One certainly does not have to be an established strategic analyst to suggest that Pakistan’s navy, which traditionally has been the most neglected of its armed services, is all set to play an unprecedented role in throwing challenges to the Indian navy in the near future. Pakistan’s planners seem to have realized the importance of the diversification and the flexibility the ocean offers to out-of-area operations in international waters. The 26/11 Mumbai mayhem was the test case of India’s maritime preparedness. Today, the vast Indian coastline of 4,104 nautical miles stands exposed as never before. And Pakistan knows this well. Hence the recent high-sea aggression of the PNS Babur against the INS Godavari.

Today, the role of Pakistan’s navy is no longer limited to the “defence of the coastline and sea lane”. It now has three additional assignments, which make for a four-pronged “strategic mission” force. Pakistan’s navy has a new-found role in the multinational anti-piracy enterprise on the high seas. There is also an elaborate action plan to woo the Chinese navy into operating in the Indian Ocean in an effort to curb and restrict the movement of the Indian flotilla. And finally, Pakistan wants to have the Chinese navy set up permanent base at Gwadar, with follow-up joint exercises in the blue waters of the Arabian Sea.

While the world’s attention is focused on land warfare involving the Taliban or al Qaida in the Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal belt, Pakistan is quietly expanding its port facilities/infrastructure and expediting fleet acquisition from both the United States of America and China. The weakest arm of Islamabad is no longer that weak. The brazen and unprovoked challenge of the Babur stands as an acid test, to be noted for the future by Indian strategists.

Survival strategies

What gives the Pakistani navy the confidence to take on the more powerful Indian navy is the decentralization of its assets — both mobile and static. Although its main combat bases remain in Karachi — with facilities about 60 nautical miles south, at Port Qasim — the “latest” has been built at Gwadar with Chinese assistance. It is also almost certain that the Chinese navy would be the prime keeper, user and beneficiary of the port bordering Iran — which is the ‘gateway to the Gulf of Oil’. Pakistan’s navy is also building the Jinnah Naval Base in Ormara, about 160 miles west of Karachi, that will reportedly act as the base for the French-built boats. Fresh suggestions of the mega purchase of six Beijing-built submarines imply a formidable challenge to the movement of Indian ships through the waters of the Middle East, possible denials notwithstanding. Today, Sino-Pak naval bonds look more structured and strategic than the alliance of the land and air forces of Beijing and Islamabad. As a result of these developments, Pakistan will surely become more of a maritime force than a traditional land-based power.

The recent stand-off between the 4,209 tonne frigate, the INS Godavari, and the 3,700 tonne frigate, the PNS Babur, could be seen against this background. One may also recall that the captain of the Babur is an experienced operator of the Inter-Services Intelligence. Thus there may be a gap of more than 30 months between the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, executed, among others, by Ajmal Kasab from Pakistan and the daylight aggression carried out by the captain of the Babur, but the writing is on the wall. The land strategy of the army-ISI duo of Pakistan may soon turn into a navy-ISI joint venture in the seas against India. It will clearly be a case of ‘survival of the fittest’ in the ocean. Especially so since Indian vulnerability and political courtesy are known only too well known to the aggressive and the hostile.