Months after the president of the United States of America, Barack Obama, unveiled his AfPak policy amid much fanfare, he was found asking himself on television last Sunday if this was the “right strategy”. The re-think has been inspired by the request for more troops by General Stanley McChrystal, commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, who is also Mr Obama’s man for the job. Technically, the president should have little problem in acquiescing to the demand since the AfPak strategy, at its heart, is committed to defeating the Taliban in active combat through a surge in troops. Of course, development and the strengthening of the country’s civil institutions are also part of this policy. But the US and its allies have already shown their belief in the workability of the ‘surge factor’ by commissioning more troops in Afghanistan — immediately after the announcement of the policy, and before the August elections in Afghanistan. The situation must have changed dramatically in Afghanistan since that time to sow seeds of doubt in a man who has consistently wanted more active and prolonged involvement in the country. Unfortunately, other than two obvious developments, nothing in the subcontinent appears to have altered much, given the inconclusive presidential election in Afghanistan and the surge in Taliban activity. The two are connected. That the August elections threw up no clear verdict is as much an evidence of the ineffectual leadership of Hamid Karzai as of the effectiveness with which the resurgent Taliban have spread fear and throttled the political machinery. This could not have been entirely unforeseen. In other words, the Americans could not have been so foolish as to depend entirely on the winnability of Mr Karzai to facilitate their exit strategy.

Mr Obama’s reluctance to commit himself to more troops has to be explained by other changes then: first, his obvious domestic difficulties, which have increased steadily, and second, the role of the allies. Italy is as unwilling as Germany to chip in any more. Finally, the increasing possibility of using former warlords to fight the war against the Taliban on behalf of the foreign powers. The European powers are supposed to be already weighing the pros and cons of implementing this policy more forcefully. This can only mean that Mr Obama can sit on General McChrystal’s recommendations for a little longer.