with a couplet in which he even questioned Madani’s faith as a Muslim. To Iqbal, the idea of secularism, of plurality, was anathema...
Q: On the Indus Waters Treaty, you say India was generous. Could the IWT have been drawn up differently and can this be rectified now that India has kept it in abeyance?
A: The IWT is a product of the Cold War era. There is no other precedent where an upper riparian state has given the lower riparian and smaller country 70 per cent of the water. It was an unequal treaty imposed on India when we were on the wrong side of history. In my opinion, it should have been terminated. Keeping it in abeyance will be effective only if we have the storage capacity.