Two expert groups set up by the ministry of minority affairs have recently submitted their recommendations. The first group was requested to propose a “diversity index” to measure the extent of unequal access of different segments of the population to public institutions and to suggest what sort of affirmative action could be used to increase diversity in the country, while the second group was entrusted with the task of advising the government on the scope and functions of an equal opportunities commission.

The committees’ recommendations deserve serious attention because these are concerned with distinct but closely related aspects of social justice that have attracted a great deal of public attention in India in recent times. Perhaps some discussion of the background will help to put these recommendations in proper perspective.

A large number of countries have adopted some form of affirmative action to redress historical deprivation as well as continuing discrimination. Somewhat surprisingly, the term “affirmative action” was coined in the United States of America, a country not renowned for explicit government action to correct social inequalities. Despite its widespread use, the need for affirmative action has often been questioned, with opponents arguing that government resources are better deployed in promoting growth. Surely, if the size of the national cake can be increased, then everyone would have more of it.

Unfortunately, deep-rooted social prejudices are often so strong that they negate narrow economic considerations. The clearest evidence of this “truth” comes from the US, the country with the highest per capita income, where blacks are victims of discrimination. Labour market outcomes for blacks continue to be much worse than for whites and the disparities are so large that they cannot be explained by differences in human capital alone.

Perhaps the most telling piece of evidence of racial discrimination in the labour market was provided in a recent experiment conducted by two MIT economists, M. Bertand and S. Mullainathan. In response to job advertisements, they sent out resumes of hypothetical job applicants. These resumes were identical except that some were with black names (Lakisha and Jamal) while others had white names (Emily and Gregg). The applicants with white names received significantly more interview calls. Interestingly, the same experiment has been replicated by researchers in India (one of them being the current chairman of the University Grants Commission), with the identical resumes being that of scheduled caste and non-SC candidates. Again, there is overwhelming evidence of discrimination against the SC candidates.

The cornerstone of affirmative action in India has been the system of quotas in education and employment in public institutions, initially for the schedules castes and tribes, but extended more recently to other backward classes. There is no doubt that the reservation system, as it is more commonly known, has improved the lives of many thousands of beneficiaries. However, it is equally evident that the quota system has not been an unqualified success.

There are many reasons why the current quota system should be (at best) only one component of a desirable system of affirmative action. One reason is that institutions typically do not fulfil their required quotas either because they do not want to or because they do not get suitably qualified candidates.

But, perhaps more importantly, the quota system attacks only a small part of the problem. For instance, why should Muslims be deprived of any benefits of affirmative action? The recent Sachar committee report points out that Muslims fare only slightly better than the SC-ST group according to all indicators of development. It is clear that the Muslims as a group have benefited only slightly from the social welfare programmes of the Central and state governments.

The report of the expert group on diversity is refreshing precisely because its recommendations represent very significant departures from the current reservation scheme in at least two important ways. First, the committee does not restrict attention to just caste disparities. It constructs a composite measure of diversity which takes into account the degree of under-representation of different groups — according to religion, caste, gender — in all institutions, public or private.

So, for instance, the diversity index for, say, undergraduates in Calcutta University will record a high value of diversity if the proportion of different groups of undergraduate students is roughly similar to that of the proportions in the “eligible” population — namely students who have passed high school. Correspondingly, if upper caste Hindu males constitute the bulk of the undergraduate students, then there would be very little diversity.

But, how should the target of increasing diversity be achieved? By setting very specific quantitative targets as in the current reservation system? The diversity commission breaks fresh ground by proposing a sharp departure from this practice. Instead, it proposes that financial incentives be given to institutions by rewarding them for “good behaviour” — that is, for increasing diversity.

This is reminiscent of an important instrument used in the US to implement its programmes of affirmative action. Federal contractors who failed to take affirmative action were debarred from competing for future government contracts. The use of such incentives places the ball firmly in the institutions’ half of the court. “Improve and you will be rewarded (or not punished)” is the motto. During periods when government funds are increasingly difficult to get, such financial inducements obviously provide very powerful incentives to all institutions.

The equal employment opportunity commission is designed to ensure equality of opportunity. The basic idea is to provide a level playing field in which it is possible that some players might end up more successful than others. For instance, all children should have access to education. Of course, some will perform better than others. These differences in outcomes are more acceptable so long as the success is determined by differences in innate abilities and skills rather than because of birth in a privileged group.

Both expert groups suggest an institutional mechanism to implement these goals. The basic idea behind both is the setting up of an autonomous commission at the national and sub-national levels (along the lines of the Election Commission) that monitors the implementation of these directives as well as acts as the repository of data.

A commission is necessary because even when individuals observe violations of government directives, it may not be feasible for them to seek judicial redress given the backlog of cases in Indian courts. However, given the considerable overlap in the objectives of the two committees, it makes sense for the government to set up just one commission that will perform the twin tasks of monitoring both objectives. After all, once different groups are given equal access to public institutions, these will also be more diverse. This is amply borne out by the experience of the US. And there is no reason why a “commission for social justice” cannot achieve the same success.