President Barack Obama’s war of necessity in Afghanistan is becoming a trap for the United States of America and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. American generals are openly acknowledging that the war on the ground is not proceeding well, the Taliban have the initiative, the situation is deteriorating, additional troops are needed and that the thrust of the US effort should be to win the hearts and minds of the people and not merely conduct military operations to eliminate the insurgency. It is being stressed that the US must not be seen as an occupying power. General Stanley McChrystal’s new strategy of inducting more troops for gaining greater military advantage on the ground, while pursuing more people-oriented policies, is considered promising. But waging war in a foreign land and winning the hearts and minds of its inhabitants are not easily compatible exercises. For Obama to induct more troops at a time the war is becoming increasingly unpopular at home could be politically perilous. His AfPak policy has run aground very quickly, despite the additional 21,000 troops put into the fray. What is the guarantee that the new strategy would work better? There are some formidable factors at play — the mountainous terrain, the isolated valleys, the tribal social structure and the generally violent culture of the country. Historical experience also cautions against a successful external intervention. Above all, the presence of safe havens for the insurgents across the border in Pakistan presents a challenge almost impossible to overcome without violating the sovereignty of that country.

To actually achieve those levels of development that would win over the populace, time and good governance are needed. But time is running out and it is precisely the problem of governance that is plaguing Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai, in power for the last seven years, has provided political continuity. This should normally have been an asset for sustained implementation of development plans, yet the insurgency has gained greater ground, large parts of the country are under the control of “warlords”, corruption is rife and drug trafficking is rampant. In any case, can one expect good governance in a war-wracked country without strong defence and police forces? Here the record of external powers has been deficient as sizeable, well-trained Afghan army and police forces have not yet materialized. The multiplicity of countries, with distributed responsibilities, separate jurisdictions, varying rules of military engagement with different international mandates for the external forces itself constitutes “poor governance” by those who demand high standards of governance from the Afghan government.

Elections in Afghanistan, seen as a critical factor in establishing the government’s writ and credibility, have caused further confusion. Karzai’s image has received a severe battering in the West because of widespread allegations of electoral fraud, now endorsed by a United Nations-backed commission. He has suffered the humiliation of being forced into a second round on November 7. If he wins, as he is likely to, he will have been politically and morally weakened as the taint of having tried to rig the election will stay. Western powers are looking for a credible Afghan partner to achieve the goal of progressively “Afghanizing” the war so that their weighty burden can be lightened. This is an element in their exit strategy. But can Karzai be that credible partner now? Ironically, it is Karzai’s Western sponsors who have discredited him with their exaggerated demands for observance of high electoral standards in a country with no experience of democracy, and this despite the fact that they have to eventually work with him and have no credible Pashtun alternative in view.

The disarray in the West is visible also in the loss of public support for the war not only in the US, but, even more so, amongst its allies. Key continental European countries are firmly opposed to increasing their troop numbers. As it is, many countries are participating in the war in a show of solidarity with the US. With the US itself wavering on how far it should commit more men and resources, Western solidarity will come under more strain, with an impact on NATO out-of- area operations and the US’s leadership role. Frustration with the war is leading to recriminations against the Afghans for not managing their own affairs better. It is as if the Western powers have entered Afghanistan on a humanitarian mission at the invitation of the Afghans and the latter are not delivering their part of the bargain. At times it is argued that the US and others are conducting operations in Afghanistan on behalf of the international community, and others, especially regional countries, ought to share their part of the burden. Initially, Obama spoke about involving the regional powers in finding a solution, but that thinking seems to have been abandoned. A regional approach would work only if all are agreed on the final outcome and their policies are adjusted accordingly. Regional cooperation should not amount to others providing the much-needed additional ground forces, but having to work largely on the US-NATO script with the Western powers preserving their autonomy of decision-making and action, especially in the military field. It should be accepted that the biggest threat in the region comes not from al Qaida but from the extremist Taliban ideology, which, whether it is anti-Western or not, is destabilizing for the region as a whole.

The US’s approach to the Afghan Taliban remains ambiguous. When Obama first enunciated his AfPak policy, he concentrated on the threat from al Qaida and omitted any direct mention of the Taliban. Mullah Omar’s presence in Quetta has been known to the Americans for years, and it is the Quetta Shura, with sizeable organized cadres at its command, that is held responsible for the mounting insurgency in Afghanistan. The US has curiously failed to act forcefully against this Shura. No move has been made in the UN security council to declare that the Taliban groups and their principal leaders are terrorists. The Pakistani military’s offer to mediate between the US and the Taliban leadership points to ambiguous political undercurrents. The British have openly advocated overtures to the so-called moderate Taliban leadership and Karzai has proposed negotiations with the Taliban as part of an intra-Afghan solution. A deal with the Afghan Taliban appears to be part of a contemplated exit strategy.

If the central reason to intervene in Afghanistan was to prevent it from becoming a platform for radical Islamist forces to launch terrorist attacks against the US homeland and the West in general, then any premature withdrawal makes little sense. Obama himself has long identified Afghanistan, and not Iraq, as the real source of the threat to the US. Any hasty retreat from Afghanistan will, logically, only compound the problem for the US and, therefore, it must persevere in its own interest. Obama will have to eventually decide whether staying the course in Afghanistan in the larger national interest should override his personal interest in getting re-elected in 2012. To get a second term he has to show success on the ground by 2011, as otherwise he could end up as a one-time president. That might ultimately prove the most decisive factor in US policy.