Over the past one month, Bangladesh witnessed three major events. Five of the killers of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were hanged, and the country’s supreme court scrapped the fifth amendment of the constitution, thereby paving the way for a ban on religion-based political parties. The Sheikh Hasina government’s actions on both were bold and prompt, although she knew the issues were sensitive and could be used by her political opponents in order to unleash another spell of political turmoil.

The third event — the signing of three agreements and a memorandum of understanding with India during Hasina’s visit to New Delhi — was the result of an equally bold initiative. Given the sharp political polarization in Bangladesh, agreements with India are always hotly contested issues in domestic politics. Hasina and her Awami League have always been accused of being pro-India. So she knew of the political risks of signing the accords, but showed both courage and determination in going ahead with her plans.

For Bangladesh, not engaging with India is no longer an option. There were times when Dhaka could afford to prick New Delhi, hoping to get support from Pakistan, China and even the United States of America. The end of the Cold War, India’s new equations with the US and the global concern over terrorism have changed not just the US’s but also other Western countries’ security and other priorities in South Asia.

For nearly three decades, the reduction of its poverty was the prime concern of Bangladesh’s donors. The world was not too upset if the country sometimes posed security threats to India. The attack on America in September 2001 changed all that. The West could no longer ignore a country that had a religious leader who was one of the 12 signatories to al Qaida’s first declaration of jihad against the West, and where a new slogan, “Bangla hobey Afghanistan, amra hobo Taliban (Bangladesh will be Afghanistan, we’ll become Taliban)”, reverberated not just in secret camps but on the streets of Dhaka. Even more worrying was the fact that the new crop of militants seemed to have the patronage of some sections in the government. Suddenly, Bangladesh was a country of great concern for the US and the other Western nations.

India presented a different picture. Its security concerns and its perceptions of threats from Islamist militants found an echo in Western capitals as never before. But something else made India’s case even more important — the world came to see it, along with China, as an emerging economic powerhouse. Pakistan, on the other hand, worried the world as a failed state. This, then, was the backdrop in which Hasina signed the agreements with India this time. The context, today, is vastly different from 1996, when, in her first term as prime minister, she signed the agreement with India on the sharing of the Ganga waters.

The accords Hasina signed this time comprised three agreements, one MoU, and a cultural exchange programme. The agreements include one on “mutual legal assistance”, another on “transfer of sentenced persons” and a third on “combating international terrorism, organised crime and illicit drug trafficking”. It has also been agreed that India will be allowed the use of Chittagong and Mongla seaports for “movement of goods to and from India through rail and road”. If the transit picks up momentum, it is estimated that Bangladesh can earn as much revenue as US $400 million a year. Bangladesh has been given transit for its goods traffic to Nepal and Bhutan through Indian territory. Another accord says that Ashuganj in Bangladesh and Siliguri in India will be ports of call for inland water traffic. The two countries have also agreed to link Agartala with Akhaura in Bangladesh by rail, the line for which will be laid with Indian finance to be given to Dhaka as grant.

India has also offered Bangladesh a credit line of US $1 billion for overhauling and improving the entire railway infrastructure in that country. It is the largest sum of money India has ever offered as a soft loan to any country, and carries an extremely low interest rate of 1.5 per cent with a repayment period of 20 years. Other important accords relate to India’s supply of 250 MW of power to Bangladesh, and dredgers to de-silt rivers in that country. As for contentious issues like the sharing of the Teesta’s water, the construction of the Tipaimukh dam in Manipur and the trade gap, the communiqué issued after Hasina’s visit promises to address Bangladesh’s concerns.

Surely, there are areas that the accords have not covered. On two major issues, the sharing of water of the 54 rivers that flow into Bangladesh from India and the trade imbalance, Dhaka can legitimately ask for more. But Hasina’s political opponents apart, independent economists and other analysts in Dhaka agree that this has been the most comprehensive push to bilateral relations between the two countries since the 1970s, and Bangladesh can benefit immensely if the accords are translated into action.

True, Bangladeshi businessmen are still unhappy about the tariff and non-tariff barriers on the export of their goods to India. India has offered to reduce the trade gap. But making it a political issue is not going to solve any problem. The fact of the matter is that Bangladesh’s exports to India have increased five-fold, from US $60 million to US $300 million in the last 20 years due to India’s trade concessions. Also, while India-baiters in Dhaka complain of the trade gap with India, not much is heard about China’s trade surplus with Bangladesh, which is bigger than India’s.

The accords in three areas are crucial to the transformation of Bangladesh’s economy: the offers of the credit line to upgrade Bangladesh’s railway network, dredgers to de-silt its rivers and supplying 250 MW of power. The massive power shortage, the drying up of rivers and the outdated railway infrastructure are among the major factors for Bangladesh’s poverty. If, despite some success in poverty alleviation and an annual inflow of US $10 billion of remittances from Bangladeshis working overseas, the country has 44 per cent of its people living below the poverty line, the answer lies primarily in the backwardness of its infrastructure and the lack of modern industries.

But all agreements are statements of intent. It depends on the political leadership of both countries to ensure that the two countries plunge into action straightaway. Politicians and other vested interests will play their games. But if businessmen and the people in Bangladesh can see things happening on the ground, they will develop their own stakes in improved India-Bangladesh ties. A small step by India can help this process. It is a common complaint among Bangladeshis that the journeys on the trains and buses linking Dhaka and Calcutta are irksome because of the delays and harassment they face at the immigration and customs checkpoints in India. Sorting this problem is a small thing, but it can make a big difference by earning the goodwill of the Bangladeshis.

In an article in a Dhaka newspaper, Bangladesh’s former foreign secretary, Farooq Sobhan, suggested that the prime ministers of the two countries appoint special envoys with the rank and status of a cabinet minister to monitor the implementing of the accords. It is a suggestion New Delhi will do well to consider seriously.