“Geo-strategy” is a term used so often that it may be worth examining it a little closely. The concept assumes an organic link between geography and strategy. Geography is supposed to be, in specific situations, an imperative in shaping the strategies of countries. How valid and determining is the aspect of geography in fashioning security policies in contemporary conditions? Does this traditional concept have relevance today in determining core security approaches by countries? Can it be said that geo-strategy today is, ironically, essentially “geo-tactical”?

Until the invention of nuclear weapons, geography — in terms of natural features, location, distance, terrain, and so on — may have mattered. But the invention of weapons of mass destruction has made the barriers of geography irrelevant. With air power, these weapons can be used at great distances. But their destructive reach has become global with the development of ballistic missiles that can deliver them from one point on the planet to another, crossing mountains, deserts, rivers and oceans within minutes. No natural barrier is a protection, nor is distance. Even countries not directly involved in a conflict and, indeed, wishing to remain aloof from it, may find themselves in the throes of annihilation with an all-out nuclear war. The appearance of these weapons is, in essence, the end of geo-strategy. Annihilation negates geo-strategy.

The development of sea-based nuclear weapons erodes even further geo-strategic calculations. Unlike land-based weapons, which are relatively more vulnerable, especially on fixed sites, and even on mobile ones, sea-based weapons are far more difficult to detect and therefore more potent as a threat. Nuclear-powered submarines can roam the world’s oceans with their deadly arsenals and overcome any geographical limits with their long-range missiles. Not surprisingly, France has eliminated its land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles as part of rationalizing its nuclear arsenal, and is relying on its sea-based capability as a deterrent. In our case, too, our real deterrent capability will be established once we acquire adequate sea-based capability and complete the triad of nuclear weaponry that we intend to have eventually.

Missiles render geo-strategic thinking largely obsolete. North Korean missiles have effectively neutralized the United States of America’s immeasurably greater conventional and nuclear capability, not to mention the advantage of being physically present next door in South Korea, in strategic terms. The US is compelled to deal with North Korea politically, unlike in the case of Iraq. Similarly, Iran’s developing capabilities threaten the viability of the normal strategic calculations of those who wish to control the politics, economics and resources of this region. Iran’s geographical relationship to the region has not changed, but its striving for nuclear capability and development of medium-range missiles alter its power projection capacity. Besides, ballistic missiles go through space, and space does not fit into any notion of geography. Space-based defences against missiles do require stationing of radar and other components at various points on the globe, and both geography and politics may condition the choice of these locations. But the threat and the response to it are governed by space and not geography.

Geo-strategy loses its salience also in the context of new threats, such as those of terrorism, for instance. What is the geo-strategy of dealing with terrorism? There could be one theoretically if terrorism were, or could, be confined, to a limited geographical space that might be controlled. But terrorism is widespread, and with globalization and modern means of communication, its operational range in terms of incitement and physical and financial support is vast. Terrorism is not only a physical phenomenon; it is also a state of mind. It is rooted in extremist religious thinking. It is a network of non-state actors operating across many nations. The potency of the threat is such that it can destabilize societies seriously. It can also pose a serious challenge to standing armies, as the US and others have discovered in Iraq and now in Afghanistan.

Cyber-security is another challenge that escapes the framework of geo-strategy. As modern military systems rely more and more on satellite-based technology and modern societies at large are heavily wired, the ability to conduct cyber-warfare is a potent weapon. The Chinese are developing this capability in a massive way, going by reports, as a form of asymmetric warfare. The US Strategic Command at Omaha is reportedly devoting as much attention to cyber warfare as to the US’s strategic arsenal.

If nuclear weapons and missiles have rendered the traditional concept of geo-strategy obsolete, in conventional-level power rivalries of a local nature, geo-strategic considerations can be relevant. All the more so as the use of nuclear weapons is practically impossible and thresholds of their use have to be kept as high as possible. For example, the Himalayas are no longer an impregnable barrier protecting us from the north, yet our effort has to be to prevent the Chinese from positioning themselves physically south of the Himalayan chain. The control of mountain-passes remains important. Siachen has to be retained, in part, to prevent further linking-up between Pakistan and China in the Karakoram Pass area. Nepal and Bhutan are geo-strategically important to us as buffers with China. Our military strategy towards Pakistan is conditioned by the geography of the Punjab plains and the desert in Sindh.

We need to be present in Afghanistan as it is Pakistan’s geographic neighbour in the west, besides being a gateway to central Asia for us. Iran, too, is geographically important as a transit country for access to Afghanistan and potentially to Central Asia and southern Russia. Myanmar is important for preventing us from being outflanked by the Chinese in the East. Given our interests in the Indian Ocean area, we have a geo-strategic interest in preventing China from expanding its presence there through acquisition of bases in friendly littoral countries. The Andaman Islands give us the possibility to dominate naval movements in and out of the Malacca Straits, for example, which is a major choke point. Iran can easily disrupt crucial oil traffic in the Straits of Hormuz, another of the world’s vital choke points, and cause chaos in the global oil markets. North Korea can unleash its conventional missiles on South Korea and wreak terrible damage because of close proximity, inducing the US and others to exercise restraint in dealing with its military challenge.

The southern Caucasian region has become important for evacuating the hydrocarbon resources of central Asia without transiting through Russian territory. Taiwan is a barrier to expansion of Chinese naval power in the Pacific and so has to be defended against a Chinese take-over. Diego Garcia facilitates the projection of US power in the broader Asian region. In other words, normal political, diplomatic and military effort is not excluded on the ground that possession of nuclear capability assures the ultimate capacity to destroy others or assure self-protection through deterrence.

Geo-strategy was an offshoot of the big power politics of an era when technology had not yet overcome the barriers of geography. In today’s nuclear-tipped missile and space age, geography has been transcended. The “geo” has been eliminated from strategy at the primary level, though at the secondary, sub-strategic level, it retains some relevance. The end of geo-strategy does not, of course, mean the end of strategy.