At the turn of the 20th century, the Indian navy was credited with strategic manoeuvres in the Arabian Sea off the Pakistan coast in mid-1999, thus hastening the end of the Kargil war. Such was the apprehension of dominant Western maritime nations that it was suggested that were it not for the heavy American naval presence in the region, the Indian navy could have dominated the waters of southern Asia, from the Straits of Malacca to the Gulf of Aden. True or not, post-Kargil definitely saw enhanced budgets for the Indian navy.

India’s naval inventory in 2000 consisted of one aircraft carrier; 18 patrol submarines (all of Western origin); 11 frigates (three imported) and 23 corvettes (17 imported). It was reported by Jane’s Fighting Ships 2000-2001 that the aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, “was first offered for sale to India by Russia in 1994. By 1999 the proposal was to gift the ship as long as India pays for the modifications... work started at Severodvinsk in early 2000, after which the ship had been laid up for several years”. More than 10 years have elapsed. The original “proposal for gift” has turned into a colossal time and cost overrun.

In contrast with India’s advantage in carrier operation stands the Chinese dedication to the cause of indigenous manufacture of aircraft carrier. Reportedly, the first Chinese carrier, built on the hull of an abandoned Soviet-era warship, is nearing completion, and it would be bigger and heavier than any Indian aircraft carrier. No nation in history has ever emerged as a naval power without indigenous ship building capability. Japan and Britain in the past, and the Soviet, American and French navies post-World War II, are the classic examples. In contrast, Italy, Greece, Germany, Spain and Portugal could never match the British, owing to the latter’s unmatched ship-building industry and technological superiority, which proved decisive in the 1982 Falklands War.

New tactic

It is disturbing that ship-by-ship not much has changed for the better for the Indian armada between 2000 and 2010. Carrier force remains static at one. Submarine strength has fallen from 18 to 15. The number of destroyers, too, remains stuck at eight. Only the number of less-power-packed frigates and corvettes has gone up from 11 to 13 and 23 to 24 respectively. In contrast, Beijing’s destroyers have gone up from 20 to 27 and frigates from 41 to 51.

The problem in the Indian Ocean, however, has shifted from traditional confrontation among navies to terror of piracy across the shipping lanes of the Red Sea-Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean tri-junction. A need for co-operation among state navies has emerged, opening up an opportunity for the Chinese navy, hitherto unseen in areas far away from East Asian waters. Since no conventional navy can operate on its own steam for long on high seas with periodic ‘base-time’, the Chinese tactic to develop Indian Ocean littoral states’ coastal assets into Chinese shelter spots is understandable.

For far too long, India did not entertain the idea of the Indian Ocean turning into an area of potential conflict instead of a zone of peace and tranquillity. As times changed, force doctrine also underwent a transformation. From the Persian Gulf to the Mozambique Channel, Red Sea to Malacca Straits, and beyond, the ensign of the Indian navy is more than visible. Indian sailors are doing regular exercise with Western and Asian navies. But China, too, recently showed its teeth with ‘live action drill’ in South China Sea amid escalating tensions with Japan and other Southeast Asian countries over territorial claims.

India needs to work in tandem with friendly navies to get permanent/long-term bases for berthing of the fleet in out-of-area missions and deepen bilateral relations that will enhance the deployment capacity of its naval fleet.