The unseemly controversy over the contradictory statements by the state home secretary and the director-general of police on the reported intelligence input warning of an attack on the Eastern Frontier Rifles camp at Shilda in West Midnapur caused serious embarrassment to the Left Front government. Even murkier was the quixotic appearance of the special inspector-general, EFR, before the media, covering his face with a black cloth for ‘safety’, assailing the district superintendent of police for not accompanying him to the Shilda camp and changing its location. His conduct tarnished the image of the state police, adding salt to the wound. Everyone was flummoxed by the pusillanimity of the government, which stopped at seeking an explanation from the officer for such an act of indiscipline.

Both incidents could have been avoided. It is worth remembering that the bureaucracy and the police are not trained to handle the media, which are often on the lookout for statements that could be used to belittle the government. But officers, senior or junior, love the idea of appearing before the camera without much preparation, and thus fall prey to the designs of the media. A professional approach would be to approve the brief for the media in advance, and leave it for the spokesperson of the ministry or department to handle it. In the other case, it was unfortunate that the special IG put himself above service, deciding to hog the limelight through theatrics. He failed to appreciate that his ‘safety measure’ was going to cause a colossal damage to the police fraternity. It was unpardonable.

The Shilda massacre demands an urgent assessment of the Maoist movement to capture power through the barrel of the gun. The state needs to have a strategic outlook to shape its policies, including the one that would deal with internal security. The policy must include dimensions that go beyond paramilitary concerns. There are two schools of thought on the modalities of tackling the Maoists. The school that supports coercion and the blatant use of force believes that in terrorizing, the fear of reprisals far outweighs the desire to help the extremists. The use of power to destroy and impose punishments compel people to shun the company of the revolutionaries, and the path of violence.

The school opposed to the paramilitary approach, on the other hand, believes that coercion generates more heat than light. It proves counter-productive when brutality makes the Red Guards desperate to lacerate the underbelly of the government and society. Indiscriminate use of force can also inspire the protagonists of the movement to carry on with the struggle against the State with greater resolve. It triggers a groundswell of support for the movement, and widespread publicity to fuel the militancy further. The ‘hearts and minds’ approach, therefore, prescribes management and containment of violence for restoration of the writ of the government in the ‘liberated areas’ by meeting the basic needs of the people, including security.

The success of this endeavour will not only challenge but also weaken the popular base of the extremists. The areas under Maoist influence have to be liberated and a semblance of governance established by revamping the institutions and the systems charged with enforcement and delivery. There is a natural tendency in the people to align themselves on the side of those who are able to provide safety and services aimed at addressing their grievances. However, the use of force will remain the first and last line of defence against any compromise with the security of life and property. The only precaution that needs to be taken is to exercise force with greater care so that mindless actions by the State do not exacerbate extremism.

The strategy must have a provision for engagement with the receptive elements of the movement. The Maoists are still very much in the minority. The areas under their control are limited; so is their influence. Ground realities demand that the strategy to combat them be more political than paramilitary. Negotiations for peace and settlement must be integral to the strategy. The alienated must be brought into the mainstream by meeting their aspirations. The task is so huge that it cannot be done by the government alone. Besides a close coordination among departments, ministries and agencies of the government, careful networking with the bordering states and non-State actors is essential to strengthen the campaign. Efficacy of governance will create greater confidence and flow of public support in the disturbed areas. The mechanism for negotiation should be kept separate from the campaign to “clear, hold and build”. The progress achieved in these three areas will help pave the way for reintegration. The State must have the skills to wage concurrently the battle for peace and development as well as the war on violence.

Intelligence plays the role of a force multiplier. It has to be refined and operationalized. Intelligence dies a premature death when ignored and debunked. Such instances are common. The intelligence input during Kargil, 9/11 or 26/11 met with the same fate. It is difficult to gather intelligence about militant and terrorist organizations which operate with a considerable degree of secrecy, and use force as the main instrument of operation. There is an element of unpredictability in the time, place, date, nature and targets of the attacks.

It is impossible for intelligence agencies to live up to the peoples’ expectations all the time. Intelligence flows in bits and pieces. No one possesses all the pieces of the puzzle or the full picture. One has to connect the dots — and some of the dots may be missing or not have the numbers. It is then that the expertise of analysts becomes necessary to study the trends, interpret the fragments, and assess the designs of the enemy. Before 9/11, bits of information was available pertaining to the plans for an aerial attack. Those involved in the planning reportedly gave as many as 11 opportunities to the State to intervene, but all were ignored because none in the establishment could imagine that al Qaida could execute such a diabolical plan. It is said that the failure of the agencies in the United States of America was one of imagination, not of intelligence.

Strategic and tactical intelligence are mostly operational. These demand a follow-up on the ground, verification of factual inputs, and tasking of intelligence operatives for further details to fill up the gaps. A painstaking exercise between the intelligence and the law enforcement units is essential to track the status of the input, to separate the chaff from the grain, and monitor progress, before using intelligence to neutralize the threat. The objective should be to try stay a few steps ahead of the adversaries and do all that is necessary to deter, defeat or destroy the sources of threat. A comprehensive strategy has to be drawn up with effective instruments at different levels of the state and the Centre. High-quality resources and technology will be necessary to vest the instruments with the required competence. Intelligence gathering and investigation call for special aptitude and skills, different from normal policing work. These are not everyone’s cup of tea.

At present, when threats are diverse, it is impossible for any single intelligence agency to survey all the information and produce intelligence that is actionable. It demands a framework of seamless relationships with agencies at different levels and places for action to be integrated and intelligence to be productive, both in content and application. The acid test of the efficacy of the intelligence machinery will be judged by a decline in the incidence of violence and security threats.

The Marxists are well-known for their disdain for intelligence from official sources. They tend to rely more on information received from party sources. This mindset must change when the challenges are stupendous. It is imperative that the Marxist leadership moves with the times and develops a healthy respect for the intelligence hierarchy. Any dithering may cost the state dear. Some of the institutionalized arrangements that have helped intelligence agencies build a direct channel of communication with the top echelons of the administrative pyramid can be made stronger by removing the aberrations that may have crept in over the years. The revamping of intelligence with improved resources is also long overdue.

Alongside this, the civil police, neglected and politically manipulated, must be assured the freedom to operate without fear or favour. They must uphold the rule of law to win public support. The harassment of innocents must be checked, giving way to professional rectitude. The abysmally low police-public ratio must change.The number of police stations in India has risen from 12,000 at the time of Independence to only 14,000, when the population has increased fourfold and modern policing has become far more complex. Police stations are chronically understaffed and ill-equipped. On the yardstick of 22 policemen per 10,000 people, the country needs an extra 3.4 lakh policemen. So the recruitment and training of the police need to be taken up on a war-footing, along with the proper strengthening of the legal system for effective action, quick disposal of cases and speedy delivery of justice.

In the Operation Green Hunt, the Central paramilitary forces are expected to bring to bear on the state police their rich experience in combating insurgencies. A close collaboration with the state machinery will help harness the latter’s reservoir of knowledge pertaining to topography, local conditions and people. This will go a long way in improving the quality of policing as well as operations. The success of the operation at Lalgarh police station is a clear indication of the results that may be achieved when the two work in tandem. It is necessary for the security forces and the police to give the administration space to work safely and closely with the people. The success of their actions would help make the idea behind the revolution irrelevant.

Finally, the success of the policies will be judged by the normal flow of life with people moving about without fear on their mind, and by the priorities of the government focused on development and growth, not on mere elimination of extremism. Lasting victory will come from a vibrant economy, political participation of the deprived, and the restoration of hope for those living on the margins of human existence.