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There must be a better way to rig an election. First, the Western powers occupying Afghanistan let President Hamid Karzai stay in the job for months after his term actually expired, on the grounds that an election in the late summer would be easier to arrange. They finally held the election in August and declared it a shining success: Karzai, Washington’s man in Kabul, had been re-elected, even though the turnout nationally was only 30 per cent.
President Barack Obama, who was already under great pressure to send more troops to Afghanistan, declared that “This was an important step forward in the Afghan people’s effort to take control of their future.” And then it all fell apart. As the evidence emerged that up to a third of the votes allegedly cast for Karzai had been fraudulent, the United States of America backed away from celebrating his “re-election.” Indeed, the fraud was so blatant and massive that even the Afghans began to choke on it, and various American emissaries bullied Karzai into accepting a run-off vote against his closest rival in the first round, Abdullah Abdullah.
That vote would have been held on November 7, but Abdullah knew that he would lose again. He belongs to the Tajik ethnic group, and there are twice as many Pashtuns (Karzai’s ethnic group) in Afghanistan as there are Tajiks. So Abdullah complained that the election officials conducting this run-off would be exactly the same men who had rigged the first round — which was quite true — and demanded their resignation.
Karzai refused to remove them; Abdullah used that as an excuse to withdraw from the election, and on November 1 the run-off was cancelled. Karzai was proclaimed president once again on the basis of the discredited first-round vote, and the whole sorry mess was abandoned. But there is a silver lining: if Obama wants to bail out of Afghanistan, he now has an excellent excuse for doing so.
Best chance
Actual Western military casualties in Afghanistan have not been very high. But the loss rate has been mounting steadily, as has the sense of futility back home. In the US, the declining popular support for the war is driven largely by a growing perception that it is unwinnable. If the US army is losing ground in Afghanistan after eight years in the country, and four previous invading armies from the industrialized world (three British and one Russian) have been forced to withdraw, why should we believe that this time is going to be any different? But the constantly repeated assertion that withdrawal from Afghanistan would lead to a surge in terrorist attacks on the West is also losing credibility.
It was always nonsense: terrorists don’t need “bases” to plan their attacks. Regular armies need bases, but all terrorists need is a couple of safe houses somewhere. Controlling Afghanistan is almost entirely irrelevant to Western security, and that reality is also beginning to seep out into the public discussion in the US.
If Obama can extricate himself from the tactical minutiae about whether to send 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan, or 20,000, or none, and focus on the larger question of why the US is occupying the country at all, he can still save himself. Now is his best-ever chance to pull out, because the political train-wreck in Kabul gives him an ideal opportunity to renege on his foolish promises to pursue the war in Afghanistan until victory.
If he misses this opportunity, he may never get another, for it will inevitably, inexorably become “his” war, and the Americans who are killed there from now on will have died on his orders. Once that kind of burden descends on a politician, it becomes almost impossible for him to change course and admit that those deaths were futile. In that case, the Afghan war will eventually destroy him.
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