Among the numerous first-time-ever features of the brazen terrorist attacks in Mumbai on 26/11 last year was the fact that foreign citizens were among those murdered. Therefore, it was logical that India should seek international cooperation in bringing pressure to bear on Pakistan asking it to show contrition and mend its ways. But there is resentment in India building up against the United States of America for not showing sufficient robustness in chastising Pakistan. In one way, this reaction shows the extent to which Indo-US relations have evolved positively in this century; in another, it reflects the limits of that relationship.

After decades of a frosty association, India and the US have reached a fruitful level of cooperation. Manmohan Singh said at Washington that the two countries “have reached a milestone in their strategic relationship” and India has been invited by the US to cooperate in civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes and high technology trade. India was the only country with nuclear weapons that had not signed the non-proliferation treaty to be inducted into the nuclear club by the world’s megapower.

This overture was because the US needs Asian allies in the post- Cold War world, and there is hardly a country less likely to pose an open or latent threat to the US than India. India would never accept its exclusion from the nuclear club, and it had the same interest as the US in hindering others from developing any nuclear weapon capability. India’s bomb is indigenous; it is a ‘responsible nuclear power’, it does not blackmail opponents and is opposed to proliferation of nuclear technology and hardware. India’s improved economic standing also gave it some leeway; it offers military muscle, democracy, market economy and stability. In its overall strategic interest, therefore, the US had little option but to accept the Indian nuclear developments and make the best out of the inevitable.

India’s global reputation may have improved, but not its immediate security concerns. Therefore India accepted the Bush post- 9/11 doctrine to secure the US aggressively from countries that harboured or helped terrorists, which seemed to New Delhi to provide the justification for addressing one of its main security concerns — the militant camps in Pakistan. Preemptive strikes in a war on terror were what the hawks in India had always advocated. India backed the Afghan Northern Alliance and offered American aircraft refuelling facilities at Indian airports; Pakistan was weakened and lost the strategic depth that its military strategists felt was essential in any conflict with India. These were among the first fruits of the new partnership.

In embarking on the new affinity with the US, India had to shake itself free of the lingering embrace of non-alignment and its many negative perceptions of American policy during and after the Cold War, which left an image of US hostility in Indian historical memory. India recognized that its long-standing problems with China and Pakistan could not be completely settled, and definitely not by military force. India had won two military engagements against Pakistan and split Pakistan into two in 1971, but neither that nor a complete hypothetical incorporation of Pakistan into India would lead to any lasting peace or security. New Delhi therefore fell back on a containment policy along with peaceful diplomacy and economic cooperation — this being a much more European model than the US approach in dealing with international problems.

New Delhi was prepared to enter into partnerships with major powers, whether the former Soviet Union or today’s US, provided that India was not relegated to a junior partner and there was no obligation to follow the major power’s lead in all matters of foreign policy. Thus US policy in various theatres of the world was resisted — though remarkably, of the numerous countries canvassed, only the American and Indian public according to a Pew poll in 2005 thought that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq constituted a threat to world peace. India was ready to accommodate itself to the Bush doctrine but wanted to continue the right to challenge US hegemony peacefully as it had done for past decades. As far as India was concerned, the Washington-New Delhi engagement was a partnership of equals that fulfilled India’s basic expectations.

Washington for its part is well aware of the limitations of strategic partnerships with any country in south Asia. In terms of hard power, neither India nor Pakistan comes anywhere near a position of challenging the US; but neither is willing to cooperate with it on the basis of Washington’s diktat. In its quest for allies, the US has opted simultaneously for both rivals — Pakistan to bring peace to Afghanistan and India as a counter-weight to contain China. This strategy has failed before and will fail again.

Before and after the Bush doctrine was enunciated, India should have understood that the US claimed new rights of self-defence for itself but refused to permit them to others. After the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, the US intervened to prevent any Indian retaliation against terrorist camps in Pakistan since the position of its protégé, Pervez Musharraf, had to be sustained. Collateral American pressure on Islamabad resulted in the house arrest of some extremist leaders but the organizations they represented were quickly renamed and continued to be as active as before. In other words, the war on terror ended when Indian interests, as opposed to American objectives, were the issue. This is exactly the same scenario that unfolds today, except there have been some American casualties and this time the evidence against Pakistan, including that compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is conclusive.

The impact of terrorism has brought the US back to this region again, though it may again be only for the short term. Washington knows that in Afghanistan it is dealing with symptoms that have their roots deep in Pakistan’s instability, which breeds extremism and militancy. Pakistan has close links with the Taliban and to an extent with al Qaida: it had incubated the Taliban and later supported its regime in Kabul, partly through the agency of the Inter-Services Intelligence, which closely collaborated with al Qaida. Pakistan was forced to fall in line when Washington decided to oust these groups from Afghanistan, with the result that Islamabad lost the safety of a hinterland. During the US invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11, hundreds of Pakistani military advisers who had been working with the Taliban had been flown out of Kunduz along with the leading lights of the Taliban and al Qaida before the Northern Alliance was allowed to attack. Not surprisingly, the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan then became a safe haven for these extremist elements.

By almost every definition, Pakistan is a rogue state and a crucial link in the axis of evil. A.Q. Khan, the progenitor of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, is the only connection between North Korea, Iran and Libya, selling and buying nuclear expertise and material for and from countries seen as threats to the US. But Khan and his helpers have never been sent to prison in Pakistan or in the US. The US had many opportunities since 1975, when Khan stole centrifuge secrets in the Netherlands, to stop Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, but chose not to take action because Pakistan was needed as a base to weaken the USSR.

Three major threats are located in Pakistan — nuclear proliferation, international terrorism and the production and trade of narcotics. As long as the US needs partners like Pakistan, there is little credibility in Washington’s assertions of moral leadership or global hegemony. So Pakistan is the ultimate challenge for the Bush doctrine, at the same time as it becomes more and more dependent on US aid for its very existence.

Pakistan plays a double game, supporting the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan half-heartedly while protecting the remnants of al Qaida and the Taliban at home, creating armed challenges to the elected Karzai government in Kabul, and sponsoring violence and terror against India. Militants can count on Pakistani intelligence and logistics because the Pakistani authorities have to cooperate with the extremists and leave their State-sponsored terrorists at least one battlefield if they want to prevent these same terrorists turning the gun against the Islamabad regime.

When US pressure becomes too strong, Pakistan initiates expeditions in the frontier area or imprisons B-list terrorists. The civilian authority in Islamabad is keeping its head down and options open till the storm blows over, and Micawber-like, waiting for something to turn up. Whether Pakistan is willing and able to cure its inner disease, stay away from jihad in its foreign policy, and accept its just or unjust borders together with its status in south Asia will determine its future destiny as a nation state.