Better prepared

Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field
Edited by Antonio Giustozzi, Foundation, Rs 795

The editor of this book does not mince words. The book, in fact, is not only an acknowledgement of the growing strength of the neo-Taliban, but also a
polite admission of the West’s failure at grasping the intricacies of the Afghan problem. Antonio Giustozzi tries to set right some of the misconceptions by drawing on the vast experiences, mostly first-hand, of specialists who have, because of their professional or academic interests, either travelled extensively in Afghanistan or researched particular issues. The contributors to this volume are well-known journalists, academics, social workers and members of the think-tank who remain involved with the ever-changing social and political realities in Afghanistan and provide the most contemporary insight possible into specific regions or issues.

Giustozzi’s overriding concern is to unearth the command-and-control structure of the neo-Taliban, as they have evolved since the Taliban, in their previous incarnation, was pushed out of power by the West-backed operation in Afghanistan post-9/11. The picture is diverse for each of the regions under investigation. The specific reasons for the return are also different, although there are significant overlaps. An indifferent government, the corruption among the Afghan police and State officials, the growing distance between the administration and the populace and wrong war tactics of the Nato forces seem to have hastened, and even encouraged, the Taliban’s comeback. But to blame bad governance entirely for the turn of events would be to misjudge a very complex situation. Taliban efforts to regroup were, in many instances, given a fillip by tribal infighting (Alokozai versus Ishaqzai in Helmand) or by a more unholy concern to secure the drug traffic across Afghanistan’s borders. While discussing Taliban networks in Uruzgan, Martine van Bijlert, in fact, reiterates an earlier observation on the Taliban movement by comparing it to a “caravan” to which different people attached themselves for various reasons.

Whatever the reason for the attachment, neo-Taliban groupings have grown in strength over the past few years. In their assessments of the past and recent Taliban organizations in Kabul, Andar, Uruzgan, Herat, Farah, Baghdis, Ghor, Helmand and in north Afghanistan, the contributors have shown how from small, unwelcome fighting units, the Taliban have come to establish parallel governments and courts in many of the districts. The Taliban, of course, have not met with equal success in all the provinces. In a number of provinces, they remain disorganized or confused units of fighters under self-aggrandizing commanders or unruly men uncontrolled by the central leadership. But in many, they are already a coherent unit with an established hierarchy and command structure, and this is what Giustozzi tries to establish by papering over what he believes to be minor aberrations to this conclusion.

In his study of the insurgency in Helmand, Tom Coghlan delineates the basic structure of the command. The basic military formation, he says, is the mahaz or front. It would typically consist of around 20 fighters under a single charismatic leader. It would “arrive” in the Taliban as a formed band with fighters connected to each other (andiwals or comrades) through blood ties, or tribal, village, locality or madrasa links. The commander is still not a full mahaz commander and would require some more experience in combat to be acknowledged by the leadership (the Quetta shura or the Taliban Leadership Council) to qualify for independent charge. Till that happens, he is only sub-commander. The Taliban claim there are as many as 25 mahazes in a single district.

What Giustozzi tries to put a finger on is the development of the hierarchy with a definite command. Strict control, apparently, is maintained by the central leadership over commanders, who are transferred regularly and rested, along with the fighters, at certain intervals. The command structure has a lot to do with the financial control maintained by the leadership. Commanders, as Gretchen Peters points out in her study of the importance of the drug trade in financing the insurgency, are required to give to the leaders a steady amount through their collection of drug money via taxation at several junctures. The money comes back from the high command in the form of cash or weapons or other assistance.

Giustozzi does not seem to completely agree with this assessment of the importance of the drug money in retaining the command structure or estimates of how much it amounts to. And that leaves the readers with some discomfort. Contributors repeatedly point to the fact that the organization of the Taliban are “far from unified”, and at times even chaotic. Yet Giustozzi seems to insist that the Taliban have crossed a certain threshold in the development of the command structure, with definite ideas about the use of resources. They may have. But this growth is definitely not uniform or consistent. Moreover, without a more comprehensive explanation of how the leadership executes its command (they seem to be putting heads together only in planning major offensives) and how it reins in its diverse and diffuse force down the line, the fog will remain about the structural organization of the Taliban, who give remarkable freedom to their men to seek personal revenge and do anything possible to keep the State and society in a perpetual limbo.

The book otherwise provides some remarkable insights into how the neo-Taliban, a more radicalized breed than their progeny, are adapting to the changed circumstances of battle. Earlier reservations about pictures, television and the media have been thrown to the winds to promote the global image of the Taliban as an organization that transcends the limits of tribal and national linkages. The Taliban are also fast changing their harsh ways to co-opt the public in their drive for an Islamic Emirate, especially those who believe that the Taliban are a “castle of butter”, which will melt as soon as the harsh responsibility of governance falls on them.