West Bengal’s chief minister is certain about two things. The Belakoba train blast was a terrorist attack. And the explosive was supposed to go off while the train was running in full speed. These are fairly obvious facts, and not of much help. The Centre had warned the state government and the railways, about six months ago, that insurgents might target trains coming down to Calcutta from north Bengal. But nothing much had been done about it. The West Bengal mindset still associates insurgency with Kashmir, Assam, the rest of the North-East and Nepal. According to this way of thinking, insurgents use the various ‘corridors’ that run through Bengal. Yet Calcutta, and much of the rest of Bengal, remain the oasis of peace. This complacence, and the administrative tardiness that results from it, lead to the loss of lives.

Relations stop nowhere, when it comes to insurgent outfits, however small, like the Kamtapur Liberation Organization. The KLO has been the prime suspect in this case, but there is a larger shifting picture within which its operations have to be understood. The KLO, ever since its formation in the late Seventies, has not only had a parallel history of political demands with the United Liberation Front of Asom, it has also been nourished and used by the Ulfa. It is because of this association that the KLO’s broadly anti-Left political stance has moved from fighting elections in the first stages towards armed terrorism. Hence, two events in the Ulfa’s recent history have determined the KLO’s will to stage a comeback in Bengal. First, the flushing out of insurgents from southern Bhutan, where they were being trained and had networked with other groups from Nepal, the North-East and Bangladesh. This dislodged them from Bhutan and forced them to move to Bangladesh, strengthening links with Bangladeshi outfits. Second, the failure of talks between the Centre and groups like the Ulfa and the National Democratic Front of Boroland. Hence, like the Ulfa, which has been violently making its presence felt again in Guwahati and the rest of Assam, the KLO has also been staging a resurgence in Bengal. Besides, larger outfits, like the Ulfa, train members of smaller groups, like the KLO, so that the latter can be used by the former to replenish the coffers. Failure to understand and act against the dynamics of this network will be dangerous for Bengal.